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ABSTRACT 
Mark Readman 
Whatʼs in a word? The discursive construction of ʻcreativity 
 
This work begins with the idea that creativity is a problematic concept generally 
and in education particularly. I argue that it is necessary to shed a belief in an 
ʻessenceʼ of creativity in order to understand how knowledge about creativity is 
produced. 
 
In a review of different approaches to creativity I identify the ways in which ʻtruth 
effectsʼ are produced in scientific and popular texts. Of particular interest here 
are approaches and assumptions (expressed through language and operations) 
in the domains of psychology, education and the arts. 
 
A post structuralist analytical methodology, drawing particularly on Foucaultʼs 
work, is justified in relation to the significance of concepts such as discourse, 
ideology, rhetoric and myth which, I argue, are crucial in understanding how 
creativity is made meaningful. 
 
The primary analysis is of key documents from the last decade which have 
sought to inform education policy on creativity: All our futures (NACCCE 1999); 
Creativity: Find it, promote it (QCA 2004); Nurturing creativity in young people 
(Roberts 2006); Learning: Creative approaches that raise standards (Ofsted 
2010a). Attention is given to the discursive processes of authorising particular 
models of creativity in these documents, the ways in which tensions and 
contradictions are dealt with and the implications for ʻcreativityʼ in education. 
 
An explicitly reflective mode is adopted where appropriate, in order to highlight 
my epistemological development during the course of the research. This takes 
the form of ʻinterruptionsʼ between chapters. 
 
I argue, ultimately, that there is a case for only operating with the term 
ʻcreativityʼ in a reflexive, meta-discursive way and that this is a particular 
necessity in education. 
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1 Starting points 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Given that writers in the field of cultural studies often cite one of Raymond 
Williamsʼ definitions from Keywords before analysing a concept, it may be too 
much of a cliché to begin by quoting him here but, nevertheless, Williams sums 
up some of the problems with the concept of creativity when he tells us that: 
 
The word puts a necessary stress on originality and innovation, and 
when we remember the history we can see that these are not trivial 
claims. Indeed we try to clarify this by distinguishing between innovation 
and novelty, though novelty has both serious and trivial senses. The 
difficulty arises when a word once intended, and often still intended, to 
embody a high and serious claim, becomes so conventional, as a 
description of certain general kinds of activity, that it is applied to 
practices for which, in the absence of the convention, nobody would think 
of making such claims. Thus any imitative or stereotyped literary work 
can be called, by convention, creative writing, and advertising 
copywriters officially describe themselves as creative. (Williams 1976, 
p.74) 
 
This difficulty is evident today in all discourses which contain (or, as I would 
suggest, produce) creativity; the importance of novelty/innovation, the 
determination of ʻvalueʼ and the relationship between the descriptive term and 
the nature of the activities categorised thus. It is a central contention of this 
research that ʻcreativityʼ is not, and cannot be, merely a descriptive term 
because it is a concept and, therefore, when it is applied and used it is always 
implicitly theorised. A key research question for me then is  
 
• How is creativity implicitly theorised? 
 
In order to answer this question it is necessary to identify some contexts and 
examples in which this implicit theorisation might be teased out and made 
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explicit. It is also necessary to choose and implement an appropriate 
methodology which will make this possible – a methodology which is sensitive 
to the specificities of enunciation and signification.  
 
1.2 A problematic concept 
What is really intriguing about creativity as a concept, particularly within 
education, is that it is able to attach itself to different interests with a high 
degree of promiscuity; it is simultaneously bereft of and rich in meaning, and 
has a polymorphous quality which makes it impossible to pin down. (In the 
context of post structuralism this is, arguably true of all words, but I would argue 
that there is a qualitative difference between the respective stability of the 
signifiers ʻcreativityʼ and, say, ʻcatʼ). Yet, despite its instability there are many 
documents and practices which claim to have secured the term for the purposes 
of, promoting, implementing or assessing it. 
 
Creativity is a concept with a history, but it tends to be used in an a-historical 
way, as if it has the status of something universal and transcendental like 
ʻgoodʼ, ʻevilʼ and ʻloveʼ. It is this implicit disavowal of its dependence upon 
specific cultural and historical conditions for its meaning(s) that constitutes 
some of the implicit theorising of creativity. Even Williamsʼ etymological 
definition above, although it situates the term historically, betrays an attachment 
to an essential notion of creativity (“to embody a high and serious claim”) and, in 
doing so, presents a history of dilution, dispersal and abuse of, what is for 
Williams, a valuable concept. The implicit ʻtheoryʼ here is that creativity does not 
need to be theorised. In his discussion of Nietzscheʼs genealogy Foucault 
endorses a rejection of such essentialism: 
 
Why does Nietzsche challenge the pursuit of the origin…? First, because 
it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest 
possibilities, and their carefully protected identities, because this search 
assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world 
of accident and succession. (Foucault 1977b, p.142) 
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A comprehensive history – a ʻgenealogyʼ to use Foucaultʼs term – of the 
development of the concept of creativity would be impossible here, but it will be 
possible to identify some moments and discursive formations where it is made 
visible in particular ways and in addition to account for the ways in which it is 
made meaningful. The value of such work, at least in an educational context, is 
that it will constitute grounds for treating the term with a greater degree of 
caution and understanding when it is used as a learning outcome, an 
assessment term or a course title. This approach, of course, runs the risk of 
becoming stuck in a nihilistic mire of postmodernism and I need to make it clear 
from the outset that I do not believe in ʻcreativityʼ. This is a kind of nihilism, in 
that I begin with the idea that there is no ʻthingʼ there. However, as with other 
forms of belief, faith in creativity produces real effects – academic research, 
assessment criteria and policy, for example - and it is the production of these 
real effects that I am interested in.  
 
1.3 Comparable concepts 
Creativity is not unique in being a common sense concept which is problematic 
when it is pressed into service in a technological or operational context. A key 
concept for me in providing a comparative case is that of violence, because 
violence can be seen to operate conceptually in similar ways; it exists as a 
common sense concept – ʻwe all know it when we see itʼ – and has also been 
the subject of extensive social and psychological research. And the research, in 
both cases, tends to posit a particular definition, categorise examples on the 
basis of this definition and then establish causes through empirical work. Like 
the literature on violence, creativity literature covers a wide range of very 
different behaviours, activities and outcomes and argues that they all have 
something in common. 
 
In this sense, much work on creativity, like much work on media effects, is 
necessarily 'backwards'; in other words, it identifies a phenomenon (e.g. the 
ʻcreative actʼ) and then works in reverse to explain the conditions necessary to 
produce this phenomenon. The problem here is very similar to the problem 
identified by both David Gauntlett (2001) and Martin Barker (2004) in relation to 
the category ʻviolenceʼ. Gauntlett, for example, argues that the  
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media effects model inadequately defines its own objects of study – for 
example, very mild and very strong representations of violence would be 
bundled together as ʻviolenceʼ, as would the physical breaking of objects 
to achieve positive goals within the narrative. (Gauntlet 2007, p.5)   
 
Similarly Barker argues that  
 
ʻviolenceʼ is not an object which researchers have discovered, in the way 
that Australopithecus was discovered. ʻViolenceʼ is an arbitrary re-
labeling of behaviours, and then also of representations of those 
behaviours. (Barker 2004, p.57)  
 
And Schlesinger, considering the methodological implications of defining 
violence, offers an insight which, if transferred to ʻcreativityʼ, has the potential to 
undermine every proposition in each of the documents which constitute the 
primary analysis in this thesis: 
 
For to define ʻviolenceʼ is not by any means to offer a protocol for its 
study and analysis. We might agree on a definition but still disagree 
about the details of subsequent categorization and what is to count as an 
adequate method for assembling evidence. (Schlesinger 1991, p.7) 
 
My argument then, is that the category ʻcreativityʼ is as arbitrary as the category 
ʻviolenceʼ, encompassing activities as diverse as artistic production, business 
management and solving mathematical problems. Janet Wolff identifies similar 
issues with the universalising claims of ʻaestheticsʼ: 
 
…the task of discovering the essential common feature of a Beethoven 
quartet, Middlemarch, Vermeerʼs Music Lesson and Chartres 
Cathedral…now appears as both ideological and misguided, for why should  
they have anything at all in common? By a series of historical events and 
accidents, they have been taken to epitomise the received canons of the 
arts…and assessed in accordance with certain, socially agreed criteria of 
excellence. (Wolff 1983, p.17) 
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Barkerʼs challenge to common sense about violence is an explicitly political 
project – he asserts that the construction of the category  
 
…excludes many actually harmful behaviours by those in power and 
authority. It turns these into the “solutions” to those it doesnʼt like. And it 
dismisses, before they can even be posed, explanations of the re-labeled 
behaviours in terms of various kinds of conflict. (Barker 2004, p. 57)  
 
My challenge to common sense about creativity cannot claim to have equal 
engagement with issues of social justice, but at a time when there is enormous 
intellectual, financial and emotional investment in ʻcreativeʼ projects, it feels as if 
some kind of intervention is necessary. This intervention is, perhaps, analogous 
to Terry Eagletonʼs engagement with the concept of ʻcultureʼ in which he argues 
that “we are trapped at the moment between disablingly wide and 
discomfortingly rigid notions of culture, and that our most urgent need in this 
area is to move beyond both.” (Eagleton 2000, p.32) I would argue that we have 
a similarly urgent need to move beyond equally problematic notions of creativity 
and that it is necessary to investigate how the term is produced and understood 
in order to make sense of the practical and ideological implications of this. 
 
1.4 The rhetorics of creativity 
A key influence on this work (as will become apparent from the frequency with 
which it is cited) is Banaji et al.ʼs The Rhetorics of Creativity, in which the 
authors argue that 
 
the idea of creativity is constructed as a series of rhetorics: claims 
emerging from the contexts of academia, research, policy and practice. 
The purpose of such an approach is to help educators and practitioners 
to see more clearly how such constructions work, what claims are being 
made, and how they might locate themselves in relation to these 
rhetorics. (Banaji et al. 2006, p.4) 
 
I am clearly indebted to this formulation and I also try to maintain a degree of 
fidelity to the authorsʼ aims, in order to avoid sliding into nihilism and thus 
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damning everything done in the name of creativity. But although I see my work 
as responding to some of the prompts set out in this document (by examining in 
detail the rhetoric of creativity in policy documents, for example), I would also 
like to resist, or even reject, some of the questions with which it concludes. For 
example:  
 
Is creativity an internal cognitive function, or is it an external social and 
cultural phenomenon? (Banaji et al. 2006, p.59) 
 
This question, although it is succeeded by sub-questions which include 
references to cultural production, seems to be dependent upon an ontological 
premise of creativity, that ʻitʼ exists, that there is a real phenomenon which we 
call creativity. There is a similar sense of commitment to an essence of 
creativity here: 
 
Is creativity a pervasive, ubiquitous feature of human activity, or a special 
faculty, either reserved for particular groups, individuals, or particular 
domains of activity, in particular artistic activity? (Banaji et al. 2006, p.59) 
 
These questions are, of course, designed to provoke debate and to destabilise 
common sense about creativity and I acknowledge that, in the context of this 
document, there is a necessity for the authors to retain the utility of the term, 
whilst questioning its value. My contribution to this debate, my attempt to 
respond to the provocations in this document, is to move beyond its 
perspectivalism and strike a more radical pose – to argue that there is no 
essence of ʻcreativityʼ and, therefore, to ask what it is or how it is brought it to 
being is to give it a priori status. This is, in itself, a rhetorical stance, and a 
dangerously philosophical one for a non-philosopher, but just as atheists might 
call for proof of God before actions are carried out in His name, I would argue 
that the evidence for creativity has been adduced by ʻbelieversʼ who have 
designed procedures and tools which have (inevitably) revealed what they have 
sought. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to begin from a position of non-belief, 
and to do so constitutes a move which is both ironic and appropriate given the 
  19 
rhetoric of faith and spirit which obtains in much writing about creativity. Like 
Foucault, I am sceptical about this  
 
notion of ʻspiritʼ, which enables us to establish between the simultaneous 
or successive phenomena of a given period a community of meanings, 
symbolic links, an interplay of resemblance and reflexion, or which allows 
the sovereignty of collective consciousness to emerge as the principle of 
unity and explanation. (Foucault 2002b, p.24) 
 
The rhetoric of faith, which is arguably at odds with the discourse of science, yet 
can often be identified within it, is highlighted by the language used by those 
who seek to challenge the orthodoxy, such as Kleiman (2007) who suggests 
that he is now “agnostic” in relation to creativity and Wagner (2009) who 
criticises the “almost messianic formulation” of the word ʻcreativityʼ. 
 
My further contribution to this debate is to develop the application of Banaji et 
al.ʼs use of the term rhetoric in order to encompass the idea of discourse. The 
reason for this is that rhetoric retains the notion of representation and agency (I 
discuss this further in subsequent chapters) whereas discourse, without slipping 
into philosophical idealism, provides a way of understanding knowledge 
production and ʻtruth effectsʼ. The work (albeit, selectively used) of Foucault has 
been of particular importance here in providing support for a position which 
seeks to challenge certainties and identify the ways in which concepts are 
mobilised within particular historical periods. I argue later that Banaji et al. often 
use the tem rhetoric in a way which is congruent with a Foucaultian1 version of 
discourse (although they also explicitly state that their “rhetoric” is a “subset of 
                                            
1 I have used the adjective ʻFoucaultianʼ as opposed to the (perhaps) more 
familiar ʻFoucauldianʼ throughout this thesis. One reason is that this is the term 
used by the Foucault scholars I find most convincing and consistent – Kendall 
and Wickham (1999; 2006) – and it also seems to be the preferred term in the 
journal Foucault Studies. Another, although more tenuous, reason involves a 
reference to phonetics; the ʻvoiceless retroflex plosiveʼ, ʻtʼ, constitutes an 
interruption in the word, which is eased by the alternative, voiced plosive ʻdʼ. 
This awkwardness in enunciation, this disruption can, arguably, be seen as a 
way of drawing attention to the reduction of a complex body of work into a 
simple adjective.  
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discourse”) which is why I think it is worth developing in this way. At one point, 
for example, the authors mention the “discursive construction of creativity” 
(Banaji et al. 2006, p.24) – a conceptual formulation which is absolutely at the 
heart of this research. 
 
1.5 Ideology and post-modernity 
I am also influenced by a postmodern conception of ideology which argues that 
ʻfalse consciousnessʼ becomes ʻrealʼ through its implementation in lived 
experience. The application here, although almost certainly a gross 
simplification, would be that a particular concept of creativity might be contrary 
to oneʼs own experience, but through its implementation it acquires the status of 
truth and reality. Žižek  explains the power of such an ideological ʻholdʼ in terms 
of fantasy and fetishisation and argues that: 
 
An ideology is really ʻholding usʼ only when we do not feel any opposition 
between it and reality – that is, when the ideology succeeds in 
determining the mode of our everyday experience of reality itself. (Žižek 
1989, p.49) 
 
In the context of creativity, this might mean that it is perfectly possible to have 
questions and doubts about creativity, to acknowledge that there are different 
perspectives, yet continue to feel that there is something about creativity which 
is ineffable. I argue that this ʻineffabilityʼ is fundamentally ideological and that it 
affords creativity a particular value within a discursive economy; in other words 
creativityʼs mobilisation within networks of power and knowledge gives it, in 
different contexts, particular functions and positions in hierarchies. Judith 
Willamson argues for a similar theoretical position in relation to advertising: 
 
As a teenager, reading both Karl Marx and ʻHoneyʼ magazine, I couldnʼt 
reconcile what I knew with what I felt. This is the root of ideology, I 
believe. I know I was being ʻexploitedʼ, but it was a fact that I was 
attracted. Feelings (ideology), lag behind knowledge (science). We can 
learn from their clash. We move forward as the revolutionary becomes 
obvious. (Williamson 1978, p.9) 
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Unlike Williamson, I am not proposing a full scale ʻrevolutionʼ and I cannot 
concur with her equation of knowledge with science, or, indeed, her opposition 
between science and ideology, but I am proposing a modest revolt against the 
ways in which creativity has been put to work ideologically, hegemonically and 
rhetorically. This work is, at least, an assault on policy initiatives which are built 
around something which cannot be adequately defined and, in addition, an 
attempt to maintain some kind of critical opposition to a concept which has been 
formed uncritically. I am not sure whether or not I can claim that there is a 
constituency being ʻexploitedʼ by creativity, although, arguably, the modelling of 
creativity as something which must be purposeful and productive could be seen 
as depriving young people of ʻcreativityʼ as, for example, unstructured play. 
Nevertheless, the elision of a romantic notion of freedom and an administrative 
notion of evidence-based assessment and inspection in the documents under 
scrutiny in this research indicates that there is significant ideological activity 
here and that some kind of intervention is necessary. 
 
1.6 Research design 
As I have indicated above, creativity is a promiscuous term used in many 
different contexts and would sustain (and has sustained) myriad research 
projects. Some of the key objects of study for this research are prosaic – four 
UK education policy and advisory documents – but, as I comment below, it has 
proved necessary, in order to make some progress with analysing the signifying 
properties of ʻcreativityʼ, to seize instances of its explicit manifestations in 
discourse. In these four documents under scrutiny I suggest that creativity is 
reified, mobilised, operationalised and delimited and, I argue, that an analysis of 
the rhetorical strategies, ideological traces and discursive modulations is a 
necessary initial step in a larger project to destabilise ʻcreativityʼ.  
 
The design of this research emerged from a series of early failures on my part 
to identify ways in which sense might be made of creativity. My initial aim was to 
explore processes of identifying and assessing creativity, but I soon became 
convinced that such judgements were inevitably constituted by and constitutive 
of discourse and, as a consequence, the focus shifted to an examination of the 
production of creativity as a concept, rather than ways of accounting for it as a 
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phenomenon. Having committed to this position, it was necessary to identify 
contexts and examples in which this kind of discursive work could be analysed. 
Personal interests and enthusiasms drew me to areas such as screenwriting 
and advertising, and although it would have possible to analyse the construction 
of creativity in these domains, I was not convinced by the value of such work. It 
became apparent to me that in education, at all levels, the stakes were higher, 
the dependence upon evidence and accountability greater and that there was, 
as Burnard puts it: 
 
…an unprecedented resurgence of activity in the field of creativity in 
education as an area of scholarship, as a key element of the shifting 
policy context, and official agenda in relation to efforts to improve our 
schools. (Burnard 2006, p.313) 
 
As I argue later, the commitment in UK education to a notion of ʻtransformationʼ 
has led to an uncritical and unproblematic embrace of the concept of creativity 
(the rhetoric of which promises ʻtransformationʼ), regardless of relatively minor 
disagreements over how it can be nurtured and realised. This embrace has 
been reinforced and fuelled by policy and advisory documents, which is why my 
research has focused on four key documents from the past ten years. Policy, a 
word which shares a lineage with ʻpolicingʼ, is where we can find the production 
of boundaries and limits, the assertion of definitions and the prescriptions of 
practice. The term ʻpolicyʼ is itself not without variations in definition and use; 
Hogwood and Gunn, for example, highlight ten different uses of it (Hogwood 
and Gunn 1984, pp.13-19), but they acknowledge that  
 
If forced to indicate a priority, however, we would have to say that in our 
eyes the defining characteristic of policy analysis, as well as its novelty 
and value, lies in its prescriptive aspect. (Hogwood and Gunn 1984, p.3) 
 
Their recognition of the importance of analysing the prescriptive function of 
policy texts underpins my own choice of objects of study in this research; the 
four key documents I have selected are key examples of the construction of 
creativity in education, because they: 
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• Are unified by an inter-referential relationship 
• Reify creativity in order to make it implementable in education 
• Represent a move of power in the validation/invalidation of particular 
definitions and evidence 
• Draw upon a relationship with the government in order to authorise such 
moves of power 
• Exhibit a gradual shift from ʻdiagnosisʼ of creativity to ʻprescriptionʼ 
• Are characterised by contradictions and fractures  
 
I argue that this kind of analysis, although it represents merely a strand of a 
possible ʻFoucaultian genealogyʼ, is necessary before the production of 
creativity is investigated within specific local contexts, perhaps in the form of 
ethnographic work utilising approaches drawn from Actor Network Theory (e.g. 
Mol 2003; Dugdale 1999). 
 
1.7 Research questions 
As indicated above I have some key questions that this research has been 
designed to answer: 
• How is creativity implicitly theorised? 
• How is creativity explicitly theorised? 
• What can an analysis of key examples, such as educational policy 
documents, reveal about this theorisation? 
• To what extent can creativity be demonstrated to be a social, rhetorical 
and discursive construction? 
• What are the implications for research, policy and practice of such a 
demonstration? 
 
These questions underpin the work of this thesis, including the analysis of 
popular and academic constructions of the concept. The systematic nature of 
the enquiry will be spelled out more clearly in the section on theory and method, 
but it is worth noting here that the analytical approach to the examples under 
scrutiny has been wholly determined by these questions, and the examples 
themselves have been chosen because they seem to offer significant 
opportunities to identify the formation and transformation of the concept. 
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1.8 The structure of the thesis 
This outline of the thesis provides a brief overview and rationale for each 
chapter. It should also demonstrate the logical progression from each 
discussion to the next. 
 
1.8.1 APPROACHES TO CREATIVITY  
I begin with an overview of creativity literature or, to be more accurate, a more 
or less representative sample of different kinds of thinking about creativity. I 
approach these examples with the same kind of methodological framework that 
I use for the primary analysis of policy and advisory documents, in that I 
highlight rhetorical features, ideological assumptions and evidence of discursive 
formation. This chapter encompasses a range of approaches to creativity which 
include scientific, popular and educational expressions of knowledge and 
implementation, and I make any connections between them explicit. 
 
The exploration of such examples of thinking about creativity is a key stage in 
my selection of educational documents to analyse in more detail in a later 
chapter; it is through the discussion of these examples that my own thinking 
about creativity becomes more focused and I acquire a sense of what might be 
at stake and of significance in official formulations of the term. 
 
1.8.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (RHETORIC, DISCOURSE AND 
IDEOLOGY) 
I move on to discuss explicitly these three conceptual terms – rhetoric, 
discourse and ideology – in order to draw attention to potential issues, problems 
and contradictions in their use. This provides a necessary preliminary 
discussion before I show how these terms can be mobilised methodologically. 
 
I argue that it is necessary to retain all of these terms for the purposes of this 
research, but suggest that the concept of discourse is paramount. I also deal 
with some of the implications of using these terms as ʻcount nounsʼ and explain 
why they may be most useful when referring to broader conceptual terrain. 
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1.8.3 THE PRACTICE OF THEORY (METHODOLOGY) 
In the ʻmethodology chapterʼ I rationalise a ʻFoucaultianʼ approach to the 
analysis of documentary evidence. There are problems with using Foucaultʼs 
methods, as Kendall and Wickham acknowledge, commenting on the various 
qualitative research methodologies which have sought inspiration from his work, 
particularly Critical Discourse Analysis: 
 
This strategic use of Foucault stems from a combination of the extreme 
difficulty of deriving a clear methodological guide from Foucaultʼs work 
(hence his ʻrelegationʼ to theoretical inspiration, as opposed to direct 
methodological use) and the attractiveness of Foucaultʼs diagnosis of 
modernity (a diagnosis that chimes with a long tradition of critical 
sociologies). (Kendall and Wickham 2006, p.2) 
 
In this chapter I discuss my use of Foucault in more detail and acknowledge 
that I too may be merely using his work as ʻinspirationʼ, to bolster a position 
which seems counter-intuitive and seek validation for a critical strategy which 
could be seen as obstinate and perverse. But I try to adopt the principles 
advocated by Kendall and Wickham in their earlier work on Foucaultʼs methods 
(1999) and, when more practical tools are needed I also draw upon the Critical 
Discourse Analysis advocated by Fairclough (1989; 1995; 2003). I acknowledge 
that, given my embrace of some of Foucaultʼs methods, that my attempt in the 
review of different approaches to creativity to construct a ʻtaxonomy of 
discoursesʼ probably exemplifies methodological infidelity and I continue to 
grapple with some of the contradictions and conflicts; indeed the notion of 
fidelity is a recurring theme for me, which is probably appropriate given my 
focus on the production of ʻtruthʼ (or, to be more precise, the production of ʻtruth 
effectsʼ). 
 
1.8.4 ANALYSIS OF EXAMPLES 
The next four chapters discuss, respectively, the documents which are the 
focus of the primary research. These are: 
All Our Futures: Creativity, Culture and Education (National Advisory Committee 
on Creative and Cultural Education 1999) 
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Creativity: Find it, Promote it (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority 2004) 
Nurturing Creativity in Young People: A Report to Government to Inform Future 
Policy (Roberts 2006) 
Learning: Creative Approaches that Raise Standards (Ofsted 2010a) 
 
My project in this research is a kind of deconstructionist one, in that I am 
seeking to reveal how creativity is best understood, even in those places where 
it appears to be most explicitly fixed (or perhaps it is more accurate to say, 
especially in those places where it appears to be most explicitly fixed) as 
rhetorical play of signification – as unstable and contingent; Richard Rorty 
suggests that “philosophy is best seen as a kind of writing” (Rorty 1978, p.143) 
and, by the same token, I might argue that creativity is also best seen as a kind 
of ʻwritingʼ. By this I mean that the concept of creativity is constituted through 
the activation of particular tropes which make sense of, and mobilise, a whole 
range of disparate, real activities and processes. Some of these activities and 
processes are internal and cognitive, some are external and practical, but in 
different contexts - scientific, pedagogic, spiritual and artistic for example – they 
are all nominated as ʻcreativeʼ, and as a result of this nominalisation these 
processes and activities become meaningful, valuable, connected and useful or 
applicable. So can policy also be read in this way? Its discursive features can 
be remarkably anodyne – generally there tends to be a minimal use of 
metaphor, an avoidance of hyperbole (although this is less true in the advisory 
documents analysed), an air of responsibility which resists analysis. But it is this 
very resistance which means that we should approach it with the tools of 
rhetorical analysis; policy might be fruitfully read not merely in terms of what it 
says, but in terms of how it says it. Policy is not neutral, despite its attempts to 
create a transparency between sign and reality. By attending to the sign, we 
can see how reality is being constructed, rather than represented. And because 
creativity is an abstract noun, the need for policy and advisory documents to pin 
it down and fix it to particular manifestations or reifications leads, inevitably, to 
contradictions and fractures. It is the nature of these documents to be assertive, 
to produce ʻtruth effectsʼ or ʻtruth valuesʼ (cf. Williamson 1994), but the 
empirical, positivist paradigm, despite strenuous efforts, cannot support such 
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claims made of an abstract noun, hence the use of the rhetorical, poetic mode 
which is evident in these documents. 
 
I argue that the concept of creativity in these four documents undergoes a 
transformation from something inchoate to something defined by a set of 
prescribed practices, and that this transformation is not determined by the 
inexorable process of science and technology which uncovers the ʻtruthʼ, but by 
the exigencies of regulatory bodies which require something amenable to 
administration and inspection.  
 
1.8.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Here I draw together some of the key strands produced by both the narrowly 
focused analysis of policy and advisory documents, and the more widely 
ranging examination of creativity, and consider how the research as a whole 
might have some value and potential for some form of application. I suggest, 
cautiously, that I may have provided sufficient grounds for undermining the use 
of ʻcreativityʼ in education and for insisting that whenever it is used the rhetoric 
is questioned and the implicit theorising is made explicit. 
 
I advocate, generally, interventions in discussions about creativity in the form of 
meta-discursivity and argue that these should take place in the domains of 
research, policy and practice. 
 
1.8.6 REFLECTIVE INTERRUPTIONS 
The ʻgrapplingʼ I discuss in 1.8.3 is demonstrated particularly in the reflective 
ʻinterruptionsʼ throughout the text. These represent an attempt to introduce a 
meta-cognitive voice into this work, the value of which is to: 
• Chart my own epistemological development in this work 
• Make more explicit the reasons for adopting particular methodologies 
and pursuing particular lines of enquiry 
• Introduce an emotional element into the work 
• Create variations in tone; this is partly a rationalisation on aesthetic 
grounds, but also it constitutes an attempt, however clumsy, to make 
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more permeable those barriers between institutional categories, such as 
ʻanalysisʼ, ʻautobiographyʼ, ʻcriticismʼ and ʻphilosophyʼ. 
 
These interruptions provide a commentary on and an addition to the primary 
ʻvoiceʼ in this research and, although it could be argued that they are dependent 
upon a notion of the ʻselfʼ which is otherwise challenged in this work, they 
attempt to reveal how that self is divided, multiple and discursively produced. At 
best, they constitute evidence of internal dialogue which, for Falzon, is a clearly 
indicated and positive direction after a Foucaultian “questioning of the 
transcendental subject”. (Falzon 1998, p.5)
  29 
Interruption 1: Reflecting on reflection 
 
In traditional thinking, research is seen as an impersonal venture in which the 
contaminating effects of individual feeling and circumstances are scrupulously 
eliminated by the use of proper scientific methods. Impersonality is seen as 
defining the character not just of the researcher’s conduct but also of the various 
relationships which research involves…What is suggested here is not merely 
that real research is indelibly personal but that its personal character, 
thoughtfully worked through and honestly set at issue, represents its greatest 
strength.’ (Salmon 1992, pp.20-21) 
 
It has been a challenge for me to adopt this reflective mode of writing about my 
research; despite my resistance to positivistic, scientific approaches to human behaviour 
I know that I am tempted to offer analysis of my objects of study as if it were ‘pure, 
logical critique’. But given that my purported aim in this research into creativity is to 
highlight tensions, to tease out contradictions and to assess implications it would be at 
best ironic, and at worst negligent, if I did not apply the same standards to my own 
work. I will use these reflective interruptions to comment on aspects of my thinking 
about creativity and aspects of the research process (sometimes these are the same 
thing). 
 
Foucault’s work is a significant presence in this thesis and it is possible to introduce 
him into these interruptions too; responding to a question about the relationship between 
his “kind of philosophy and the arts in general”, he says: 
 
…For me, intellectual work is related to what you could call “aestheticism”, 
meaning transforming yourself…I know that knowledge can transform us, that 
truth is not only a way of deciphering the world…but that if I know the truth I 
will be changed…This transformation of one’s self by one’s own knowledge is, 
I think, something rather close to the aesthetic experience. Why should a painter 
work if he is not transformed by his own painting? (Foucault 2000b, pp.130-
131) 
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These reflective interruptions constitute an attempt to register this kind of 
transformation, to consider how my thinking has developed, how I continue to find 
particular obstacles insurmountable and how I reach accommodations with others. 
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2 Approaches to Creativity 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This section constitutes a kind of ʻliterature reviewʼ, or perhaps a ʻconceptual 
reviewʼ. My aim here is to cover some of the most significant approaches to or 
versions of ʻcreativityʼ via a taxonomical/discursive strategy. In other words, 
what I want to do here is create some categories of statements about, and 
concepts of, creativity and in doing so encompass a representative, but 
necessarily selective, amount of relevant literature, both academic and popular. 
This strategy for reviewing is consistent with my analytical approach to the 
subject, which seeks to reveal the significance of particular discursive 
formations of creativity, rather than to discover a notional essence or to suggest 
how it might be implemented. The resulting ʻreviewʼ will, therefore, be organised 
conceptually and will make connections between statements about creativity 
which occur in disparate domains. The advantage of this is that it obviates the 
need for several ʻliterature reviewsʼ, but enables sense to be made and 
coherence to be identified between literature and other evidence from 
psychology, neuroscience, popular culture, the arts and so on. The justification 
for this is also that, despite, what I call later, the ʻtechnologisation of creativityʼ, 
its status in policy and advisory documents is often underpinned by the same 
kinds of common sense that we can identify in non-scientific, non-educational 
and non-technological contexts. In the final section I draw together some of 
these strands in a review of education-specific approaches that relate to 
creativity. 
 
2.2 A historiography of creativity? 
I am continually negotiating with the notion that this chapter exemplifies 
historiographical work, in that it assesses how particular ʻstoriesʼ about creativity 
have been constructed. Regarding historiography, Bentley argues: 
 
The task lies not in providing an original reading or interpretation of any 
single writer or school but instead to seek freshness of viewpoint by 
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offering a synthetic account which searches for connection and 
comparison and which is not afraid to look beyond the subject of history 
for explanation of what historians do and how they think. (Bentley 1999, 
p.viii) 
 
The analogy is not a direct one, but my aim here, albeit in relation to work about 
creativity, is similar; I am trying to offer a synthetic account of what creativity 
researchers, advocates, users and critics do and how they think and operate. 
My organising principle is not a historical one, but a thematic or conceptual one 
– hence the ʻsynthesisʼ.  
 
However, I am no historian and the most I could claim to be offering here, in this 
context at least, is a very selective, discontinuous, recent history of ideas about 
creativity. This may be ʻFoucaultianʼ, but unlike Foucault I am avoiding making 
any ʻepochal claimsʼ on the basis of my findings; the conclusions that I draw 
from the diverse material in this chapter, and the more narrowly circumscribed 
collection of educational documents in a later chapter, could well be woven into 
various possible histories, but that is not my aim here. By avoiding such 
universalising claims perhaps I can also avoid incurring the kind of criticism 
which Merquior levels at Foucault when he asks: 
 
…whatever kind of historiography he was up to – the historianʼs one, or 
any other – Foucault was the first to claim that the evidence was on his 
side. Therefore, we can hardly exempt his historical analysis from the 
standard assessment of such studies. Hence our right to ask: are his 
interpretations borne out by the record, or are they too strained or too 
fanciful? Now while some of them are truly suggestive and even cast a 
genuinely new light on the historical evidence, many others are…just tall 
orders largely unsupported by the facts. (Merquior 1985, p.144) 
 
2.3 Categorising creativity 
Before beginning this work it is necessary to discuss how a set of categories of 
creativity or, perhaps, a taxonomy of creativity discourses (although, as I point 
out later, I am wary of using ʻdiscourseʼ as a ʻcount nounʼ) might be created. 
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Firstly it is necessary to explain how a discourse might be identified and to 
relate this to rhetorical and ideological dimensions. There is an excellent model 
for this approach in The Rhetorics of Creativity: A Review of the Literature 
(Banaji et al. 2006) in which the authors explain: 
 
By rhetorics we mean in this context a subset of discourse, characterised by 
specific properties: 
• They are highly elaborated structures, drawing on distinctive traditions of 
philosophical, educational, political and psychological thought 
• They are organised to persuade as a form of ʻcommunicative actionʼ 
(Habermas, 1984), seeking to bring about consensus, leading in some 
cases to intervention in specific contexts of practice 
• They produce discursive frameworks such as key terms and taxonomies 
which can be learnt by practitioners who either need them or are obliged 
to use them. In this way they feed back into more general ʻpopularʼ 
discourses of creativity. (Banaji et al. 2006, p.5) 
 
A key question in relation to this work is why the authors have opted to use 
ʻrhetoricsʼ rather than ʻdiscoursesʼ as the defining mode of expression. Perhaps 
it represents a desire to distance themselves from ʻcommon senseʼ or lay uses 
of the term to refer, with no critical criteria, to different types of speech about 
things. The statement that ʻby rhetorics we mean…a subset of discourse, 
characterised by specific propertiesʼ seems to reinforce this, as does the 
comment on methodology which states the hypothesis that  
 
organised, conscious, structured models of creativity, whether they 
emerge from policy imperatives, philosophical traditions or empirical 
research, are always mobilised, or ready to mobilised, in the interests of 
intervention in practice or policy and can be termed rhetorics as distinct 
from discourses. (Banaji et al. 2006, p.6) 
 
Whilst I would concur that many statements about creativity are certainly 
rhetorical, I believe that it is also possible to identify statements (and clusters of 
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statements) which are not designed primarily to persuade (which implies 
intention), but which instead produce ways of thinking and acting in relation to 
creativity about which we do not need to be convinced – which operate as 
ʻcommon senseʼ. A Foucaultian approach to discourse, according to Kendall 
and Wickham, begins by “the recognition of a discourse as a corpus of 
ʻstatementsʼ whose organisation is regular and systematic” (Kendall and 
Wickham 1999, p.42) and entails the recognition that “statements involve 
ʻthingsʼ as well as ʻwordsʼ”.  They counsel that “The crucial thing here is to avoid 
the idea that [discourse] is a purely linguistic term (as in most incarnations of 
ʻdiscourse analysisʼ).” (Kendall and Wickham 1999, p.35) To illustrate how this 
strategy might be more useful we could look, for example, at the way in which 
behavioural psychology produces creativity discursively, not only through its 
language and arguments expressed in academic papers, but through the tools 
which it has devised in order to identify the object of study, such as 
psychometric tests, and the administration of these tests in laboratory 
conditions. These processes are implicated in the language and arguments, 
and they also inform the language and arguments. Consequently I prefer the 
term discourse in its Foucaultian colours, in that it frees us from a specifically 
linguistic focus, although, regarding speech, writing and apparent intention, I 
will, like Banaji et al., inevitably, refer to rhetorical features. 
 
Gibson also provides a valuable analysis of statements about creativity which, 
unlike Banaji et al., he refers to as ʻdiscoursesʼ – “…a somewhat eclectic 
selection of ten discourses that all appeal to creativity to sustain their positions” 
(Gibson 2005, p.149), although his emphasis on language and the absence of 
an explicitly Foucaultian context for the term suggest that, in this case, 
ʻrhetoricsʼ might have been the more useful term. The example highlights the 
potential problems with using the term ʻdiscourseʼ – how one can easily slip into 
using it merely to refer to a disciplinary or institutional category of 
communication (I discuss these issues more fully later). It is possible that my 
aim here of producing a set of working categories, or a ʻtaxonomy of discoursesʼ 
may even betray a lack of fidelity to a Foucaultian project in that it seeks to 
produce knowledge in a reductive, expedient form, given its roots in scientific 
classification and the identification of essential common qualities between 
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objects (cf. Popper 2002). The concept of discourse, although it can be 
simplified as a “systematic body of knowledge” (Powers 2007, p.18), can seem 
as problematic in its own way as, ironically, the concept of creativity. But 
perhaps, if I operate with the term critically and reflexively it may be possible to 
hang onto it; the word ʻdiscursiveʼ has a relationship with the word ʻideologicalʼ, 
but is freed from the latterʼs connotations of Marxian theory and its association 
with ʻfalse consciousnessʼ. Discursive qualities of objects and actions refer to 
the networked, relative nature of these things, which make them meaningful and 
give them agency, but ʻdiscursiveʼ qualities do not necessarily indicate a 
predetermined place within a coherent order (unlike ʻideologicalʼ qualities for, 
say, Althusser (1977) and Bourdieu (1992; 1993; 2010)). So showing how 
creativity becomes discursively active as a concept entails locating it within 
particular contexts and identifying how these contexts create the conditions for 
creativity to be manifested in a particular way. And discourse, as a concept, 
enables us to see the relationships between rhetorical enunciation and power; 
power, that is, as a force by which meaning is asserted – through language, 
institutions and operations – not necessarily power as a notional monolithic, 
repressive force. 
 
In summary then, what follows is a series of categories – a taxonomy of 
discourses (despite my unease around the term as a ʻcount nounʼ) rather than 
rhetorics, but I acknowledge that sometimes the difference between them will 
not be significant and that my process of identification may sometimes be 
clumsy. I have acknowledged above that the notion of the category is inherently 
problematic, so I need to be explicit about the fact that this review is a work of 
construction, rather than mere registration and that I am actively involved in 
producing and developing particular categories by arguing implicitly and 
explicitly that they represent particular ways of thinking about creativity. 
 
The nine categories used by Banaji et al. (2006), in their review of creativity 
literature pertaining to education, provide a valuable starting point and include: 
ʻcreative geniusʼ; democratic and political creativityʼ; ʻubiquitous creativityʼ; 
ʻcreativity as a social goodʼ; ʻcreativity as economic imperativeʼ; ʻplay and 
creativityʼ; ʻcreativity and cognitionʼ; ʻthe creative affordances of technologyʼ; ʻthe 
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Creative Classroomʼ. I would like to develop some of these categories and 
introduce some of my own. 
 
2.4 Categories of creativity 
The term creativity is used in a variety of ways and contexts; the quotidian, 
ʻcommon senseʼ usage can refer to almost anything – sometimes it is a 
synonym for ʻartisticʼ, sometimes it refers to a kind of problem solving, but 
always it signifies difference from the norm. Some examples of this will be 
discussed later. The psychological approach attempts to pin it down as a 
cognitive function, whereas in the artistic context creativity is invoked as 
mystifying and alchemical. When it is invoked in popular contexts it can signify 
all or some of these qualities – usually aligning it with qualities of inventiveness, 
originality and artistry.  
 
Albert and Runco, in their history of research into creativity, suggest that 
concepts of creativity emerged from developments in secular, scientific thought 
and that  
 
…the debates through the eighteenth century…eventually came to four 
fundamental acceptable distinctions, which were to become the bedrock 
of our present-day ideas about creativity: (a) Genius was divorced from 
the supernatural; (b) genius, although exceptional, was a potential in 
every individualʼ (c) talent and genius were to be distinguished from one 
another; and (d) their potential and exercise depend upon the political 
atmosphere at the time. (Albert and Runco 1999, p.22)  
 
This suggests that there was, and continues to be, a degree of coherence in 
conceptions of creativity, but even in the field of psychology, according to Kahl 
et al.ʼs bibliometric study, “approaches to and definitions of creativity remain 
highly divergent.” (Kahl et al. 2009, p.1) Beyond this academic domain 
conceptions of creativity are even more diverse, although some common 
themes and discursive features emerge and are persistent. Despite Albert and 
Runcoʼs assertion above that genius was “divorced from the supernatural”, for 
example, I would argue that rhetorical associations with mysticism, faith and 
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spirit continue to be evident, even in some of the policy and advisory documents 
discussed later. This kind of engagement with utterances about creativity 
represents a break from the sort of chronological, teleological story told by 
Albert and Runco (1999) because it seeks difference, contradiction and ʻmessʼ. 
Albert and Runco look for historical progress and a gradual, inevitable 
demystification of creativity, enabling them to conclude that: 
 
Now to close the circle. We have observed over its history that research 
on creativity is able to progress as science when, at times blind to the 
next step, it is empirical, as Bacon…told us science should be. (Albert 
and Runco 1999, p.28) 
 
For Albert and Runco creativity is a scientific problem, the solution towards 
which we have been working, through the Enlightenment and the period of 
modernity. An alternative historical approach is offered by Nelson who, with a 
Foucaultian inflection, argues that creativity should be seen as emerging from 
specific conditions of possibility suggesting, for example, that  
 
The emergent discourse also needs to be understood as a product of the 
new system of the arts arising in the eighteenth century, with its now 
familiar dualities of art/craft, aesthetic/purpose, genius/talent, 
creative/mechanical… (Nelson 2010, p.66) 
 
Although they may adduce similar material, the respective perspectives of 
Albert and Runco and Nelson are significantly different; the former seek to show 
how understanding of creativity became increasingly sophisticated through 
scientific and philosophical progress, whereas the latter seeks to demonstrate 
how the concept of creativity has been dependent upon specific historical 
conditions. It seems like a subtle distinction, but the fundamental difference lies 
in the respective investments in a notional essence of creativity; I share 
Nelsonʼs resistance to the notion of such an essence and this underpins my 
research. 
 
  38 
The following review of different approaches is necessarily selective, but 
provides reasonably extensive coverage by being organised into sections which 
represent some of the key approaches to creativity. Some approaches focus on 
origins and processes, some on products and some on reception and 
interpretation. Some literature has been included if terms such as ʻgeniusʼ, ʻartʼ 
and ʻcultureʼ appear to be used synonymously (or metonymically) with creativity, 
even if the term itself is not used. It will become apparent that all of the 
approaches to creativity, with the exception of the sociological concept of 
attribution, take as a starting point the notion that creativity exists as a trait, a 
state or a quality and that, therefore, the project becomes to identify its nature in 
order to realise its conditions of production. In this sense creativity research, 
analysis and commentary are not dissimilar to alchemy; all seek the conditions 
for recognising and producing ʻgoldʼ. 
 
2.4.1 CREATIVITY AS A SPECIALISED FORM OF HUMAN PRODUCTION 
This category could equally be called, as Banaji et al. (2006) do, ʻcreative 
geniusʼ, as it explores the ways in which the persona of the creative individual is 
constructed. This conception, I would argue, is a familiar one, which underpins 
many of the ʻcasual instancesʼ of creativity in the later section of this chapter 
and which also represents the starting point for much creativity research (for 
example: Gardner 1993; Gruber and Wallace 1999; Martindale 1999; Houtz et 
al. 2003; Simonton 1999).  Consequently I will illustrate this particular 
conception through a primary focus on Storrʼs work which takes the exceptional 
individual as the sine qua non of creativity. 
 
Storr (1972) is explicitly concerned with the motives of creative individuals and, 
in exploring this, reinforces the idea that creativity is the preserve of ʻspecialʼ 
individuals who produce something new, extraordinary and unique: 
 
…there are certainly some people who are gifted at drawing, or who have a 
particularly lively sense of colour, but who are not impelled to use these 
talents for anything more exciting than a holiday sketch book or the 
decoration of a house…in spite of their endowments, they do not express 
their day-dreams in creative fashion. (Storr 1972, p.50) 
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For Storr, then, creativity is the sign of elite endeavour and that evidence of this 
is provided by the production of remarkable, extraordinary work. Storrʼs work is 
a detailed analysis of creative impulses and manifestations using an explicitly 
Freudian framework; it seeks to explain why some people are creative, or driven 
to be creative: 
 
Creativity is one mode adopted by gifted people of coming to terms with, 
finding symbolic solutions for, the internal tensions and dissociations 
from which all human beings suffer in varying degree. The less gifted find 
other, less obviously creative solutions; but are equally debarred from 
obtaining the whole of their satisfaction in life from instinctual expression. 
(Storr 1972, p.252) 
 
Storrʼs treatment of creativity as symptom (and therapy) will be referred to in a 
later section, but here it is worth noting that his category of “gifted people” has 
been produced by enlisting a canon of artists and scientists who have achieved 
high status. This list includes, for example: Ian Fleming; van Gogh; Conrad; 
Rossini; Mozart; Schubert; Brahms; Beethoven; Thackerey; Darwin; Chopin; 
Einstein; Keats; Strindberg; and Baudelaire. These people are self-evidently 
creative (Storr does not provide any criteria for their inclusion) because of their 
canonical status, and therefore the questions which seem inevitable and natural 
are to do with why these people were driven to be creative, rather than in what 
sense they could be called creative. Implicit here is the notion that these people 
are creative because they have been recognised as being creative. This is not a 
sound starting point, philosophically or logically, but it enables Storr to focus on 
the psychopathology of these individuals. The ensuing shared catalogue of 
sublimated desires, wish fulfilments and neuroses seems to justify the selection 
of this group of creative people. It is probably not a conscious rhetorical 
strategy, but this process of ʻworking backwardsʼ from a tenuous starting point 
and the subsequent sense of circular logic seems to be characteristic of writing 
about creativity; we can certainly find instances of it in some of the education 
documents analysed later. Having established the psychopathology of the 
creative individual Storr is able to include a chapter on Einstein without even 
addressing the shift from arts to science: 
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To label as schizoid a man so universally admired as Albert Einstein is to 
court attack from the psychologically naïve. Yet Einstein provides the 
supreme example of how schizoid detachment can be put to creative 
use. (Storr 1972, p.85) 
 
Thus the conditions are created for extraordinary people in any field with 
particular behavioural traits to be categorised as creative. It is a subtle work of 
classification because, like something involving sleight of hand, our attention is 
directed elsewhere, but we are left with a picture of the creative person as 
troubled, male and somehow ʻotherʼ. 
 
This is, as Pollock points out, bound up with the notion of the ʻgeniusʼ: 
 
The preoccupation with the individual artist is symptomatic of the work 
accomplished in art history – the production of an artistic subject for 
works of art. The subject constructed from the art work is then posited as 
the exclusive source of meaning…and the effect of this is to remove ʻartʼ 
from historical or textual analysis by representing it solely as the 
ʻexpressionʼ of the creative personality of the artist.ʼ (Pollock 1980, p.59) 
 
As Pollock suggests, what is missing from such accounts of creativity is the 
function of historical and cultural context in producing the category; creativity 
within this discourse exists outside and above such prosaic factors and the 
creative individual has an essential, special quality. Even Csikszentmihalyiʼs 
work, in which the importance of the ʻfieldʼ and ʻdomainʼ is acknowledged, is 
based on 91 interviews with “exceptional individuals” (Csikszentmihalyi 1996, 
p.12) and he attributes a high degree of homogeneity to the characteristics of 
creative people: 
 
I would say that the original contribution made by the person is likely to 
be similar across cultures, while the contribution of the field and the 
domain will bear the distinctive stamp of the culture in which the creative 
process takes place. (Csikszentmihalyi 1996, p.405) 
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Although, unlike Storr, Csikszentmihalyi is sceptical about the application of a 
Freudian framework to creativity, like Storr he has no problem in identifying 
creative individuals: 
 
There were three main conditions for selecting respondents: The person 
had to have made a difference to a major domain of culture – one of the 
sciences, the arts, business, government or human well-being in general; 
he or she had to be still actively involved in that domain (or a different 
one); and he or she had to be at least sixty years old (in a very few 
cases, when circumstances warranted, we interviewed respondents who 
were a bit younger). (Csikszentmihalyi 1996, p.12) 
 
This group of living participants does not have the same status as Storrʼs dead 
geniuses, nevertheless, some of the names are familiar and reinforce the 
validity of the list with their familiarity: Stephen Jay Gould; Nadine Gordimer; 
Oscar Peterson; Wayne Booth; Linus Pauling; Ravi Shankar; and E. O. Wilson. 
All of the intervieweesʼ names, together with their accomplishments, are listed in 
an appendix which, with the selection criteria, brings into being a kind of 
contemporary canon of creative individuals. This, as I shall suggest later in 
relation to a similar feature of All Our Futures (NACCCE 1999), constitutes a 
discursive operation in which authority is claimed for a certain kind of 
knowledge and achievement is equated with creativity: 
 
The in-depth analysis of these interviews helps illustrate what creative 
people are like, how the creative process works, and what conditions 
encourage or hinder the generation of original ideas. (Csikszentmihalyi 
1996, p.12) 
 
This ideologically rich notion that some people are simply ʻspecialʼ is an 
enduring one; even Boden (1992; 1999), whose work seeks to demystify 
creativity through “computational psychology” reinforces the ideology of the 
extraordinary individual – here with regard to “motivation, emotional 
involvement, and self-confidence”: 
 
  42 
Thus, we see a characteristic personality type of highly creative 
individuals, many of whom are driven, and in turn drive their associates 
even unto death: Florence Nightingale, lying on her sickbed, dictated (in 
both senses) to her male helpers, some of whom sickened and died 
under the strain. (Boden 1999, p.352) 
 
This elitist model of creativity is in continual tension with more democratic 
expressions of creative possibilities. Perhaps this tension can be understood by 
slipping back into a Freudian framework and suggesting that the value of 
creativity within a psychic economy is maintained by its rarity; if it becomes 
open to all it loses this value. And to maintain focus on an economic model, the 
elitist model integrates easily with concepts of and demands for originality and 
innovation; if the creative individual is defined by his or her ability to produce 
original work then they constitute a valuable commodity in a national economy.  
 
2.4.2 CREATIVITY AS ANY FORM OF EXPRESSIVE ACTIVITY 
The notion that everyone has innate creative potential and that, therefore, any 
kind of expressive production can be classified as creative is attractive in an 
educational context and to those who embrace a democratic, anti-elitist version 
of creativity; it validates the efforts of those “who struggle endlessly to produce 
original work, but who lack the innate ability to do so” (Storr 1972, p.17) by 
removing the need for any outcomes to be objectively ʻoriginalʼ or ʻvaluableʼ. 
 
For Gauntlett ʻcreative methodsʼ in an identity project are  
 
…methods in which people express themselves in non-traditional (non-
verbal) ways, through making something…So this particular 
understanding of creativity involves the physical making of something, 
leading to some form of communication, expression or revelation. 
(Gauntlett 2007, p.25) 
 
Freely admitting that this is a ʻcommon senseʼ definition whilst acknowledging 
the complexity of creativity, this is clearly a pragmatic move necessary in order 
to progress with a larger project. However, this notion of creativity obtains in a 
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much less interrogated fashion in the education policy documents such as All 
Our Futures (NACCCE 1999) and Nurturing Creativity in Young People 
(Roberts 2006) which will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. The 
latter “is predicated on a core belief – that all children and young people can be 
creative and should have access to creative experience”, (Roberts 2006, p.15) 
a statement which raises some key questions for creativity research, namely, 
what constitutes a ʻcreative experienceʼ? and does having one necessarily 
make one ʻcreativeʼ? 
 
Robinson endorses this concept of creativity, arguing that  
 
We all have creative abilities and we all have them differently. Creativity 
is not a single aspect of intelligence that only emerges in particular 
activities, in the arts for example. It is a systemic function of intelligence 
that can emerge wherever our intelligence is engagedʼ (Robinson 2001, 
p.12)  
 
and argues that it constitutes a social asset which must be harnessed.  
 
For Willis the priority is not to enlist creativity in the service of economic well-
being, but to champion the “vibrant symbolic life and symbolic creativity in 
everyday life, everyday activity and expression” (Willis 1990, p.1). His version of 
creativity is ʻwithout wallsʼ and inextricably bound up with a project to validate 
the culture of young people. As with the ʻspecialisedʼ category discussed above, 
there is a ʻcreative subjectʼ at stake in this particular discourse; the difference is 
that the subject here has low ʻofficial statusʼ. Willis, however, finds aesthetic and 
symbolic value in all activities of young people and argues, as Hebdige (1979) 
also does, for the active production of identity to be recognised as creative, 
suggesting in the process that this represents a mobilisation of power: 
 
Grounded aesthetics are the specifically creative and dynamic moments 
of a whole process of cultural life, of cultural birth and rebirth. To know 
the cultural world, our relationship to it, and ultimately to know ourselves, 
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it is necessary not merely to be in it but to change – however minutely – 
that cultural world. (Willis 1990, p.22) 
 
This inclusive discourse of creativity ironically usually entails a qualitative 
distinction to be made between different types of creativity, and championing 
the type which has low status. Craft (2001), for example, differentiates between 
ʻbig Cʼ and ʻlittle cʼ creativity: 
 
ʻLittle c creativityʼ is distinct from ʻhigh creativityʼ, which I take to mean 
the extraordinary creativity of the genius, in any particular field such as 
science, art, dance, mathematics, etc…The admission of new creative 
minds into a domain by the field is the recognition of the potential of ʻbig 
C creativityʼ; in other words, of the kind of creativity which actually 
changes the domain, they refashion it. (Craft 2001, p.46) 
 
This is a distinction similar to that which Barsalou and Prinz make with the 
terms ʻexceptionalʼ and ʻmundaneʼ creativity when they argue that “Whereas 
exceptional creativity graces a few individuals, mundane creativity graces 
everyone.” (Barsalou and Prinz 1997, p.267) It is also a distinction made by 
Boden, although she uses the nomenclature ʻP-creativityʼ and ʻH-creativityʼ: 
 
One sense is psychological (I call it P-creative, for short), the other 
historical (H-creative). Both are initially defined with respect to ideas, 
either concepts of styles of thinking. But they are then used to define 
corresponding senses of ʻcreativeʼ (and ʻcreativityʼ) which describe 
people. The psychological sense concerns ideas…that are fundamentally 
novel with respect to the individual mind which had the idea…The 
historical sense applies to ideas that are fundamentally novel with 
respect to the whole of human history. (Boden 1992, p.32) 
 
The key similarity here is that in all cases the ʻinferiorʼ form of creativity is one 
accessible to all; Barsalou and Prinz argue for a biological basis for linguistic-
cognitive creativity; Boden argues for the status of personal novelty in idea 
production; and Craft makes the case for personal coping strategies to be 
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defined as creative. But it is only this ʻdemocraticʼ characteristic which connects 
these different conceptions of creativity in any way at all – an observation which 
perhaps reveals the rhetorical significance of naming and definition – the 
recruitment of a range of disparate activities under the seductive and powerful 
protection of ʻcreativityʼ. 
 
Conceptually it is conceivable that the notion of ʻcraftʼ could fit into this category, 
but the relationship between creativity and craft is a problematic one, despite its 
inclusion in the erstwhile Labour governmentʼs category of the ʻCreative 
Industriesʼ (DCMS 2001), which includes craftspeople and technicians as well 
as artists in its retention of its 1998 definition of the sector as: 
 
Those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and 
talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the 
generation and exploitation of intellectual property. (DCMS 2001, p.4) 
 
But this is an expedient organisation of a range of disparate professions, 
including “advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, 
designer fashion, film and video, interactive leisure software, music, the 
performing arts, publishing, software and computer services, television and 
radio.” (DCMS 2001, p.5) Ideologically, stereotypically, the ʻcraftspersonʼ is 
different from the ʻartist; they are different kinds of people, they approach their 
work in different ways, they produce different kinds of things. The Turner Prize 
winning artist Grayson Perry, for example, referring to the low status of crafts 
(such as his own specialism, pottery) in the ʻart worldʼ, and the “over privileging 
of the idea” claims that “I often call myself, mockingly, a conceptual artist 
masquerading as a craftsman.” (Thinking Allowed 2008) 
 
In terms of their implications for practice and implementation these ideas are 
the most valuable for education policy because they offer the possibility of the 
acquisition of skills and the development of learning. We can identify versions of 
Bodenʼs ʻP-creativityʼ and Craftʼs ʻlittle c creativityʼ in policy documents (e.g. 
NACCCE, Roberts) and elements of Willisʼs celebration of youth culture 
(Roberts particularly), but they are in continual tension with the notion that an 
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emphasis on creativity in the curriculum will produce exceptional, flexible, 
entrepreneurial workers. 
 
2.4.3 CREATIVITY AS DIVERGENT THINKING 
This approach sees creativity as something beyond rationality and logic, hence 
the advocacy (at the extreme end of this way of thinking) of ʻrelease 
mechanismsʼ such as sleep (dreams), drugs (Stafford & Golightly 1967; 
Bourassa & Vaugeois 2001), surrealist games, automatic writing and 
brainstorming. Creativity in this context is dependent upon hidden areas of the 
mind, which creative processes and strategies can somehow realise. 
 
De Bonoʼs work (1977; 2007) utilises some of these strategies, such as the use 
of random words in order to ʻdevelop creative habits of mindʼ (2007, p.5) and 
the idea that creativity is a kind of thinking (ʻidea creativityʼ to use de Bonoʼs 
term) has led to the development of intelligence-type tests in order to measure 
it. Guilfordʼs ʻStructure of the Intellectʼ test and Torranceʼs Test of Creative 
Thinking were both designed to generate multiple responses to prompts which 
were then assessed in terms of fluency, flexibility and originality. (Plucker & 
Renzulli, 1999, p.39) However, as Dietrich argues  
 
divergent production is not a process…Rather, it is more an outcome of a 
set of specific underlying processes. This makes these instruments a 
dead end in the search for the fundamental nature of creativity. (Dietrich 
2007, p.23) 
 
This approach to creativity is one of the more accessible and ʻinstrumentalʼ, 
although it has been recognised that divergence in itself does not necessarily 
lead to a desirable outcome and that another stage involving convergent 
thinking may be necessary; Boden, for example, is critical of the notion (which 
she attributes to “some modern psychologists”) that “the more unusual ideas 
are the more creative ones” (Boden 1992, p.30) and argues that “creative 
thinking is made possible by constraints, which are the opposite of randomness. 
Yet many people see unpredictability as the essence of creativity.” (Boden 
1992, p.217) 
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Although the sorts of psychometric tests which might establish divergent 
thinking seem to have given way to more qualitative investigations in 
psychology and social psychology (exceptions being Fink et al. and 
Rubensteinʼs recent work described below, which both utilise tests of the former 
kind), the idea that creativity involves surprising and unexpected thinking and 
questioning has ideological potency and can be identified in to a degree, for 
example, QCAʼs illustration of how pupils might exemplify creativity: 
 
Creative pupils explore possibilities, keep their options open and learn to 
cope with the uncertainty that this brings. They: 
• Play with ideas, experiment, try alternatives and fresh 
approaches…  
(QCA 2004, p.11) 
 
However, as I discuss later, this divergent experimentation is always in the 
service of a ʻhigher purposeʼ and only valid if it leads to specific outcomes. 
Nevertheless, as recently as 2007 Fink et al. argue that: 
 
Recent research efforts in the field of neurosciences have expanded our 
knowledge about creativity to a considerable extent. Different frameworks 
and theories about possible mechanisms underlying creative thinking 
have been proposed. Basically, theoretical and empirical advances in 
these disciplines have – along with psychometric approaches – 
displaced the viewpoint of creativity as an unsearchable phenomenon. 
(Fink et al. 2007, p.68) 
 
Having established, rhetorically at least, that creativity is amenable to scientific 
scrutiny, the authors justify an approach which involves measuring brain activity 
during the execution of ʻcreativeʼ tasks (such as problem solving, story 
composition and divergent thinking). The outcomes of such tasks are rated in 
terms of creativity by the scientifically acronymic ʻCATʼ procedure derived from 
research by Teresa Amabile – a procedure which sounds less convincing when 
it is expanded into ʻConsensual Assessment Techniqueʼ and revealed to be 
dependent upon the judgements of appropriate observers.  
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It is research such as this which can reinforce the notion that creativity is a kind 
of thinking or a kind of intelligence; the apparatus and discourse of science 
produces a persuasive case for this. But to refute this and argue that creativity 
is something ineffable which cannot be measured is merely to substitute one 
discourse for another; the ways of thinking about creativity are different but 
exemplify similar foundationalism. 
 
Divergent thinking is conceived as a positive attribute and characteristic of 
creativity in the examples of above, however the obverse of this notion is 
exemplified in the conception of creativity as psychopathological, discussed 
next. 
 
2.4.4 CREATIVITY AS ʻMENTAL ILLNESSʼ 
This approach to creativity can be found in academic literature in the fields of 
psychology, neuroscience, psychoanalysis and also features as an aspect of 
the ʻfolk psychologyʼ (Bruner, 1990) about creativity. Prentky (in a special issue 
of the Creativity Research Journal: Creativity and the Schizophrenic Spectrum) 
for example, tells us that “Since the days of Aristotle, there has been a romantic 
notion that madness is allied with genius.” (Prentky, 2000, p.95) It is also a 
popular conception of creativity, particularly exemplified in a documentary about 
Spike Milligan in which he is repeatedly referred to as a “mad genius” and his 
creativity is attributed to his manic depression. The psychiatrist Anthony Clare 
imparts professional weight to this notion in the film and provides this 
observation: 
 
The manic...can be extraordinarily productive, be it a painter, a writer, be 
it a composer like Schuman. And then in depressed periods – nothing. 
(The Unseen Spike Milligan 2005) 
 
A recent interview with Milliganʼs daughter invokes the same perspective, 
commenting that at the height of his popularity Milligan 
 
was also having periods of manic depression, which fed his creativity and 
plunged him into terrible black moods. (Lambert 2010, p.2) 
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A psychoanalytical framework finds the aetiology of creativity in the early 
formative experiences of the individual; Freud attributes Leonardo Da Vinciʼs 
creativity, for example to the infantile formation of his psyche: 
 
In Leonardoʼs case we have had to maintain the view that the accident of 
his illegitimate birth and the excessive tenderness of his mother had the 
most decisive influence on the formation of his character and on his later 
fortune, since the sexual repression which set in after this phase of 
childhood caused him to sublimate his libido into the urge to know, and 
established his sexual inactivity for the whole of his later life. (Freud 
1985, p.229) 
 
And Storr, in characteristic Freudian mode, concurs that  
 
we can see that the persistence of pregenital traits which are usually, 
and pejoratively, labelled neurotic, may also promote the human 
tendency toward creative, symbolic endeavours and syntheses. (Storr 
1972, p.214)  
 
However, he doubts that schizophrenia can easily lead to artistic production, 
because  
 
creative work tends to protect the individual against nervous breakdown 
[and]… the acquisition of the skills required to practise an art, or to 
transmute an idea into comprehensible form, demands a ʻstrong egoʼ. 
(Storr 1972, p.51) 
 
There is psychological research which links, or at least explores the notional 
relationship between, mental illness and creativity. Rubinstein, for example, 
states that  
 
Many studies show that there is a link between creative ability and the 
risk of mental disorder. The prevalence of mental problems among 
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creatively gifted people is often, but not always, significantly higher that 
among the general population. (Rubinstein 2008, p.806)  
 
His hypothesis, however, (in line with Storr, coincidentally) that schizophrenics 
lack the “healthy carriers” (Rubinstein 2008, p.807) necessary to score highly on 
a creativity test seems to be borne out in an experiment in which three groups 
of hospitalised patients – schizophrenic, anxious/depressed and personality 
disordered – are compared with each other.  This research raises many 
questions, not least the categorisation of the patients and the nature of the ʻTel-
Aviv Creativity Testʼ used to ascertain their abilities, but, nevertheless, it 
represents a particular approach which reinforces a notion of creativity as both 
symptom and (potentially) therapy.  
 
Alternative, but related approaches, use cognitive psychology to provide means 
of understanding creativity, as Prentky says:  
 
…the crucial question is not whether creativity and mental illness are 
causally linked but whether our understanding of mental illness offers 
insight into the creative process. (Prentky 2000, p.99) 
 
And neuroscientific approaches may agree that creativity can be a symptom of 
some form of malfunction, but the cause is sought in the machinery of the brain, 
rather than the psyche. The case of Tommy McHugh, described in Rix (2007) 
and Giles (2004) exemplifies the sort of brain injury (subarachnoid 
haemorrhage) which is seized upon by neuroscientists and neurologists as 
proof that creativity is the product of particular physical regions in the brain. 
Neurologist Alice Flaherty attributes McHughʼs ʻmanic creativityʼ to changes in 
his temporal lobe and supports the argument by asserting that “Van Gogh 
almost certainly had temporal lobe epilepsy.” (Rix 2007) This view is not 
universally accepted, however, even amongst neuroscientists, one of whom 
argues that “There is no such thing as a neural center for a complex behavior or 
mental process.” (Dietrich 2007, p.25) 
 
  51 
This version of creativity tends to gloss over the differences between activities 
such as writing, sculpting and painting and avoids engaging with qualitative 
judgements about the nature of what is produced. Instead, it focuses on the 
obsessive, compulsive nature of some kind of ʻsymbolic productionʼ and draws 
comparisons with the supposed habits and routines of acknowledged ʻcreative 
artistsʼ. The idea is a seductive one, perhaps because it fits well with the familiar 
image of the tortured artist, for whom creativity is a curse and a compulsion. 
Csikszentmihalyi also mobilises this image when discussing van Gogh: 
 
…we should remember that a hundred years ago those canvases were 
just the hallucinatory original works of a sociopathic recluse. 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1999, p.321) 
 
From this position it seems like a logical step to return to Storrʼs notion that 
creativity can have a prophylactic function – the painful struggle as an 
alternative to collapse. It also provides a seductive and appealing explanation 
for some peopleʼs extraordinary achievements in which there seems to be an 
element of schadenfreude; it is easier to enjoy the work of, say, Spike Milligan, 
van Gogh and John Lennon, if we believe they were unhappy and sick – if the 
price they paid is one which we would be unwilling to pay. It also provides a 
psychopathological explanation for ʻextraordinarinessʼ, which exempts us from it 
and provides an excuse for our own ordinariness. 
 
This observation leads us to another approach to creativity – not a discourse in 
itself, but a theory which draws attention to discursive features in the 
constitution of creativity.  
 
2.4.5 CREATIVITY AS ATTRIBUTION 
Whereas the creativity project in psychology has been designed to identify 
mental processes that can be measured and qualified, the focus in sociology 
has been to identify the ways in which creativity is attributed to individuals – the 
development of a kind of ʻsocial reception theoryʼ in which the judgements of 
social actors are afforded the same kind of scrutiny as the activities of notionally 
creative individuals.  
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Kasof argues that creativity research has tended to be dispositionally biased, in 
other words it has sought to identify the traits of creative people and explain 
how these traits lead to creative work: 
 
Dispositional approaches to creativity…have almost entirely neglected 
the subjective reception of creative products – the evaluation and causal 
attribution of original products. (Kasof 1995, p.355) 
 
 Kasofʼs alternative approach is to suggest that creativity is a sociological rather 
than a psychological phenomenon; it is situational rather than dispositional. He 
identifies a range of factors which influence perceptions of creativity, arguing 
that particular conditions will make it more likely that creativity will be attributed; 
even the name of an artist is considered significant, causing Sternberg to title 
his rebuttal: ʻIf You Change Your Name to Mark Twain, Will You Be Judged As 
Creative?ʼ (Sternberg 1995)  
 
The criticisms of Kasofʼs approach by Sternberg (1995), Paulus and Asuncion 
(1995), Magyari-Beck (1995) and Runco (1995) all reveal a fundamental 
investment in an essence of creativity. Sternberg argues that Kasofʼs “article 
does not even deal with creativity per se, but rather with attributions of 
creativity.” (Sternberg 1995, p.367) Paulus and Asuncion take issue with his 
suggestion that “status cues and pseudonyms” might be significant:  
 
Are these strategies necessary or even contemplated by truly creative 
individuals? We presume that creative genius will be recognized 
independent of such characteristics. Possibly such accoutrements of 
creativity are required for modestly creative individual whose true level of 
creativity is somewhat debatable. (Paulus and Asuncion 1995, p.400) 
 
Magyari-Beck disputes Kasofʼs “agnostic” position on personal dispositions, 
arguing: 
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Perhaps I am not mistaken in my observations that most creativity 
scholars have found enough evidence for studying the disposition for 
creativity as an existing phenomenon. (Magyari-Beck 1995, p.84) 
 
And Runco is more dismissive, merely acknowledging that “Kasof…takes us 
closer to an understanding and prediction of acclaim and its correlates”, but 
insisting that 
 
I do not think that Kasof has helped us understand creativity per se. In 
fact, I fear he has contributed to a trend that is taking us away from clear 
understanding of the creative process…My emphasis is on the need to 
distinguish between the mechanisms that underlie creativity and those 
involved in the expression and reception of the resulting insights. (Runco 
1995, p.377) 
 
Runcoʼs rhetorical use of the term “I fear” may actually betray something literal; 
Kasofʼs article seems to have prompted a degree of fear, anxiety and hostility in 
those for whom the search for creativity and its “mechanisms” is like a Grail 
quest. The suggestion that there may be no Grail, that there is no ʻthingʼ, but a 
complex network of societal factors that sometimes coalesce into a meaningful 
social sign, must feel like heresy. 
 
But although Kasofʼs work has radical potential (discussed more fully later), his 
article does not entirely dismiss ʻcreative ontologyʼ; he refers to “creative 
behaviour” (Kasof 1995, p.322), “precocious creators” (Kasof 1995, p.319) and 
lists creative people such as Einstein, Miles Davis and Brian Wilson. But even 
here there is the possibility of quotation marks – the suggestion lurks that these 
terms are always already flawed and ideologically constituted.  
His work has explicitly influenced some later research in the ʻcreativeʼ domain of 
screenwriting. Elsbach and Kramerʼs research into perceptions of unknown 
screenwriters in Hollywood pitch meetings seems to confirm Kasofʼs theories of 
attribution; they conclude that executives (or ʻcatchersʼ in the pitch/catch 
relationship) make decisions largely on the basis of the way in which writers 
conform to particular ʻprototypesʼ and that they ʻ…often rely on cues that are the 
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opposite of those known to be correlated with actual creativityʼ. Although this 
particular statement seems to cling to a notion of some kind of essential 
creativity, the research constitutes a challenge to this:  
 
This finding suggests that having a perceived handicap (such as being 
unpolished) sometimes leads catchers to judge a pitcher as more 
creative than individuals who appear more conventional. This 
phenomenon might be termed the "Woody Allen effect" after the 
famously neurotic but talented writer, director, and actor. (Elsbach and 
Kramer 2003, p.292) 
 
This notion of attribution can be found elsewhere; Gauntlett also acknowledges 
the importance of situational factors to a degree, stating that “If Iʼm not known 
as ʻan artistʼ…we are then less certain about whether we can label my stuff as 
creative” (Gauntlett, 2007, p.24) and Csikszentmihalyiʼs ʻsystems modelʼ also 
recognises the importance of the judgements of the gatekeepers in a particular 
domain who will ascertain the degree to which an original and valuable 
contribution has been made:  
 
To have any effect, the idea must be couched in terms that are 
understandable to others, it must pass muster with the experts in the 
field, and finally it must be included in the cultural domain to which it 
belongs. So the first question I ask of creativity is not what is it but where 
is it? (Csikszentmihalyi 1996, p.27; emphasis in the original)  
 
This approach is valuable because it problematises common sense assertions 
about value and quality, revealing their dependence upon cultural contexts, but 
Csikszentmihalyiʼs examples tend to be ʻcanonicalʼ as I have mentioned above 
– outstanding figures in their respective fields – and consequently, as with 
Gladwellʼs  (2008) research into successful individuals, the theory feels rather 
retrospective and self-validating. The historiometric approach to creativity 
outlined by Simonton (1999) makes a virtue out of such ʻcanonical productionʼ 
and Boden (1992), too, views her “H-Creativity” as an unproblematic index of 
exceptional individuals. Csikszentmihalyi, whilst acknowledging the significance 
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of the social basis for the validation of achievement and discovery, considers 
that Kasof goes  
 
…too far, inasmuch as he views creativity exclusively as a process of 
attribution and impression management, neglecting entirely the 
substantive contribution of the person. (Csikszentmihalyi 1996, p.407) 
 
And it may be indicative of Csikszentmihalyiʼs disdain for this notion that he 
consistently misspells Kasofʼs name as “Kosoff”. (Csikszentmihalyi 1996, 
pp.407; 436) 
 
There is radical potential in a theory which focuses on attribution, which a return 
to a Foucaultian notion of discourse might help us realise. Kasofʼs discussion of 
how creativity is reported by “observers”, namely their tendency to ascribe 
causality to the disposition of the creator – even when the “endogenous creator” 
ascribes causality elsewhere (Kasof 1995, pp.335-339) – can be fruitfully linked 
with Foucaultʼs notion of the ʻauthor functionʼ, which Foucault argues: 
 
…results from a complex operation whose purpose is to construct the 
rational entity we call an author. Undoubtedly this construction is 
assigned a “realistic” dimension as we speak of an individualʼs 
“profundity” or “creative” power, his intentions or the original inspiration 
manifested in writing. (Foucault 1977a, p.127) 
 
 It can also provide an example of how elements of a discursive construction of 
creativity are invoked and reinforced, thereby being constituted by and 
constitutive of that discourse; Kasofʼs notion of “illusory correlation” (1995, 
p.326) describes the way in which truth effects are produced through responses 
to and reproduction of stereotypes and ideologies of the artist, for example. His 
set of ʻwidely understoodʼ and ʻappliedʼ attributes of creativity correlates with 
Soussloffʼs analysis of the concept of the “absolute artist” in which she identifies 
the discursive importance of the biography of the artist in the production of a 
particular mythology. (Soussloff 1997) 
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I have devoted a significant amount of space to this theoretical framework 
because it provides some valuable conceptual tools for the analysis of the 
policy documents later. The need to judge and attribute creativity is fundamental 
to QCAʼs (2004) assertion that teachers should identify creative thinking and 
behaviour and Ofstedʼs (2010a) assumption that prescribed practices can be 
inspected, for example, and these documents presuppose that such objective 
observation and assessment is possible. 
 
2.4.6 CREATIVITY AS THE ANTITHESIS OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY 
This is a popular conception of creativity and exemplified in the artist Billy 
Childishʼs manifesto for The Idler magazine which includes such aperçus as: 
“The true artist, by nature, is always an amateur and never a professional” and 
“The professionalʼs violence against creativity and the rewards for his cowardice 
must be exposed and finally ridiculed”. (Childish 1998, p.12) Less polemically, 
Anthony Storr demurs that “…the skilful technician can engage in the highly 
profitable occupation of writing music for the cinema; though at what cost to his 
creativity is hard to determine” and suggests that “most composers…rate film 
music as ʻincidentalʼ music, and separate it sharply from original compositions 
which truly reflect their own creative personality”.  (Storr, 1972, p.54) 
 
At stake here is a concept of the individual, autonomous subject – like that 
described in the section on creativity as a specialised form of production. But 
here it is starkly defined in opposition to applied, commissioned and even ʻcraftʼ 
works. There is an alignment here between a spiritual concept of the self which 
must be protected from the contaminating influence of money – a concept 
which, even if it does not have its roots there, chimes with the 
classical/Christian concept of ʻcare of the selfʼ discussed by Foucault: 
 
We see that Christian asceticism and ancient philosophy are placed 
under the same sign: that of the care of the self. The obligation to know 
oneself is one of the central elements of Christian asceticism. Between 
these two extremes – Socrates and Gregory of Nyssa – taking care of 
oneself constituted not only a principle but also a constant practice. 
(Foucault 2000a, p.227) 
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To know oneself, to be ascetic, principled and vigilant – these are all elements 
of an artistic discourse in which life, theory and practice are all inextricably 
entwined and stand in opposition to ʻselling outʼ and compromising oneʼs 
integrity. In fictional representations of creativity this opposition is also apparent; 
the narrator of The Love Secrets of Don Juan, for example, reflects upon his 
plan to escape from advertising: 
 
So I decided I was going to abandon the nine-to-five, Freddy's Fifteen 
Fruit Flavours and Yogi's Yoghurt Fizz, and instead of writing clichés, I 
would live one. Like many in advertising before me, I was going to write 
the great existential novel. I was going to abandon pseudo-creativity for 
the real thing. For art. (Lott 2004, p274) 
 
The distinction between ʻcommissionedʼ, profitable work and ʻauthenticʼ work is 
one which has been evident in representations of the popular music industry in 
which figures of soulless profit-driven executives are evoked and bands which 
ʻsell outʼ are scorned. In Ondi Timonerʼs film Dig! (2004) the contrast is made 
evident between rival bands The Dandy Warhols, whose fortunes change when 
they licence a track to Vodafone for a television commercial, and the stubborn 
and uncompromising Brian Jonestown Massacre. Mistrust of the profit motive in 
general and the music industry in particular is much in evidence in the film, 
summed up by musician Genesis P. Orridge who expresses a sense of the 
violation of the self – the rupture of mind and body – in those who seek to profit 
from creativity: 
 
I have no respect for anyone working for any major label in any capacity 
whatsoever in the executive. They're all liars, they're all mediocre people 
with no talent, they don't know talent, they don't understand or like music 
in any way whatsoever. I dread to think what they're like in bed trying to 
have sex, because, you know, their mind and body are not connected. 
(Dig!, 2004) 
 
This sense of the incompatibility of ʻartʼ and ʻcommerceʼ can be traced back 
certainly to Adornoʼs critique of the ʻculture industryʼ which  
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lives parasitically from the extra-artistic technique of the material 
production of goods, without regard for the obligation to the internal 
artistic whole implied by its functionality. (Adorno 2001, p.101) 
 
 And we can also find evidence of this opposition in George Gissingʼs New Grub 
Street in which “the struggling novelist Edwin Reardon, who believes in old-
fashioned literary values…has ʻnever written a line that was meant to attract the 
vulgarʼ, and he dies destitute. His opposite number is the young journalist 
Jasper Milvain, ambitious, cold, shallow and prepared to do anything for 
money.” (Carey 1993, pp.107-108) 
 
The concept is so embedded in common sense that it almost needs no 
explication; an interview with the writer and performer David Mitchell 
emphasises the contrast between his supposed wealth and the fact that he lives 
in “an ex-council flat, off a dowdy strip of Irish pubs and bingo halls in unlovely 
Kilburn, north-west London” causing the journalist to speculate “I wonder if his 
reluctance to upgrade the fabric of his life stems from fear of losing his 
creativity.” (Aitkenhead 2009, p.9) The presupposition here is that creativity is a 
product of asceticism and that financial and material wellbeing are antithetical to 
it – a position which Nelson criticises, arguing that: 
 
…it may well be that the contemporary valorisation of creativity, of the 
artist as loner/outsider – in short the ideal of a purer realm of art unsullied 
by economic or political imperatives – though superficially beguiling, is 
wilfully blind to its own ideological compromises, and impoverished for 
this reason. (Nelson 2010, p.56) 
 
As the selection of material in this section indicates, this discourse of creativity 
tends to be manifested in popular rather than academic texts, but statements 
which equate material poverty with creative potency are persistent. It is 
interesting because it constitutes an apparent inversion of the marks of success 
in a capitalist economy; here poverty is valuable because it ensures 
independence and, therefore, artistic integrity. Perhaps also it constitutes a kind 
of ʻnegative nurtureʼ and, therefore, is congruent with a discourse of faith in 
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which the ascetic must suffer in order to open themselves, and subordinate 
themselves, to God. ʻTrue creativityʼ in this discourse cannot be bought or 
produced to order. It is, of course, problematic in practice, in that this inverse 
relationship constitutes an ideal – an ideal probably best exemplified by 
narratives of artists such as van Gogh who endured a miserable, penurious 
existence and whose ʻworthʼ was realised posthumously. As such it is 
incompatible with the “Creativity as economic imperative” rhetoric described by 
Banaji et al. (2006, pp.30-34) and, therefore, has a curious status as both 
marginal and fundamental – marginal in any kind of operational discourse, but 
fundamental ideologically. 
 
This explicitly cultural formulation is distinctly different from the evolutionary 
model discussed below; the former is predicated on a notion of the free, 
autonomous subject – an existential model, whereas the latter posits creativity 
as an inevitable feature of organic progress – metaphorical in some cases, but 
actual in others. 
 
2.4.7 CREATIVITY AND EVOLUTION 
There are some explicit links in the creativity literature between creativity and 
evolution; Ward et al. tell us that: 
 
It will come as no surprise to readers…that humans are an enormously 
creative species. In a relatively short span of time, geologically speaking, 
we have gone from fashioning rocks into our first primitive tools to 
building spacecraft that allow us to retrieve rocks from other 
planets…There really is something uniquely generative about human 
cognition. (Ward et al. 1999, p.189) 
Claxton (2006) similarly, in an article which challenges stereotypical concepts of 
creativity, proposes a “ʻknowing systemʼ embodied in our biology” and a 
“layered model of memory” which, along with his use of the term “epistemic 
evolution” and the notion of “thinking at the edge”, imply an evolutionary 
progression towards greater insight and self-realisation which he labels “soft 
creativity”. (Claxton 2006, pp.355-356) And more explicitly, Csikszentmihalyi 
suggests that: 
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…creativity can be seen as a special case of evolution; specifically, it is 
to cultural evolution as the mutation, selection and transmission of 
genetic variation is to biological evolution. (Csikszentmihalyi 1999, p.316) 
 
Despite his use of the term ʻculturalʼ, it is probably more accurate to describe 
Csikszentmihalyiʼs concept of ʻdomainʼ and ʻfieldʼ as environmental given the 
implications here of inevitable progress and the suggestion that ʻcultureʼ is 
relatively unproblematic and homogeneous: 
 
What we call creativity always involves a change in a symbolic system, a 
change that in turn will affect thoughts and feelings of the members of 
the culture. A change that does not affect the way we think, feel or act 
will not be creative. (Csikszentmihalyi 1999, p.316) 
 
This positions and produces creativity within what we could call a teleological 
discourse – an order of thinking in which human beings are agents of, and 
subject to, an inexorable historical process of progression and improvement. 
Creativity is seen, here, as a defining element of that change – both catalyst 
and index; catalyst in that it brings about cultural shifts and index in that, 
retrospectively, it becomes a trace of itself. This latter function is paradoxical – 
the status of creativity is ascribed to something because of the change that 
occurred – effect precedes cause. This is better illustrated in Wilsonʼs 
description of evolution, to which he ascribes creativity: 
 
Three features of evolution conspire to give it great creative potential. 
The first is the vast array of mutations…All populations are subject to a 
continuous rain of such new genetic types that test the old. 
A second source of evolutionary creativity is the speed at which natural 
selection can act. Selection does not need geological time, spanning 
thousands or millions of years, to transform a species… 
The final creative feature of natural selection is the ability to assemble 
complicated new structures and physiological processes, including new 
patterns of behaviour, with no blueprint and no force behind them other 
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than natural selection itself acting on chance mutations. (Wilson 1992, 
pp.76-77) 
 
Creativity for Wilson represents novelty, change, adaptability, appropriateness 
and progress, and the ʻagentʼ is nature. The evidence for ʻcreativityʼ consists in 
the products of natural evolution, about which there is the assumption that each 
successive iteration improves upon the last. This concept of creativity, when 
transposed into a cultural context (as Csikszentmihalyi does) gives agency to 
humanity and the process of natural selection to gatekeepers. As an analogy it 
is seductive, but ideologically it serves to naturalise a cultural concept and limit 
the range of products (and associated activities) that have value. It also effects 
an elision between culture and nature, because it implicitly ascribes creativity to 
humanity as a natural, inherited trait from the process of evolution. Nelson 
identifies this tendency when she argues that the shift away from an eighteenth 
century  notion of a “fixed and immutable universe” towards “a universe 
unfolding within a metaphysical structure that is malleable enough to impart a 
new sense of freedom to human endeavour”: 
 
…gains its most characteristic expression in Darwinʼs theory of evolution 
– and no less famously, in The Descent of Man, the work in which 
Darwin aligns human imagination with a narrative of continuous novelty 
or invention. (Nelson 2010, p.67) 
 
The seductions of evolutionary creativity are evident in Kimbellʼs work, in which 
he cites Jacob Bronowskiʼs assertion, in his TV series The Ascent of Man, that: 
Man…has what no other animal possesses, a jigsaw of faculties which 
alone, over three thousand million years of life, make him creative. 
(Bronowski 1973 in Kimbell 2000, p.206) 
 
Kimbell goes on to link this evolutionary capacity with “the uniquely human 
qualities” that underpin design and technology work in schools. 
 
Nature and technology often work as binary opposites within discourse, but this 
teleological discourse (metaphorically driven by ʻdescentʼ and ʻascentʼ 
  62 
respectively in the examples above) effects a harmonisation between them; if 
we accept that technology is an evolutionary trait of a human-dominated era, 
then it becomes possible to see it as an extension of humanity in a creative 
history.  Boden reinforces this in an argument for making sense of creativity in a 
technological context: 
 
The creative strategy of evolution, you may say, is Random-Generate-
and-Test: new biological structures are generated by random mutations, 
and then tested by natural selection. So randomness, not carefully 
mapped guidance, is seemingly all that is needed for generating 
fundamental change. (Boden 1992, p.209) 
 
The notion of randomness, however, is questioned by Wolpert in his discussion 
of whether or not scientific progress is ʻcreativeʼ: 
 
What is so impressive about good scientists is the imaginative solutions 
they come up with. Perhaps the analogy is with chess – choosing the 
right line many moves ahead: to think of the chess maser as making 
random searches, like a crude computer programme is quite misleading. 
(Wolpert 1992, p.60) 
 
Wolpertʼs implicitly historiometric approach challenges the ʻcomputational 
thinkingʼ model proposed by psychologists such as Boden, arguing that 
 
One only need recall that Einsteinʼs discovery of the theory of relativity 
was influenced by his posing the following problem: what would be the 
consequences of running alongside and then catching up with a point on 
a light wave? Computers couldnʼt ʻthinkʼ like this. (Wolpert 1992, p.65) 
 
Nevertheless propositions based on the connections between technology and 
human creativity have been made persuasively; the next section examines the 
ways in which technology is discursively linked with creativity. 
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2.4.8 CREATIVITY AS A FUNCTION OF TECHNOLOGY 
Banaji et al (2006, pp.46-48) examine the different ways in which technology is 
conceived in the context of education. They cite a project in which teachers 
were convinced that digital video technology enhanced the creativity of their 
students because of its liberating potential, but note that the study found that 
the most 'effective' work was conventional and carefully researched. So, 
'creativity' is not an inevitable consequence of using technology, but, here, a 
result of awareness of the medium and “specific pedagogic practice”. 
 
The language used to sell computer software, however, is less cautious and 
often makes unambiguous promises about the transformative and liberating 
power of technology: 
 
Sony Creative Software inspires artistic expression with its award-
winning line of products for digital video, music, DVD, and audio 
production. 
Sound Forge, ACID, and Vegas software have defined digital content 
creation for a generation of creative professionals, amateurs, and 
enthusiasts. (Sony Creative Software 2009) 
and: 
Adobe Creative Suite 4 delivers tightly integrated software and services 
that measurably improve productivity and enable you to produce richly 
expressive work in print, web, interactive, video, audio and mobile. 
(Adobe Creative Suite 2009) 
 
Both of these use a version of creativity which is tied to artistic production - the 
software is 'creative' because it is designed to enable the production of images 
and sound. In both cases the software facilitates the 'expression' of the user; 
there is no contradiction here between the romantic image of the 'artist' and the 
modern image of the computer user - the two merge harmoniously. And in the 
case of CS4, the old contradiction between art and commerce - 'creativity' and 
'productivity' is also resolved, or at least presented as unproblematically 
complementary. 
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There is clearly something at stake in this representation of computer 
programmes – it is not simply that 'you can still be creative with technology' 
(and even this argument has not been universally accepted), but 'this 
technology will make you creative'. 
 
An alternative, satirical, point is made in Adam Buxtonʼs sketch show Meebox 
(2008) in which a parody of a software tutorial illustrates how ʻMoviemakerʼ (a 
“great bit of kit”) can produce an entire feature length screenplay after the user 
selects some crude elements (such as ʻa plot twistʼ and ʻcameoʼ). This 
representation of technology in the creative process embodies a suspicion that 
technology makes it easy for people to appear to be creative which is, arguably, 
related to Benjaminʼs (1973) assertion that mechanical reproduction of art 
destroys its authenticity and, ultimately, changes the purpose of future artistic 
production. Sennettʼs humanist plea for a recognition of the value of craft 
expresses similar concerns about technology, asking: “Is it a friendly tool or an 
enemy replacing the work of the human hand?” (Sennett 2008, p.81) 
 
Technologyʼs relationship with creativity in education is, on one level, an 
unproblematic one; given the saturation of everyday life with technology it is 
generally taken for granted that these tools and extensions enhance, enrich and 
enable creative endeavour. But the ideological resistance to ʻmachines taking 
overʼ constitutes the opposition to this acceptance, for it undermines the 
investment in the notion of human creative agency. To end this section with 
Margaret Boden again, her work simultaneously undermines and reinforces 
ʻcreativityʼ; it undermines the ʻromanticʼ concept by arguing that creativity can be 
broken down into a set of procedures, and it reinforces the operational concept 
by the same means. Boden (1992) argues that, theoretically, artificial creativity 
is possible because creativity can be conceived heuristically or algorithmically 
as a series of computational stages. This model of computational thinking, 
whilst antithetical to the concept of creativity as an essential human trait, lends 
itself to an operational model in education, where for Roberts (2006), QCA 
(2004) and Ofsted (2010a), creativity is dependent upon creating the conditions 
for particular kinds of outcomes to be generated. 
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2.4.9 CREATIVITY AS ʻQUOTIDIAN ENHANCEMENTʼ 
This is a category which would not survive scientific scrutiny, given that it is 
loosely bounded by ʻconditions of receptionʼ – in other words, these instances of 
creativity are classified by the everyday conditions in which they are 
encountered – on walls, in notes, magazines and websites. Nevertheless, I 
have become fascinated by casual invocations of the concept of creativity. By 
casual, I mean that the term is used as self-evident, it is not defined and no 
attention is drawn to its usage. I would argue that these instances of usage 
within ʻfound textsʼ are particularly valuable (like the definitions discussed later) 
because of their apparent ʻnaturalnessʼ and, therefore, ideological nature. This 
category clearly does not constitute a ʻdiscourseʼ, but it is possible to discern 
the discursive production of the concepts of creativity here. 
 
In the following example creativity is invoked as both noun and adjective; it is an 
article from the ʻWorkʼ section of The Guardian in which a young woman, Sarah 
Hallam, is interviewed about the nature of her media sales job for a listings and 
entertainment guide: 
 
One might be forgiven for thinking Hallam waved goodbye to her 
creativity when she “settled” for sales, but she says, that isnʼt the case at 
all. “Working in media sales for a good magazine or a good radio station 
can be so creative”, she argues. (Davis 2008, p.7) 
 
It is, perhaps, less significant that the article endorses the idea that “The 
commercial side of print and broadcasting offers plenty of scope for creativity” 
(Davis 2008, p.7), than that it is represented as so desirable; the assertion that 
the job is creative gives it value. Creativity here is constituted more by 
association than definition – the evidence of ʻcreativityʼ in the job itself is 
minimal and involves client liaison and advising on “what sorts of adverts they 
should use” (Davis 2008, p.7) – but the environment is described in seductive 
terms: 
 
The city-centre Leeds Guide office is a funky affair, all brick and white 
plaster, music blaring at one end of the office, posters everywhere. A 
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couple of fashionable types walk past with geometric hair and the MD is 
squatting down by a computer in the sales area. There is activity 
everywhere and if thereʼs something happening in Leeds, the Leeds 
Guide appears to be on it. (Davis 2008, p.7) 
 
These are the sorts of indices of creativity that would fit Richard Floridaʼs 
concept of a ʻcreative classʼ, which is built upon (perhaps paradoxically) a 
notion of romantic individualism and “peopleʼs intrinsic motivations” (Florida 
2002, p.101), despite his entreaty in the final chapter for the creative class to  
 
…evolve from an amorphous group of self-directed, albeit high-
achieving, individuals into a more cohesive, more responsible group. 
(Florida 2002, p.316) 
 
The sketch above of the Leeds Guide office activates a number of elements on 
the basis of which Florida might attribute creativity: the physical environment 
with the suggestion that it is a reclaimed, once-cheap, ex-industrial, revitalised 
space; the flexibility and ʻalternativenessʼ of work attire; the appearance of 
collegiality in the MD apparently dirtying his hands with technology; the 
saturation of the environment with expressive or artistic work; and the 
impression of energy, connectedness and excitement conveyed by all of this 
and the terms “funky” and “fashionable”.  
 
Given this information we might be persuaded, as Kasof (1995) would suggest, 
to attribute creativity to this environment and those who work in it. It is also 
possible that the employees may be persuaded, via a similar process of 
attribution, that they are actually creative and for this to become constitutive of 
their identity (as it seems to have done for Sarah Hallam). It is irrelevant to 
claim that they are mistaken or correct, but more important to identify how this 
particular construction of reality is produced and how its claims to truth are 
rendered. This fundamentally simple proposition underpins the primary analysis 
in subsequent chapters, but in the case of education policy and advisory 
documents, there is more at stake in the implications for particular practices and 
ways of knowing. 
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In other contexts creativity functions to convey an intangible otherness – a 
promise of artistry and taste. (Figures 1 and 2) 
 
 
Figure 1     Figure 2 
The names of these small businesses: ʻCreative Décorʼ and ʻCreative Lightingʼ 
respectively, suggest, through the mobilisation of the adjective that what is 
being offered is special, different and valuable. And although it is easy to mock 
such instances, I would argue that even in the official documents analysed later, 
this notion, however crude, obtains. 
 
Similarly, in Figure 3, the first page of a feature in Good Housekeeping (October 
2010) about “creating the right impression”, the interviewee  claims “Iʼm a 
creative person on the inside, but I donʼt look it on the outside” and achieves 
this transformation through a change of wardrobe. Creativity, here, is an index 
of self-worth and such expressions of it, Kasof (1995) and Elsbach and Kramer 
(2003) would argue, constitute a form of self-attribution. From a Foucaultian 
perspective, creativity here can be seen as illuminating the notion of 
ʻtechnologies of the selfʼ – the “inside/outside” formulation suggests that 
creativity is a force which has been imprisoned and which can be released via a 
ʻpower moveʼ against the incarcerating self, thus reinforcing the illusion of the 
autonomous individual. 
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Figure 3 
 
For the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “creativity is the lifeblood of our 
organisation” according to a plaque in its London headquarters at White City. 
(Figure 4) This rhetorical formulation, invoking a physiological metaphor, 
creates a false sense of tangibility; “lifeblood” has a physical presence, 
admittedly, but it is hard to conceive of creativity pumping through the 
organisation (especially as the “heart” apparently consists of “Audiences”, two 
lines above). The aim here seems to be, through the ʻbodyʼ metaphor, to 
construct the BBC as a kind of ʻsuper humanʼ and to invoke the notion of 
creativity as an essential human capacity. If the BBC is super human, then it will 
be capable of ʻsuper creativityʼ. 
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Figure 4 
 
An interview with Gwyneth Williams immediately following her appointment as 
controller of BBC Radio 4 elicited a similar invocation of creativity; in response 
to a question about how much she wanted to change Radio 4 she replied: 
 
I guess what I want to do really is build a more relaxed, creative Radio 4 
– try and add that to Markʼs [Damazer – former controller] sort of 
intellectual rigour – and make sure we add pleasure, surprise, wit and as 
much creativity as we can, because thereʼs so much of it out there, letʼs 
get it all on air. (The World at One 2010) 
 
When pressed for an example of this, she was hesitant before suggesting that it 
might mean “some more surprising commissions”. There is no body metaphor 
here, but there is the same “semantic aura” (Wagner 2009, p.1); creativity here 
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is more valuable when it is not interrogated, when it is allowed to be a non-
specific, desirable quality which infuses an organisation. 
 
An alternative representation of ʻcorporate creativityʼ, which ironically undercuts 
such rhetoric, is a cartoon from Harperʼs Magazine. (Figure 5) The humorous 
inversion of the rhetoric of freedom used by businesses to aspire to a notion of 
creativity (e.g. ʻthinking outside the boxʼ; ʻblue sky thinkingʼ) invokes the 
emotional, ideological opposition between creativity and commercial interests. It 
deftly activates the irreconcilable tension between a rhetorical, emotional 
concept of creativity and the demands for employees (and students) to produce 
evidence of this.   
 
 
Figure 5 
 
2.4.10 CREATIVITY AS EDUCATIONAL NECESSITY 
We have seen how creativity has been constructed in a variety of ways and 
subject to different interpretations and applications in a wide range of spheres. 
The launch of the Creative and Media Diploma in 2008 has been a catalyst for 
this research because it is a course with ʻcreativeʼ in its title and represents in 
some way, therefore, a reification and operationalisation of idealistic notions of 
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creativity which have been circulating in education for some time. It is a central 
assertion of this research that in the last ten years, within particular policy and 
advisory documents, it is possible to identify passionate calls for, positive 
responses to and, finally, regulation of creativity. It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine how this concept has been generated. This chapter examines some 
ways in which creativity has been constructed, argued over and lauded in the 
domain of education specifically, given its special status here; as Jeffrey and 
Troman argue: 
 
An international policy text now highlights the importance of 
creativity…Its use in education at a macro level is seen as unleashing or 
releasing human potential to develop western knowledge based 
economies. Within education circles it is a discourse that is liberatory in 
values in that it sees creativity as a way of developing a meaningful, 
relevant life for individuals to control more of their work and to take 
ownership of it celebrating their innovative activities. (Jeffrey and Troman 
2009, p.2) 
 
Discussions of creativity in education have historically betrayed a tension 
between a notional 60s liberalism and assessment-driven accountability and 
standards, a history sketched by Marshall (1991) who argues creativity has 
been associated  
 
…with the so-called progressive education and, in particular, the notion 
that academic standards have been sacrificed on the altar of the 
personal growth of the child. (Marshall 1991, pp.116-17) 
 
This tension is evident explicitly (as disavowal) and implicitly (through structural 
oppositions) in the primary documents which will be analysed later. Banaji et al. 
paint this vivid picture of: 
 
…the 60s stereotype – someone who provides a lot of materials and 
shouts ʻhave fun, enjoy, createʼ but then leaves the class to their own 
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devices without directing or evaluating, making suggestions or placing 
limits. (Banaji et al. 2006, p.50) 
 
The position of value and desirability which creativity occupies today is one 
which it has enjoyed for a relatively short time; David Hartley observes that 
under Chris Woodhead (the Chief Inspector of Schools from 1994 until 2000) 
Ofsted approved of “more traditional whole-class, brisk, subject-specific, 
directly-focused method(s) of teachingʼ rather than ʻprogressive orthodoxies in 
the classroom.” (Hartley 2003, p.85) Hartley suggests that a key moment of 
change in thinking about creativity in UK education was the publication of All 
Our Futures: Creativity, Culture and Education by the National Advisory 
Committee on Creative and Cultural Education (NACCCE) which argues that “a 
national strategy for creative and cultural education is essential” (NACCE 1999, 
p.5) and I have selected this document as my starting point in the primary 
analysis of successive chapters because of its significance in this context. And 
at this early stage in creativityʼs gradual, but inconsistent, shift from the margins 
to the centre of educational concerns in the UK, the anxiety about the 
perception of creativity as laissez-faire pedagogic practice was evident. Hartley 
(2003) identifies a moment of tension in the governmentʼs response to the 
NACCCE report in which there is an attempt to retain traditional principles whilst 
embracing the new:  
 
Creativity and the grasp of the basics are not in conflict. The ability to 
draw on a body of facts is an essential stepping stone to the 
development of creative thought which translates imagination into 
practical implementation. (Blunkett and Smith 2000, p.1) 
 
I will return to these documents in subsequent chapters in order to analyse 
them in more detail, and to address, particularly, how this tension is dealt with. 
The remainder of this section, however, examines some key examples of how 
creativity is produced in educational research, with particular reference to 
concepts of value, utility and cognition. 
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Recent pedagogic work on creativity is overwhelmingly positive about and 
uncritical of its conceptual and ontological status. I will not pretend to represent 
this work comprehensively, given its popularity and the vast range of material 
which covers the age range from nursery to post-graduate education. What I am 
able to do, however, is address a number of examples which are connected by 
their advocacy of creativity. This may seem like an arbitrary criterion, but it 
provides rhetorical coherence between disparate works. Ken Robinson, in the 
preface to a key collection of essays on creativity, for example argues that: 
 
Like All Our Futures, these essays aim to give a textured understanding 
of what creativity is, why promoting it is a necessity not an option, and 
how it can be done in a sure-footed, professional and reasoned way. 
(Craft et al. 2001, preface) 
 
And the introduction to this collection makes a similarly rhetorical move to 
simplify and operationalise creativity: 
 
The framing and evolution of this book reflects changing thinking about 
the elusive concept of creativity and its relevance to the current 
contemporary world of education and we suggest there has been a 
universalization of the conception of creativity. (Jeffrey and Craft 2001, 
p.1)  
 
Both of these extracts indicate how an agenda is being set for creativity in 
education; it is established as a ʻthingʼ which is necessary in education and 
which, thanks to increasingly sophisticated thinking, has become universally 
understood and, therefore, can be implemented. The only possible challenge to 
this universalisation in Craft et al.ʼs collection of articles comes from differences 
in priorities – between ʻcreative teachingʼ and ʻteaching for creativityʼ, for 
example, and differences in implementation. (Jeffrey and Craft 2001, pp. 4-11)  
 
Despite the advocacy of a range of potentially valuable and worthwhile 
activities, this collection does not (can not) make sense of creativity because, 
like All Our Futures from which it derives its energy and campaigning zeal, it 
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mobilises myths of creativity, uses familiar rhetoric and, ultimately, uses 
ʻcreativityʼ as a brand for a range of vaguely alternative pedagogic theories and 
practices. Gale (2001), for example, proposes four models “within which a 
creative approach to post-compulsory teacher education might be developed” 
(p.103) and, although he emphasises the mutable and non-fixed nature of 
these, the notion of creativity is treated as a given. The question is 
acknowledged, but side-stepped when he explains: 
 
Space does not provide the opportunity to examine vast numbers of 
theoretical expositions on the nature of creativity; however, it will be 
possible to identify and briefly examine four major areas in which a 
creative approach may be applied with relevance and apposition to post-
compulsory teacher education. (Gale 2001, p.105) 
 
Thus, creative approaches are invoked here as things which are not explicitly 
conceptualised (the implicit assumption is that they do not need to be) but which 
refer to alternatives to dominant modes of thought and action. This is not to say 
that what Gale proposes is without merit, but his use of ʻcreativeʼ, I would argue, 
has a primarily rhetorical function. One of his four models is a “post-structural 
model” in which he draws upon Foucaultʼs work in order to advocate a critical 
evaluation of dominant practices: 
 
Not only will such a strategy offer the possibility of new and fresh 
approaches to teaching and learning practice within post-compulsory 
teacher education, but also it will begin to unearth the way in which the 
discourses in question have established truth claims… (Gale 2001, 
p.112) 
 
The link with creativity here is established by the arbitrary statement that this 
strategy will be brought about by “creative teaching practitioners”. A similar 
arbitrary insertion of creativity is evident when Gale argues that:  
 
  75 
The use of narrative represents a post-structural means of fostering a 
creative approach to teacher education within the post-compulsory 
sector. (Gale 2001, p.112) 
 
It would be possible in nearly every case to substitute the word ʻalternativeʼ for 
ʻcreativeʼ in this essay without disruption; of course it would change the 
meaning, given the rhetorical force of ʻcreativeʼ, but not the ʻsenseʼ. The irony is 
that Gale is advocating four models of pedagogic practice which are reflexive 
and meta-discursive without practising the same reflexivity in relation to the 
concept of creativity which is being produced here. When he argues that: 
 
The use of narrative, therefore, can provide an approach to post-
compulsory teacher education that encourages autonomy, imagination 
and above all creativity. (Gale 2001, p.113) 
 
he is, in effect, mounting a challenge to one discursive formation through the 
instatement of another. Creativity here is loaded with assumptions about its 
ʻothernessʼ and the way that it is used here to encompass, absorb and 
represent a range of disparate (but alternative) approaches to teacher 
education imbues it with value and is, therefore, a move of power. This 
manoeuvre, although well intentioned, exhibits the same conditions of possibility 
as we find in, for example, Ofstedʼs prescriptions for creativity in which a 
different set of activities and approaches are yoked to the term. 
 
Other writers yoke creativity to other pedagogically worthy concepts and 
activities, for example, spirituality (McCarthy 2001), parenting (Haringman 
2001), the ability to deal with lifeʼs vicissitudes (Craft 2001) and effective school 
management (Imison 2001) – a range of concerns through which creativity is 
modelled as something learner-centred, productive and humanist. There is a 
sense in which these essays, about a range of different things, are connected 
only by a sprinkling of ʻcreativity dustʼ; Imisonʼs chapter, for example, includes 
this over determined statement: 
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Creativity is, I believe, a special kind of flexibility and a conscious attempt 
to challenge existing assumptions and preconceptions – an active 
attempt to unlearn; a drive to find out, to introduce, construct or 
reconstruct something new. A key means to achieve these creative 
objectives is being innovative. It has been a central part of my practice 
and means using imagination, creativity and strategic action as a leader 
to solve challenging problems. (Imison 2001, p.145) 
 
As with some aspects of the policy and advisory documents discussed later, 
such a move of definition does not perform conceptual clarification; it is not 
clear, for example, whether creativity is constituted by all or merely some of 
these elements, whether it is synonymous with innovation or exists in a cause 
and effect relationship with it. But such amorphousness enables disparate 
elements to be made to cohere rhetorically. 
 
There is some discursive dissonance, however, even within education – one 
example being criticisms of the way in which ʻcritical thinkingʼ is sometimes 
subordinate to ʻcreativeʼ thinking. Buckingham, in the field of media education, 
for example, argues against the “Romantic notions of ʻcreativityʼ and ʻself-
expressionʼ which have sometimes informed student production”, but also that 
ʻproduction work should be much more than a mere illustration of pre-
determined “theoretical” insights.ʼ (Buckingham 2003, p.137) He identifies the 
scepticism amongst 80s critics, such as Bob Ferguson, whose  
 
…main criticism was directed against the notion of ʻcreativityʼ, an idea 
imported from Art and English teaching, which he condemned as 
mystical and individualistic. The emphasis on creative self-expression 
through media was seen to reflect a dangerous ʻromanticisation of the 
working classʼ. (Buckingham 2003, p.124)  
 
He notes that writers on media education, such as Alvarado, Gutch, Wollen and 
Masterman advocated approaches which  
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explicitly sought to oppose and subvert dominant forms of professional 
practice; and in the process, the ʻexpressiveʼ or ʻcreativeʼ potential of 
production was rigorously subordinated to the demonstration of critical 
understanding. (Buckingham 2003, p.125) 
 
By a curious coincidence the space adopted by those who see ʻcritiqueʼ as 
more important than ʻcreativityʼ is one that it shares, but for different reasons, 
with the advocates of traditional ʻstandardsʼ, for whom ʻcreativityʼ lacks 
academic rigour. An analogy might be the space uneasily shared in the 80s by 
feminists and the right-wing moralists, both groups of which were opposed to 
pornography, but on different principles (see Levinson 2003). This tension is 
one which the policy and advisory documents seek to lay to rest. 
 
In all of the documents analysed in the later chapters which constitute the 
primary focus of this research there is absolute certainty that creativity exists – 
they all ask “what is creativity?” and all strive to provide an answer. The 
investment in finding an answer to this question and the determination to find 
ways of implementing and realising creativity are both significant, and I argue 
that they reveal the evidence of production by and production of particular 
discursive fields. The production of creativity as a ʻproblemʼ, for example, 
legitimates a practical response to it which draws upon a technological (or, I 
suggest later, a ʻmedicalʼ) order of thinking and, through rhetorical adroitness, 
the abstract noun becomes elided with specific, demonstrable evidence. But 
attention to the specifics of expression can reveal the instability and 
insubstantial nature of the concept; Banaji et al. in their review of key literature 
pertaining to “the creative classroom” note that the diffusion of the concept into 
a variety of existing activities and ideas could result in the disappearance of 
ʻcreativityʼ: 
 
In its most positive incarnation, then, the ʻcreative classroomʼ rhetoric 
may be seen to promote forms of learning that are generally held to 
improve the experience of children in education – holistic learning, active 
learning, expanded notions of intelligence, attention to social and cultural 
contexts, social learning and ethical human development. By the same 
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token, though, it runs the risk of losing what is distinctive about ʻcreativityʼ 
itself – if it cannot be distinguished from all these other things, where is 
its explanatory power? (Banaji et al. 2006, p.54) 
 
The discursive construction of creativity in education is doubly uncritical of it; 
uncritical about it as a ʻforceʼ and uncritical about it as a concept. The four key 
documents discussed later all fall into this category (although the QCA 
document, at least, raises the possibility of a creativity which is not necessarily 
a force for good). A striking example with which to end this section is a recent 
article by Samuel Hope (2010) which exhibits many of the tendencies and 
contradictions I identify in the main documents later. It is a particularly pertinent 
piece of work for this research because it explicitly links a discussion of 
creativity with policy initiatives in education. Hope sometimes appears to be 
challenging the rhetoric and commonsense around creativity such as in this 
point in his conclusion: 
 
In education policymaking circumstances, arts educators need to work to 
ensure that: 
1. Terms like creativity and innovation are used realistically and do 
not become rhetorical or conceptual substitutes for the arts or 
other disciplines either singly or together, else such terms 
otherwise gain a connotation of superficiality. (Hope 2010, p.46) 
And: 
I am concerned that the word creativity is becoming yet another 
generic surrogate for goodness that is insufficiently connected to 
something concrete. (Hope 2010, p.41) 
 
But despite his rejection of rhetoric and acceptance that “creativity is not an 
automatic good” (p.41), Hope is committed to an ontology of creativity and uses 
rhetorical strategies to persuade the reader that an ideal creativity can and 
should be enshrined in American education policy. This is one example of the 
kinds of textual contradiction that we find in the UK documents under scrutiny. 
Another is the mobilisation of set of regulatory principles by which creativity is 
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constructed; in Hopeʼs paper this mobilisation coexists with an overt 
denunciation of standardisation and regulation of creativity. 
 
As with some of the documents which will be discussed later, we can identify a 
number of common elements: textual moves to make creativity concrete; use of 
the language of faith and belief; a metaphorical system which contrasts organic 
growth with technological sterility; and the masking of logical inconsistencies 
with rhetorical urgency. Hopeʼs main strategy of reification is the alignment of 
creativity with knowledge and skills; he argues, for example, that: 
 
Creativity is evident every time we speak. Yet the range of creative 
knowledge and skill in the verbal realm is vast. (Hope 2010, p.39) 
 
In other words it is necessary to have a complex of creative knowledge 
and skills all working together over a long span of time, and all in multiple 
relationships between stable frameworks…and immediate creative 
decisions. (Hope 2010, p.40) 
 
…we cannot divorce the issue of creativity from knowledge and skill 
development. Pitting creativity against knowledge and skill development 
is a disastrous policy for students and for our nation as a whole. (Hope 
2010, p.41) 
 
There are many more examples of this kind of alignment here, all of which are 
reminiscent of the assertion in the UK documents that creativity and standards 
go hand in hand. The problem created in both contexts is that such reification 
results in the vanishing of creativity; the equation of it with knowledge and skills 
and, crucially, the demonstration of knowledge and skills by students, tends to 
leave us grasping at some intangible ʻotherʼ. Hope employs three different 
rhetorical strategies to hide this problem. The first is to put forward utilitarian 
arguments, such as, to fail to align creativity with knowledge and skills would 
bring about “another anti-creativity backlash” (Hope 2010, p.42) and that 
“creativity, knowledge and skills all lift each other to ever higher achievement”. 
(Hope 2010, p.42) The second is to invoke the language of faith in order to 
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persuade us that this intangible ʻotherʼ exists. This language includes 
references to inspiration and the spirit: 
 
Creativity is not only extremely complex, but it is also mysterious, and 
thus it is wise to be humbled before it. (Hope 2010, p.40) 
 
Instead of confining us in word, thought, and process prisons, the spirit of 
creativity leads us on. It produces more because it always tells us that 
there is something more, something richer in mind, spirit and action. And, 
of course, there always is. (Hope 2010, p.46) 
 
The third is to align creativity with the American national identity. Hope tells us 
that “creativity is a natural attribute of human beings”, linking genetics with 
biblical scholarship when he argues that  
 
Noah was known for building an ark, but he also possessed the innate 
capability to create computers, build airplanes and operate complex 
distribution systems. (Hope 2010, p.41) 
 
But towards the end of this paper we find that Americans exhibit these innate 
tendencies par excellence: 
 
Since our beginnings, we in the United States have been wise in the 
ways that we have nurtured these [framework-detail] relationships in 
many of our most basic decisions…And, in an overall sense, these 
decisions have enabled us to succeed. Our success is astounding. Here 
are two sobering facts. Because population numbers are higher, China 
and India have larger numbers of naturally gifted people than we do. But 
in 2003, the campuses of the University of California generated more 
patents than China or India. Will we be able to say something similar in 
2013 or 2023? (Hope 2010, p.46) 
 
Creativity as a national characteristic becomes aligned with freedom in this 
section of the paper, because “The natures of education and creativity work far 
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more like farming than running a factory” (Hope 2010, p.45) and, therefore, the 
metaphors of organic growth, cultivation and nurture are contrasted with the 
routine, standardised constrictions of mechanised production. In addition, 
because of the reference to China and India, this freedom acquires political 
connotations and there is the implication that to fail to embrace this version of 
creativity is to be un-American. There is a correspondence here with the 
assertion in the Government Response to Nurturing Creativity in Young People 
that “Creativity is something we do well” (Lammy and Adonis 2006, p.2). 
 
I have devoted a considerable amount of space to this single article because it 
constitutes a useful bridge between the literature about creativity, particularly in 
an educational context, and the (critical) discourse analysis of the UK policy and 
advisory documents which follows. Here we can identify many of the features, 
characteristics and strategies to which I will draw attention later, such as the 
alignment of creativity with existing policy priorities, the use of particular tropes 
and, perhaps most important of all, the construction of creativity as something 
subject to regulation. In Hopeʼs paper there is a clear contradiction between 
what it says and what it does; in a set of recommendations to policy makers at 
the end of the paper he argues that: 
 
In education policymaking circumstances, arts educators need to work to 
ensure that: 
… 
8. Assessment and other management schemes reduce content and 
method standardization, centralized control, or demands for 
teacher conformity, at least to the extent that creative 
development is expected. (Hope 2010, p.46) 
 
Yet this rejection of standardisation appears in a document which includes a 
twelve point checklist for verifying “If I have ʻlearnedʼ to be creative” (Hope 
2010, p.43) and an eleven point checklist for identifying a “creative 
environment” (Hope 2010, p.44). Admittedly, what I am adducing here as 
standardisation is different in quality and degree from the standardised 
assessment regime which obtains in the US, but there exists an unresolved 
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tension between the plea for freedom from constraint and inevitable constraints 
that characterise any work of classification. I argue later that this constitutes the 
biggest conceptual problem in the efforts to classify and operationalise creativity 
in the UK education system. 
 
2.5 Concluding comments 
This selective review of creativity literature has been organised into different 
categories. These categories have been influenced by the existing classificatory 
work of Banaji et al. (2006) and through them I have sought to make 
connections between statements about creativity based on apparent conceptual 
and rhetorical similarities. As with all work of classification it also attempts to 
differentiate between things – to indicate how particular academic, aesthetic or 
political investments in the ʻnature of thingsʼ causes creativity to be modelled in 
different ways. But one thing they all share is a sense of defining and 
accounting for ʻhuman extraordinarinessʼ, which is a term sufficiently vague to 
encompass the diversity of activities and achievements attributed to creativity. 
And this, I would argue, is the problem with such work on creativity; if one is 
sceptical about the existence of ʻsomethingʼ called creativity then one must, 
necessarily, be sceptical about research and practice which begins with this 
assumption – and most of it does. It is tempting to denounce the entire history 
of creativity research, as Barker does with the tradition of research into ʻmedia 
violenceʼ: 
 
Hard though it may be to accept that an entire research tradition is based 
on thin air, this is my case. I challenge the research tradition to show a 
single reason why we should treat cartoons, news, horror, 
documentaries, police series, westerns, violent pornography and action 
adventure as having anything in common. (Barker 1997, p.28) 
 
To adopt a similar stance here would necessitate arguing that a research 
tradition which focuses empirical work on subjects who are already presumed to 
embody the qualities being sought, must be questionable. Particularly as the 
identification of those subjects is driven by both an implicit theory of why they 
are significant, and ideologically pre-formed notions of the nature of that 
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significance. So, even though Gruber and Wallace (1999) make explicit the 
ideological nature of research, stating that: 
 
Methodological issues are never purely and simply methodological. 
Overtly or not, they always call into play deeply held convictions about he 
nature of knowledge and truth. (Gruber and Wallace 1999, p.93) 
 
their own assumptions about the “knowledge and truth” of creativity are not 
addressed and we are offered the Wright brothers, Picasso, Eliot, Einstein, 
Stravinsky and Ghandhi as self-evidentially exemplary. The term “unique 
creative people” forms part of the title of this particular essay and the assumed 
existence of creativity is merely a starting point for their case study approach, 
focusing particularly on Darwin. Simontonʼs explanation of his ʻhistoriometricʼ 
methodology betrays the founding assumptions of such work which, ironically, 
seems to overlook the specificities of history: 
 
Historiometric samples contain personalities who have “made history” in 
an important domain of human achievement. In the particular case of 
creativity, historiometric researchers will study those individuals who 
have some claim to the epithet “creative genius”. (Simonton 1999, p.117) 
 
He concludes that historiometry has unique value in the field of creativity 
research: 
 
The most obvious of these assets, of course, is the ability to engage in 
the scientific study of creativity in its most stellar form. The subjects of 
historiometic inquiries are undoubted exemplars of creative genius. 
(Simonton 1999, p.125) 
 
The rhetorical insistence on genius and the “undoubted” evidence of creativity in 
such exemplars may seem crude – especially when placed in this critical 
context – but this is a persistent starting point for much notionally scientific and 
pedagogic research in this area.  
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This assessment of different approaches, then, indicates a rather chaotic and 
contradictory situation regarding the understanding of ʻcreativityʼ. Most usefully I 
have shown how educational literature about creativity embodies notions which 
are inevitably ideological and which determine particular proposals of practice 
and implementation. I suggest that this simultaneous plenitude and absence of 
meaning make creativity, as an abstract noun, particularly amenable to any 
number of exemplifications and reifications – a characteristic which can be 
identified explicitly in the policy and advisory documents discussed later. 
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Interruption 2: The Romantic vs. The Puritan 
One tension was evident in my formal application to undertake this research; when I re-
read the application now, it seems as if I was clearly aware of the need to make sense of 
the concept of creativity in the context of education and the ‘creative industries’ , but 
my original reference points of screenwriting and advertising betrayed an excitement 
with the products of these domains. The way that this tension has subsequently been 
manifested is in an internal dialogue in which the seductions of artistic creativity are 
countered with a kind of puritanical zeal to treat them as mere discursive products.  
 
This has brought about an attitude to creativity which is both bellicose and apologetic; 
the bellicosity is expressed through an irritation with work which treats creativity as an 
essential quality and the apology is expressed through parodying my position as a 
nihilistic killjoy. This is not a comfortable position to occupy, not least because I know 
that I run the risk of dismissing subtle and nuanced work on creativity merely because it 
has not (as I have) identified its instability, but also because I can see that so much 
exciting, challenging and valuable work is being done in the name of creativity. In times 
of doubt I wonder whether I am merely quibbling over terminology. But at such times 
my earlier work as a postgraduate English student returns to comfort me and I 
remember the lessons of post structuralism – that language is not merely a set of labels, 
that it produces meaning rather than merely registering meaning and that attention to the 
construction of concepts is necessary and important work.  
 
But then, again, the doubts – a key influence on my work is Martin Barker’s analysis of 
violence in which he shows how violence is produced in documents and in interviews as 
a concept with explanatory force. And violence is a concept which is used to define 
certain kinds of activities and then, in turn, legitimise particular kinds of oppressive 
responses. But creativity? Creativity is a ‘good thing’ – what is the justification for 
approaching it so aggressively? Surely there are no comparable ethical grounds? I try to 
convince myself with my answer, that it is similarly (if not equally) necessary to adopt a 
critical stance in relation to the ‘creativity orthodoxy’ which, although encompassing 
many different methodologies, largely adheres to the ‘find it, promote it, nurture it, 
assess it’ strategy. This uncritical embrace is a provocation to me, so critical work feels 
like a necessary counter to it, despite the fact that, on an emotional level, I am equally 
seduced by the myths, practices, personalities and outcomes of creativity. This dialogue 
with myself also reveals a path which provides the ethical justifications I have felt 
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wanting; in the domain of education creativity has become a key concept and its 
increasing acceptance as important is justified in terms of alternative, innovative 
pedagogy. I am impressed by advocates such as Ken Robinson who is witty, articulate 
and committed to improving education. But, at the same time, I see a term, which can 
be made meaningful in many different ways, being modelled in some quite specific 
ways within documents which are likely to have significant impact on how it is taught, 
understood and rendered valuable or ascribed utility. This realisation enables me to 
argue (not just to myself any more, but to conference delegates, colleagues and people 
at parties) that this is not merely a work of critique for its own sake – not merely an 
academic exercise in analysis – but work which pokes at and unscrews bits of the 
conceptual machinery of creativity at a moment when it appears to be being sealed in a 
‘black box’2.  
 
The ethical justification then, whilst not as obvious as Barker’s (no-one is going to be 
oppressed for being creative, after all), is that the category of creativity is being defined 
and limited in particular authorised ways, that this category legitimises certain 
educational activities and outcomes whereas others, in this educational economy, are 
rendered value-less. In this sense, creativity could be seen as something oppressive and 
limiting (how ironic). Maybe, to return to my earlier aside, one could be oppressed for 
being creative if it were manifested in the ‘wrong way’, or for not being ‘creative’. 
 
At this point the Romantic Idealist in me wants to reclaim an inclusive concept of 
creativity in which anything is valid – the dyad of the public versus the state is 
momentarily invoked with a rebel yell as we storm the castle and seize ‘creativity’ from 
our masters. But the post structuralist Puritan quickly appears and talks him out of such 
folly, explaining that to do so would be merely to seize one myth rather than another. 
‘So what does that leave us with?’ asks the Romantic Idealist? ‘Nothing? “Nothing will 
come of nothing” as a retiring fictional king once said. So what’s it all for?’ The post 
structuralist Puritan explains that it is OK to find that there is no ‘there’ ‘there’, that 
there is no essence of creativity to be found and held aloft and that the battle is to reveal 
how the stories create the myth – ‘Now we see as through a glass darkly, then as face to 
                                            
2 I have borrowed the term from Latour (1987) who uses it to refer to the simplification 
of complex and contingent processes in science so that they become a ‘given’. This 
reduction also creates a resistance to questioning, or opening the ‘box’. 
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face’ he elaborates, but quickly realises that an analogy with meeting God might 
undermine his anti-essentialist position and moves on. 
 
A problem remains with my ‘critical posture’. My commitment to a methodology which 
depends upon the concept of social construction could slide into endless relativism were 
it not for the desire to stake some kind of ethical claim above. But, as Kendall and 
Wickham point out 
 
…the relativistic turn in academia looked attractive to many social researchers – 
but only as long as it enabled them to undercut the truth claims of those 
enterprises to which they held an ideological opposition…social constructionism 
is often directed to unmasking one form of truth – and is quick to posit 
replacement (more palatable) truths. This is the moment of critique. (Kendall 
and Wickham 2006, pp.3-4) 
 
I should acknowledge then that my  ‘truth claims’ can only ever be claims; I can argue, 
cite evidence, use rhetoric, demonstrate, in fact, some of the very characteristics called 
‘creative thinking’ described in the documents upon which I am launching a critique. 
But through this mode of writing I can, at least, personalise and contextualise my truth 
claims and, by revealing their contingent nature, avoid hiding behind the 
“dehistoricisation of the persona of the critic.” (Kendall and Wickham 2006, p.4) 
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3 Ideology, Rhetoric and Discourse 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It is ironic that, in order to make sense of creativity, I am using three other 
equally slippery conceptual terms. On discourse, for example, Mills suggests: 
 
The term ʻdiscourseʼ has become common currency in a variety of 
disciplines: critical theory, sociology, linguistics, philosophy, social 
psychology and many other fields, so much so that it is frequently left 
undefined, as if its usage were simply common knowledge. It is used 
widely in analyzing literary and non-literary texts and is often employed to 
signal a certain theoretical sophistication in ways which are vague and 
sometimes obfuscatory. It has perhaps the widest range of possible 
significations of any term in literary and cultural theory, and yet it is often 
the term within theoretical texts which is least defined. (Mills 2004, p.1) 
 
And on rhetoric, Dixon says: 
 
The critic may perhaps be excused for feeling that he is in the position of 
a man trying to dissect and reassemble a jellyfish – for the word, as [T.S. 
Eliot] went on to acknowledge, is notoriously slippery and imprecise. It 
has served to designate a number of radically different stylistic qualities. 
It has been invoked in order to praise writers, and at other times in order 
to condemn. (Dixon 1971, p.1) 
 
And Booth concurs that “No one definition will ever pin rhetoric down”. (Booth 
2004, p.3) 
 
Regarding ideology, Eagleton, similarly argues: 
 
…the term ʻideologyʼ has a whole range of useful meanings, not all of 
which are compatible with each other. To try to compress this wealth of 
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may have had in to a single comprehensive definition would thus be 
unhelpful even if it were possible. (Eagleton 1999, p.1) 
 
Despite the issues, these three terms provide the conceptual apparatus for the 
methodology adopted here; it is through the debates around and analyses of 
discourse, rhetoric and ideology that analytical approaches to policy and 
advisory documents can be developed and applied. And because I want to 
speak of ʻrhetorical strategiesʼ, ʻdiscursive constructsʼ and ʻideological 
implicationsʼ in relation to these documents it is essential that I elaborate my 
understanding of the terms and how I intend to mobilise them. 
 
Each of these terms will now be dealt with in turn, their value made apparent 
through an explanation of how they might (and will) be applied to the key 
documents in this research which construct creativity. I will endeavour to 
highlight how these terms provide different analytical frameworks, the important 
distinctions and overlaps between them and the methodological implications of 
using them. 
 
3.2 Ideology 
Here we can draw a useful distinction between the use of the term ideology in 
different contexts. Frowe (1992), for example, points out that 
 
The purely descriptive or neutral sense of the term, where it simply refers 
to a set of beliefs such that all beliefs are, ipso facto, ideological, renders 
it otiose. Similarly restricting it to describe only political positions, 
perhaps its most widespread use, ignores other areas and can lead to a 
somewhat misconceived characterization of its pejorative connotations 
as nothing more than knee-jerk reactions. I have my beliefs; my 
opponents, ideologies. (Frowe 1992, p.43) 
 
But Frowe is resistant to an ʻAlthusserianʼ view of ideology which sees it as ʻan 
ineliminable level of social formationsʼ (Frowe 1992, p.43) and comes to the 
conclusion that ʻTo describe something as ʻideologicalʼ entails the conclusion 
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that it is unsatisfactory in some way; that it provides an incomplete or deficient 
understanding of the situation.ʼ (Frowe 1992, p.43) 
 
For Fairclough, whose development of Critical Discourse Analysis has been a 
key influence on the methodology of this research, the relationship between 
discourse and ideology is a crucial site of distinction: 
 
In claiming that a discursive event works ideologically, one is not in the 
first instance claiming that it is false, or claiming a privileged position 
from which judgements of truth or falsity can be made. One is claiming 
that it contributes to the reproduction of relations of power. (Fairclough 
1995, p.18) 
 
This indicates how we might retain a sense of the importance of ideology in 
producing and maintaining power relations, whilst avoiding a reductive Marxist 
conception of the term whereby it is a synonym for ʻfalse consciousnessʼ. But 
even here the notion of ʻreproductionʼ is difficult to negate entirely, despite 
Faircloughʼs disavowal of conceptions of ideology which see it as ʻmechanical 
or deterministicʼ. (Fairclough 1995,p.18) 
 
So what might it mean to talk of ʻcreativityʼ as ʻideologicalʼ? To follow Fairclough, 
it would enable us to see particular versions of it as more powerful than others 
and to attempt to understand the processes by which these versions become 
more dominant and accepted as orthodox (a ʻhegemonicʼ model). The question 
remains as to whether we could refer to alternative or oppositional versions of 
creativity as similarly ideological, given that they may be equally dependent 
upon a coherent set of beliefs. It becomes problematic, however, if one 
imagines references to an ʻanti-professional ideology of creativityʼ, because 
ideology here suddenly becomes partial, pejorative and similarly ʻfalseʼ. The 
term ʻdiscourseʼ, whilst being far from unproblematic itself, offers a way of 
referring to systems of knowledge and language without necessarily being 
dragged into binary relations of domination and subordination. It also enable us 
to recognise that authorised, powerful versions of creativity, such as those 
produced by government appointed bodies and government departments are 
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not necessarily unitary or even coherent; a focus on discourse, therefore, 
facilitates an approach which sees meaning as a site of conflict and 
contestation. Nevertheless, to argue (as I will) that creativity is ideological is to 
assert that it is a concept rather than a product of nature, so there is 
considerable value in retaining this term, and to link it with Barthesʼ comparable 
notion of ʻmythʼ, in order to critique the process of naturalisation. 
 
3.3 Rhetoric 
For Banaji et al., the term rhetoric provides some mileage in relation to issues of 
creativity. They stipulate a working definition of rhetoric as a ʻsubset of 
discourse, characterised by specific propertiesʼ and argue that rhetorics are 
 
…highly elaborated structures, drawing on distinctive traditions of 
philosophical, educational, political and psychological thought. (Banaji et 
al. 2006, p.5) 
 
A formulation which sounds like a substitute for Foucaultian discourse, although 
a little later they argue that rhetorics 
 
…produce discursive frameworks such as key terms and taxonomies 
which can be learnt by practitioners who either need them or are obliged 
to use them. In this way they feed back into more general ʻpopularʼ 
discourses of creativity. (Banaji et al. 2006, p.5) 
 
The distinction becomes explicit with the statement that 
 
…organised, conscious, structured models of creativity, whether they 
emerge from policy imperatives, philosophical traditions or empirical 
research, are always mobilised, or ready to be mobilised, in the interests 
of intervention in practice or policy, and can be termed rhetorics, as 
distinct from discourses. (Banaji et al. 2006, p.6) 
 
The conception of rhetorics as being “organised to persuade” and “seeking to 
bring about consensus, leading in some case to intervention in specific contexts 
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of practice” (Banaji et al. 2006,p.5) echoes the ʻclassicalʼ definitions that can be 
found elsewhere (e.g. Dixon 1971 and Booth 2004) and indicates that for these 
authors rhetoric is conscious, linguistic production by an active agent. And 
perhaps it is agency which is at stake in this document and which has 
necessitated a focus on rhetoric rather than discourse, despite the Foucaultian 
resonance of many of their comments on particular statements. It also appears 
that, despite the comment that “This report takes as its basic premise the notion 
that the idea of creativity is constructed as a series of rhetorics” (Banaji et al. 
2006, p.4) the status of ʻconstructionʼ is not quite as radical as Foucaultʼs, that it 
constitutes representation rather than reality. The ontological status of creativity 
is not being challenged here, but rather the notion that there is a single 
definition; the “key objectives of the review are”: 
 
To identify a distinct set of rhetorics of creativity which can be of use for 
researchers and practitioners in the field of creative learning 
To identify a set of cross-cutting themes, posed as questions, which can 
similarly be used in planning, evaluation and research 
To make the argument that creativity is to be seen more productively 
through these rhetorics than through narrow and unchanging 
characterisations that seek to endorse particular definitions, making 
different stances more entrenched and more difficult to reconcile and 
debate. (Banaji et al. 2006, p.5) 
 
This report, then, perceives the problem of creativity as one of communication 
and, therefore, focuses on issues of rhetoric rather than discourse. 
Nevertheless, there is a claim that rhetoric emerges from discourse: 
 
This review will explore what the different discursive positions claim 
about creativity, and how they function as rhetorical stances. (Banaji et 
al. 2006, p.5) 
 
A statement which reveals, perhaps, a tension in this document between what 
is ʻrhetoricalʼ and what is ʻdiscursiveʼ; on one hand we have ʻdiscursive 
positionsʼ – a spatial metaphor suggesting a range of stable locations – and on 
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the other we have the suggestion that these can function as ʻrhetorical stancesʼ 
– another spatial metaphor suggesting a physical pose. At the risk of appearing 
to nit-pick, it is difficult to understand exactly how these metaphors work; a 
ʻpositionʼ cannot ʻclaimʼ and neither can it adopt a pose. A human agent, 
however, can do both of these things, so how might we interpret this? Does the 
absence of the human agent, but the transfer of her abilities to discourse, 
represent an unease with a post structuralist position? Does it reveal that a 
focus on rhetoric necessitates an agent? Or is this kind of figurative stumble 
inevitable when grappling with the concept of discourse which, for Foucault, 
entails a disavowal of the independent, essential human agent? It seems to be 
the case that this document, like many it critiques, is designed to create the 
possibility of operationalisation – to produce something which is functional and 
useful, particularly for those in education. Its institutional context – ʻCreative 
Partnershipsʼ – provides a justification for this: 
 
Creative Partnerships aims to influence policy and practice in both the 
education and cultural sectors. It was established by the Arts Council 
England, with funding from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
(DCMS) and the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) in response 
to the National Advisory Committee on Creative and Cultural Education 
(NACCCE) report by Ken Robinson…It spearheads a raft of initiatives 
designed to develop creativity and encompasses social, personal and 
economic domains. (Banaji et al. 2006, p.2) 
 
This statement from the foreword of the document is not written by the authors, 
but by representatives of Creative Partnerships who make explicit links with the 
reforming agenda established by All Our Futures. This might explain why The 
Rhetorics of Creativity feels torn, at times, between the radical denunciations of 
nature and essence offered by analysis based on ʻdiscourseʼ and the far more 
modest claims about persuasion and style offered by rhetorical analysis. This is 
not to negate its insights, many of which have provided me with starting points 
for my own analysis. And my analysis, at best, represents my aspiration to offer 
ʻcritiqueʼ, but it may at times function merely as more ʻcommentaryʼ.  
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It is also ironic (and I am sure that the authors cannot fail to see this irony) that 
in their critique of All Our Futures (1999) they comment that:  
 
According to the NACCCE report, and despite its almost overwhelming 
visual emphasis on drama, dance and art projects, there is a dynamic 
relationship between technology, science and the arts. (Banaji et al. 
2006, p.15) 
 
But in their own publication there is an identical tendency to include images of 
arts-based ʻcreativityʼ; sculpture, painting, dance/theatre and computer arts for 
example. Some of the captions for these pictures indicate an affiliation with 
Creative Partnerships, which suggests that they have been included because of 
institutional determinants, and it is likely that they were all selected at the 
editorial stage by someone other than the authors. Nevertheless, without 
speculating for long about the possible origins, it is worth noting that they tend 
to function illustratively (and rhetorically) rather than critically. And like the 
images in Nurturing Creativity in Young People (2006) (similarly based on 
drama, dance and art work) and the marginal quotations in All Our Futures 
(1999), there is the suggestion that these are ʻsafeʼ, self-evident representations 
of creative endeavour. The images which include human figures either show 
ʻartistsʼ engrossed in creative work or joyful children ʻperformingʼ with others. 
The images of sculptures all depict figurative work (two of human figures, one of 
a peacock); one of Anthony Gormleyʼs figures in Another Place seems to gaze 
at the horizon in one of them. We might, therefore, argue that a ʻrhetoric of the 
imageʼ (Masterman 1985) is at work here; the pro-social, arts-based rhetoric 
that Banaji et al. identify in other reports, which, perhaps, they attempt to 
undermine through analysis, bursts out of their own document, refusing to be 
repressed. 
 
Creativity may be expressed rhetorically, but rhetoric does not inevitably 
persuade or become accepted as true or ʻcommon senseʼ – in other words 
ʻideologicalʼ. It is also possible that there may be rhetorical similarities between 
statements which are discursively different; in this context, the notion that 
ʻrhetoric is a subset of discourseʼ may not be helpful. Nevertheless, rhetoric as 
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term to account for persuasive textual (linguistic and visual) strategies, 
intentional or not, is an important and useful concept and one which I use 
repeatedly throughout this research. 
 
3.4 Discourse 
As Toril Moi points out, in relation to Cixousʼ concepts of masculine discourse:  
 
Theoretical discourse is in other words inherently oppressive, a result of 
masculine libidinal investment. Even the question ʻWhat is it?ʼ is 
denounced as a sign of the masculine impulse to imprison reality in rigid 
hierarchical structures. (Moi 1988, p.111) 
 
As Moiʼs example illustrates, discourse is a useful concept because it identifies 
the ʻperformativityʼ of statements (and, for the purposes of this research, 
statements about creativity); in this context, they do not merely register with 
differing degrees of ʻaccuracyʼ a pre-existing reality, but they construct that 
ʻrealityʼ. The emphasis here on the question ʻWhat is it?ʼ is reminiscent of 
Popperʼs focus on ʻWhat is?ʼ questions (Popper 1992, p.62); both Cixous and 
Popper problematise these simple, quotidian formulations by demonstrating that 
they produce knowledge in particular, partial ways whilst appearing to be 
neutral and objective. 
 
In a consideration of the problems with the concept of ideology (which, for him, 
brought about, therefore, the development of the concept of discourse), 
Foucault argues that  
 
…the problem does not consist in drawing the line between that in a 
discourse which falls under that category of scientificity or truth, and that 
which comes under some other category, but in seeing historically how 
effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are 
neither true nor false. (Foucault 1984, p.60)  
 
This is a neat summary of the analytical approach I have adopted to the subject 
of creativity in specific documents; having identified it as a site of contradiction 
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and contestation, I am keen to investigate the ways in which it is mobilised in 
documents which have authority in the domain of education and to consider the 
implications for such mobilisation.  
 
Garnham (2005) argues similarly for an interrogation of the term ʻcreative 
industriesʼ in government policy documents, the use of which  
 
serves a specific rhetorical purpose within policy discourse. It serves as a 
slogan, as a shorthand reference to, and thus mobilises unreflectively, a 
range of supporting theoretical and political positions. This lack of 
reflexivity is essential to its ideological power. It disguises the very real 
contradictions and empirical weaknesses of the theoretical analyses it 
mobilises, and by so doing helps to mobilise a very disparate and often 
potentially antagonistic coalition of interests around a given policy thrust. 
(Garnham 2005, p.16) 
 
Although he makes an excellent argument, Garnhamʼs use of the term 
ʻdiscourseʼ here is virtually synonymous with ʻgenreʼ or category of enunciation; 
nevertheless, the dynamic activation of meaning that he describes is congruent 
with a Foucaultian concept of discourse. It is tempting, in this research, to 
attempt to name discourses, to develop a taxonomy of, say ʻdiscourses of 
creativityʼ, and use the term as a ʻcount nounʼ as Lin (2008) does in relation to 
ʻthe discourses of media educationʼ, but this has a necessarily limiting effect on 
the conceptualisation of discourse and on what can be said about a particular 
discursive formation. It also confers upon ʻa discourseʼ a degree of coherence 
and homogeneity that may not actually be the case, given that a particular 
statement may activate competing or incompatible discursive frames. 
 
When discourse becomes the adjective ʻdiscursiveʼ it can, like the adjective 
ʻcreativeʼ free itself from the rigour and specificity of definition and lend itself to 
anything which pertains to language and communication, which may be why 
Fairclough (1995) prefers the term ʻdiscoursalʼ, although Stillarʼs (1998) use of 
ʻdiscoursalʼ seems synonymous with ʻdiscursiveʼ in the general sense. And, as I 
discuss in the Methodology chapter, the ways in which the term is mobilised, 
  98 
even within the contiguous disciplines of linguistics, social psychology and 
cultural studies, can have very different implications. 
 
Whilst I would concur that many statements about creativity are certainly 
rhetorical, I believe that it is also possible to identify statements (and clusters of 
statements) which are not designed primarily to persuade (which implies 
intention), but which instead produce ways of thinking and acting in relation to 
creativity about which we do not need to be convinced – which operate as 
ʻcommon senseʼ – and therefore discourse becomes a more useful concept. A 
Foucaultian approach to discourse, according to Kendall and Wickham, begins 
by “the recognition of a discourse as a corpus of ʻstatementsʼ whose 
organisation is regular and systematic” (Kendall and Wickham 1999, p.42) and 
entails the recognition that “statements involve ʻthingsʼ as well as ʻwordsʼ”.  They 
counsel that “The crucial thing here is to avoid the idea that [discourse] is a 
purely linguistic term (as in most incarnations of ʻdiscourse analysisʼ).” (Kendall 
and Wickham 1999, p.35)  
 
A key example of discourse analysis as a linguistic enterprise is Brown and 
Yuleʼs (1983) work in which discourse is a synonym for spoken or written 
communication, although the authors make it clear that theirs is a branch of 
linguistics which prioritises the utterance and the context – a branch they relate 
to “pragmatics” (Brown and Yule 1983, p.26). Their analytical strategies are 
particularly useful in the context of interpersonal communication and they 
illustrate how concepts such as frames may be useful in decoding printed 
communication. However, this kind of analysis tends to be limited to 
understanding discourse as  
• Functional 
• Intentional 
• Isolated interactions. 
 
Stillarʼs work, similarly, although theoretically broader in scope, is based on a 
notion of discourse which he describes as: 
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…the social activity through which we make meanings with linguistic and 
other semiotic resources. This term emphasizes the forms of 
interpretation, interaction, and exchange that pattern text meaning 
potentials. Discourse concerns the participants involved, the particular 
kinds of situations in which text plays a part, and the social systems and 
structures that bear upon how and what texts can mean to those 
involved. (Stillar 1998, p.12)  
 
A Foucaultian mobilisation of the concept of discourse does not neglect the 
specificities of language use, but it requires us to conceive of a field of 
power/meaning which catches us and ʻperformsʼ us. Discourse in this context is 
fundamentally ideological in that through it we construct our identities and make 
particular kinds of sense of the world. To illustrate how this strategy might be 
more useful we could look, as mentioned earlier, at the way in which 
behavioural psychology produces creativity discursively, not only through its 
language and arguments expressed in academic papers, but through the tools 
which it has devised in order to identify the object of study, such as 
psychometric tests, and the administration of these tests in laboratory 
conditions. The term discourse then, in a Foucaultian context, frees us from a 
specifically linguistic focus, although, regarding speech, writing and apparent 
intention, I will, like Banaji et al., inevitably, refer to rhetorical features. 
 
3.5 Summary 
Despite the slippage between these terms at various points depending upon 
context and writer, I think each has value in informing and underpinning an 
analysis of creativity literature, naturally occurring data and policy/advisory 
documents.  
 
Ideology is a term with baggage, but I shall implement it to refer to culturally 
specific beliefs, rather than propaganda-induced ʻfalse consciousnessʼ – the 
product of a coercive state – or partisan political beliefs. Barthesʼ (1973) notion 
of myth provides a touchstone here, as does Žižekʼs (1989) concept of ideology; 
both argue that all aspects of lived experience, thought and consciousness are 
ideologically informed and underpinned. Ideology here, as formulated by 
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Althusser (1971) can be conceived as ʻfieldsʼ of power which exist in and 
around us. 
 
I shall endeavour to avoid using rhetoric and discourse as ʻcount nounsʼ. 
Rhetoric is a valuable and recurring term for me in this research, but most 
useful when it refers adjectivally to the persuasive strategies of language use – 
the use of tropes such as metaphor, simile and hyperbole, for example, as well 
as structural features, such as the use of syllogistic reasoning. Rhetoric does 
not, of course, exist in a vacuum and I will relate it to ideological and discursive 
functions where necessary. 
 
Discourse is perhaps the most difficult term to pin down, but Foucaultʼs use of it 
refers to the production of knowledge and ʻtruthʼ through the language and 
practice of everyday life and, therefore, makes it invaluable in a discussion of 
creativity. Discourse in this sense, entails taking into account the material 
conditions of ʻstatementsʼ, as well as what the statements ʻsayʼ. In other words, 
and with particular reference to the objects of study in this research, it means 
taking into account the fact, for example, that a policy document exists in order 
to regulate creativity in education, and considering the implications of this for 
practice and the construction and validation of particular things as ʻknowledgeʼ. 
Foucaultʼs concept of discourse enables us to conceptualise language, 
documents and practices as interrelated elements in the production of ʻrealityʼ 
and ʻtruthʼ. 
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Interruption 3: Authorship 
I am not unaware of the irony of using a reflective mode – a mode which is predicated 
upon the notion of the creative, self-determining subject – in the context of work which 
is theoretically predicated upon the absence of such a subject. But the justification is 
that transparency of discourse is at stake. Perhaps ‘transparency’ is the wrong word, but 
explicitness about discursive determinants might be better. And my theoretical mentors, 
Barthes and Foucault, despite seeking the dissolution of the subject, have often adopted 
a meta-discursive mode in order to highlight their own cognitive struggles or, 
alternatively, to draw attention to their own captivity within discourse. Consequently I 
will attempt to use these interruptions in a similar way and, at the same time, 
acknowledge that this mode is in itself a discourse with rules, limitations and 
conventions. 
 
It is a mode well suited to drawing attention to the processes of production which are 
usually effaced and, as such, it enables me to connect it with my earlier educational 
work in which this was the primary aim; teaching about documentary, for example, was 
not simply a process of identifying stylistic conventions, but of arguing that those 
conventions perform an ideological and rhetorical function in that they seek to persuade 
an audience to adopt a particular point of view and to accept the transparency of the 
representation. So, in this mode, I can reflect upon the nature of enunciation in this 
document – I can draw attention to the shifts between my representation of a subject 
position as “I” or “we” and speculate why this might bet the case. I can also draw 
attention to the logic of inclusion and exclusion, which might otherwise go without 
comment; the process of learning to be a researcher is a process of decision making – 
including, of course, the decision to produce these interruptions – and this mode creates 
a space in which some of these decisions can be discussed more frankly, perhaps. 
 
The references which are littered throughout this thesis, for example, perform (perhaps 
primarily) a rhetorical function; they persuade the reader (I hope) that the work is well-
researched, that arguments have been synthesised from those proposed by others and 
that, therefore, I can claim some degree of authority. But the source of such references 
is rarely addressed in work like this or, rather, the means by which the references were 
sourced. I can claim, with a degree of honesty, that many of the references that appear 
here were found by trawling through bibliographies and an iterative process of 
searching various databases with variations of key words. But some of them resulted 
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from informal encounters and chance: at an academic conference a chat with a 
colleague turns to Susan Leigh Star and her work on classification; whilst browsing in a 
charity shop I come across a salient anecdote in Michael Simkins autobiography; a book 
which contains a collection of comments about faith edited by John Brockman (on my 
shelf for years) takes me to a similar collection on the subject of creativity. I mention 
these examples because they reveal the extent of serendipity in this work and remind me 
that I can make no claims to have produced anything definitive, objective or ‘scientific’. 
Regarding Foucault, whose presence can be felt throughout this research, I feel as if I 
have a relationship with his work like that of Nicholson Baker’s to John Updike: 
 
Hardly a day has passed over the last thirteen years in which Updike has not 
occupied at least a thought or two; and while his constant summonings were at 
the outset brought on more by skeptical admiration than by simple enjoyment, 
the enjoyment and admiration were increasingly there as well. (Baker 1991, 
p.30) 
 
Baker then goes on to confess how little he has actually read of Updike’s work – “fewer 
than five pages” here, “fewer than twenty pages” there, concluding that he has read 
“less than half the words Updike has written.” (Baker 1991, p.32) This combination of 
intimacy and ignorance is a familiar one, but not an easy one to admit to. 
 
It is also impossible for me not to address my own mobilisation of forms of address, 
given the degree to which I am using this as an analytical strategy in this chapter. When 
I use the pronoun “we” instead of “I” what does this signify? There is a sense in which I 
am trying to share the responsibility for particular observations in order to make them 
more legitimate – it is not just “I”, but “we” who can identify X or Y; in other words – 
“look, it’s obvious!” I notice that I often pair this “we” with a modal verb – “can” or 
“may”. For example, a particularly tentative offering will begin “we might infer from 
this that…”, in which the pronoun shift and modal qualifier remove most of the 
responsibility for the assertion from me. On the other hand, it is possible that by using 
this particular device I hope to imply that a banal observation has the status of a 
profound one because I am attempting to remove myself from being implicated in it – a 
kind of double sleight of hand. 
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4 The practice of theory (methodology) 
 
Any body of knowledge or discipline in the human sciences that claims to 
produce definitions in its own area of expertise, is today faced with the 
observation that so-called empirical definitions change historically and 
discontinuously; that they do not reflect transcendental or universal 
subjects meanings, structures, realities, or processes. (Allen 1986 in 
Powers 2007, p.25) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
It is significant that so much of the work on creativity, so many of the 
conversations about it seek to define it. So what do these attempts to define a 
concept reveal about the situations within which they occur? And what do the 
different mobilisations of these definitions reveal about the operation of those 
situations, fields and disciplines? If “The act of defining or re-defining 
something…constitutes a move of power” (Powers 2007, p.25) then it is 
necessary to examine the discursive production of definitions of creativity and 
assess the nature of such operations, to disentangle the threads (and, in doing 
so, inevitably perform another discursive operation). The challenge is to avoid 
imposing an arbitrary explanatory model and to avoid merely providing another 
gloss or commentary on the texts under scrutiny. 
 
4.2 Textual/discourse analysis 
My analytical strategy in this work is to decode – to apply a theoretical approach 
which reveals how texts construct versions of creativity which are always 
relative and ideologically or discursively based. This is not a typical approach to 
creativity, although some notable examples are Banaji et al. (2006), Gibson 
(2005) and Neelands and Choe (2010). All of these researchers pay attention to 
the detail of enunciation in policy documents about creativity and refer to 
rhetoric, discourse and ideology, although with slightly different respective 
inflections, and my research is undoubtedly influenced by and an extension of 
the work done here. However, I am trying to take account of more than just the 
ʻtextsʼ with which I am working; I do not wish merely to provide another 
  104 
“commentary” (Mills 2004, p.61) on them (in fact, I argue that they provide this 
commentary for each other) but to demonstrate how they authorise and grapple 
with particular versions of creativity. Methodologically then my influences can 
also be found in post structuralism and post modernism, in that this research is 
not about using scientific method to uncover a universal truth, or even 
generalisable theory, but to examine the ways in which such ʻtruthsʼ are 
produced about creativity. It constitutes a circumvention of the ʻwhat is?ʼ 
question, on the basis that the search for such equations merely reproduces 
and defers meaning; instead it is built upon ʻhow is?ʼ questions, which seek to 
identify the conditions of the production of meaning. 
 
Eagleton, in describing the ʻgains of structuralismʼ in literary theory explains that 
it represents ʻa remorseless demystification of literatureʼ and tells us that  
 
Loosely subjective talk was chastised by a criticism which recognized 
that the literary work, like any other product of language, is a construct, 
whose mechanisms could be classified and analysed like the objects of 
any other science. (Eagleton 1983, p.106)  
 
Whilst acknowledging that analytical work on policy documents about creativity 
is not the same as analytical work on ʻliteratureʼ, there is a sense that their 
common investment in their subject is not dissimilar to “The Romantic prejudice 
that the poem, like a person, [harbours] a vital essence, a soul which it [is] 
discourteous to tamper with” (Eagleton 1983, p.106) and, therefore, an 
analytical methodology which exposes the mechanisms at work in such 
discourse seems entirely appropriate. Although the language of, say, All Our 
Futures is not ʻpoeticʼ (although, as I point out later, it uses certain poetic and 
rhetorical devices), I argue that its investment in the importance and an 
ʻessenceʼ of creativity is ʻRomanticʼ.  
 
My methodology, then, also owes something to ʻcritical discourse analysisʼ 
which is, itself not a unitary term for an orthodox set of procedures, rather it 
describes an approach to research which, as Bryman suggests, is anti-realist 
and constructionist: 
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…it denies that here is an external reality awaiting a definitive portrayal 
by the researcher and it therefore disavows the notion that any 
researcher can arrive at a privileged account of the aspect of the social 
world being investigated…the emphasis is placed on the versions of 
reality propounded by members of the social setting being investigated 
and on the fashioning of that reality through their renditions of it. (Bryman 
2001, p.360) 
 
In these terms, the practice of discourse analysis could easily overlap with 
rhetorical analysis, in that it becomes a form of sceptical reading. And it is true 
that a systematic scepticism and refusal to take anything for granted underpins 
analysis of rhetoric, ideology and discourse – even in the Foucaultian sense. 
Faircloughʼs version of discourse analysis adds the word ʻcriticalʼ before it which 
gives it an overt political purpose – the explicit goal of which is to critique “the 
social reproduction of relations of domination.” (Fairclough 1995, p.24)  
 
What is at stake in the different inflections of discourse analysis is the agency of 
the subject: in the ʻtextual/rhetoricalʼ mode subjectivity is not an issue – the 
individualʼs control and manipulation of their own enunciation and marshalling of 
the repertoire of resources available to them is not considered problematic; in 
the ʻFoucaultianʼ mode the focus is on the ways in which textual (and material) 
conditions limit the possibilities of particular kinds of utterances and limit the 
range and nature of subject positions available. Both modes will appear to, and 
may actually, be doing the same things at particular times, but the stakes are 
higher in the latter, in which the stance is more radical and challenging. It 
should be clear, however, that this ʻanti-realistʼ stance is not the same as 
philosophical idealism – Foucault admits the ʻextra discursiveʼ existence of 
things, but argues that such things only become meaningful within discourse. 
For my purposes, then, I am not, of course, denying the physical existence of 
art, music and literature, but arguing that they are only constituted as ʻcreativeʼ 
through discursive processes. I hesitated for a moment when writing ʻart, music 
and literatureʼ, aware that I was using exclusively arts-based examples as 
illustrations; if I were to accept the proposition that ʻcreativityʼ includes work in 
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the sciences, the examples would be likely to be conceptual breakthroughs, 
rather than the physical production of something – they would not have a 
ʻphysical existenceʼ in the same way. This, perhaps, might explain why the 
general emphasis on creativity tends to be arts-based – the situation is 
analogous with this description in Rowntreeʼs comments on assessment: 
 
For a studentʼs work to count for anything, it usually has to result in a 
product – a painting, a laboratory notebook, a three-dimensional model, 
or the perennial essay…They appear to exist for all to see in the same 
tangible form, with some ʻtrue valueʼ that we feel we ought to be able to 
agree on. One is reminded of the ecologist examining the regurgitated 
pellets of owls or the faeces of badgers as a more convenient means of 
establishing the creaturesʼ diets than hanging around trying to observe 
what they eat. (Rowntree 1977, p.137) 
 
In the context of Foucaultʼs work, however, discourse analysis is more than 
simply ʻtextual analysisʼ, rather, as Kendall and Wickham explain, it entails an 
examination of how subject positions are constructed and power is produced, in 
other words, “the identification of rules that ensure a practice is material and 
discursive at the same time”: 
 
These rules…ensure that knowledge cannot be reduced to thinking, 
thoughts, opinions, ideas, and so on, but is best understood as a material 
practice with definite, public, material conditions of operation like literacy 
training, schooling more generally, printing, professional organisations for 
only some knowledge endeavours (the sciences, engineering, medicine, 
etc.), and many others. (Kendall and Wickham 1999, p.45) 
 
The documents that constitute the primary research in this thesis are not merely 
ʻtextsʼ, but can be thought of as resonating nodes within particular discursive 
fields – education, psychology and government, for example. A Foucaultian 
approach to them can help us reveal how they are constituted through pre-
suppositions about the nature of knowledge, assessment and cultural value and 
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how the abstract concept of creativity emerges as a more or less operational 
term within this context. Similarly, as Mills argues 
 
…the main reason for conducting an analysis of the structures of 
discourse is not to uncover the truth or the origin of a statement but 
rather to discover the support mechanisms which allow it to be said and 
keep it in place. (Mills 2004, p.45) 
 
So why is this work necessary? Firstly because creativity has become such a 
significant concept in contemporary culture – it represents personal growth, 
effective management and a vibrant economy, for example. Secondly, because 
much of what has been written and said, although ostensibly about one ʻthingʼ – 
creativity – is actually about many different things (one of my questions is why 
this glossing, this conflation is so desirable/seductive and what the effect of this 
might be). Thirdly, creativity has recently been moved to the foreground of 
education – it is a key focus of government education policy, features in the title 
of a new qualification and, most significantly it is operationalised in the recent 
Ofsted document (analysed in Chapter 8) in which “creative approaches” 
become aligned with a set of pedagogic prescriptions. 
 
The austerity of a Foucaultian approach is difficult to maintain, but perhaps 
necessary given the seductive and promiscuous nature of the concept under 
scrutiny. It seems like an appropriate approach given the ways in which 
creativity is often the site where different, often opposing, rhetorics meet and 
their contradictions ignored or resolved as creativity is glimpsed, disappears 
and is reformed through other discursive operations. Sheridanʼs description of 
Foucaultʼs approach to ʻmadnessʼ provides an apt analogy: 
 
…when Foucault speaks of ʻmadnessʼ he does so not from the 
standpoint of reason. He offers no definition of the term. He refuses to 
see it as a constant, unchanging reality, manʼs growing understanding of 
which is reflected in an ever more refined vocabulary. The word is useful 
to Foucault precisely because it is non-medical, because it is used by 
everyone and spans the entire period with which he is concerned. 
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Madness is not initially a fact, but a judgement - even if that judgement 
becomes itself a fact. It is a judgement passed by one part of the human 
mind on another. One person on another. (Sheridan 1980, p.13) 
 
Creativity, as I have discussed in the review of different ways of conceiving it, is 
sometimes explicitly equated with ʻmadnessʼ or, at least, symptomatically 
related to forms of psychological or neurophysiological aberration, but despite 
this congruence, my point here is a methodological one; Foucault circumvents 
definition and rejects essence, focusing instead on judgements and I, identifying 
some similar features in the reification of the abstract noun ʻcreativityʼ, am 
attempting something similar. However, it is likely that the rigours of such 
analysis will prove, at times, too inflexible and that it will become necessary to 
produce re-formulations of existing statements in the forms of codes and 
taxonomies, thus slipping into the sort of epistemological production that 
Foucault critiques. 
 
Central to my methodology is the concept of discourse and, although I have 
distinguished between this and the concepts of ideology and rhetoric in the 
previous chapter, it is necessary to take some time to explain the 
methodological implications of this; through an examination of approaches to 
discourse by, for example, Fairclough and Foucault, the theoretical foundations 
for analytical activity will become clear. I will then explain how such theoretical 
foundations will necessitate particular analytical operations on particular texts. 
 
4.3 Using Foucaultʼs methods 
A Foucaultian engagement with texts which produce creativity is predicated on 
the idea that language and discourse are not neutral or transparent means of 
describing or registering the real world; rather, they are always active in 
constructing ʻrealityʼ by making it meaningful. The approach also avoids a 
conception of the concept of creativity as some kind of evolution or linear 
progression, but rather attends to the particularities of its various contexts of 
construction. This means avoiding the temptation to account for the shifts in the 
concept of creativity by deferring the explanation to a notional overarching logic 
– that of the economics of capitalism, for example, although this may be one in 
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a network of elements which has prompted the generation of policy and 
advisory documents. Giddens explains Foucaultʼs approach thus: 
 
In Foucaultʼs work, the decentring of the subject became both a 
methodological and, in a certain sense, a substantial phenomenon. 
History was constituted in epistemes, or more latterly in fields of power, 
through which human subjects were disclosed; and, in the current age, 
we were moving away from an era dominated by a particular type of 
constitution of subjectivity. We were witnessing the ʻend of the individualʼ. 
(Giddens 1995, p.262) 
 
And although Giddens is averse to the erasure of the subject from history, his 
summary of Foucaultʼs position highlights the issue of subjectivity and opens up 
the possibility of using this as a way into understanding discourses which 
produce the ʻcreative subjectʼ – the creative student and creative teacher, for 
example. 
 
This approach is, arguably, legitimated by the fact that, as I assert, there is no 
such thing as ʻcreativityʼ; creativity does not have ontological status - it is a 
concept which, unlike things which have a physical as well as discursive 
existence – Africa, weapons and young people, for example – is inferred 
through the material existence of other things – art, inventions and 
mathematical calculations, for example. Therefore, an ʻanti-realistʼ approach 
might prevent us from being seduced by the rhetoric of ʻcreativity. I am mindful, 
at this stage, of Kendall and Wickhamʼs prescription that the analysis of 
discourse should entail “the identification of rules that ensure a practice is 
material and discursive at the same time” (Kendall and Wickham 1999, p.45), 
but although creativity becomes manifest through material and discursive 
practices, it does not have a physical, pre-discursive existence. There is a 
qualitative difference here which Kendall and Wickham highlight in a later work 
in a discussion of social construction: 
 
…the emphasis on social construction – a nominalist approach – is 
useful for some examples, but the nominalist approach can easily be 
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over-extended: one would not want to be too nominalist about rocks, for 
example. (Kendall and Wickham 2006, pp.3-4) 
 
Mills (2004) draws attention to the different ways in which discourse is used as 
a concept in different disciplines and their associated methodologies. She 
highlights the fact that discourse analysis within linguistics is a kind of 
functionalist approach to language; it  
 
…aims to make explicit those implicit norms and rules for the production 
of language, and is particularly interested in the way that discourse 
consists of sets of structured hierarchical units. (Mills 2004, p.124) 
 
As such, however, it tends to ignore the ways in which social relations bear 
upon, and are manifested in, speech and written texts; although it usefully 
draws attention to the ways in which meaning is not merely inherent in the 
content of communication, it tends not to problematise the nature of such 
meanings, the nature of interpretation and the differential stakes that might 
obtain. 
 
A discursive analysis of advisory and policy documents has been chosen as an 
approach because it can reveal the ideological underpinning of the construction 
of creativity. Advisory documents are frequently translated into policy and, 
subsequently, teacher training and specifications and, although there may be 
disagreement over content, they tend to be accepted as rigorous, neutral and 
authoritative. The assumption tends to be that they have been thought through 
and written by experts and are, to some extent, unimpeachable. Jeffrey and 
Troman, identifying the significance of such texts argue that: 
 
A number of policy texts are present in educational settings at any one 
time and each influences the power and significance of others. Policy 
discourses are one of the main means whereby policy texts, in the 
settings in which they operate, influence the value, the implementation 
and the embedding of those policies. (Jeffrey and Troman 2009, p.2) 
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Similarly, Fairclough, in a defensive stance, and advocating the use of 
discourse analysis argues that  
 
The best way of convincing social scientists is by doing socially and 
culturally sensitive discourse analysis, using analytical frameworks which 
are accessible, clearly suited to social research, and complement other 
form of (e.g. ethnographic, or organizational) analysis. What will clinch 
the argument is showing that textual analysis is better able than other 
methods to capture sociocultural processes in the course of their 
occurrence, in all their complex, contradictory, incomplete and often 
messy materiality. (Fairclough 1995, pp.185-186) 
 
So an analysis of how these supposedly neutral documents are actively 
constituting and producing the concepts which are assumed to be pre-existing 
will be a valuable exercise. It may be argued that a focus on ʻtextsʼ is too 
limiting, and it is true that this research can only provide a selective and partial 
discussion of how creativity is constructed; future work could usefully examine 
how the concept is mobilised and made meaningful in actual classrooms, 
studios and laboratories (Jeffrey and Troman (2009) have begun to do this in 
the context of primary education, where they find a dynamic negotiation by 
teachers between the ʻcreativityʼ and ʻperformativityʼ discourses). The selected 
documents, however, constitute evidence of how creativity is being constructed 
in specific institutional and temporal contexts, how it is being modelled in a 
particular authoritative way and how particular rhetorical, discursive and 
ideological factors can be seen to be at work. The documents are, in 
themselves, a form of practice as well as implying and influencing other forms of 
subsequent practice. The results of this research could establish some concrete 
starting points from which to interrogate creativity in specific conditions of 
material existence and lived experience. 
 
There is a connection here with the ʻpolicy sociologyʼ practised by, for example, 
Stephen Ball who, in an analysis of the background to the 1988 Education Act, 
identifies the determinants of and conflicts within educational policy. He argues 
that “…values do not float free of their social context. We need to ask whose 
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values are validated in policy and whose are not.” (Ball 1990, p.3) Ball sees the 
ideological imprint of Thatcherism in education policy here and, regarding the 
emergence of ʻcreativityʼ as a policy term, some have taken a similar approach 
to it and identified the ideological imprint of the erstwhile Labour governmentʼs 
ʻknowledge economyʼ. Although my critical stance is comparable, I am not 
seeking to demonstrate that creativity is determined unproblematically and 
coherently by the exigencies of the economy in the documents selected for 
analysis. But there is a focus on the construction of value and the ways in which 
a concept is translated into suggestions and even prescriptions for practice. 
Taylor et al. describe this stance as “critical” in their review of the literature of 
policy analysis: 
 
Most of [the] early literature tended to be positivistic in its methodology 
and functionalist in assumptions. While this work continues, and is 
particularly evident in political science, some more recent work in the US 
is critical of this tradition and is generally referred to as interpretive – 
meaning that it takes an anti-positivist methodological stance. In the 
British and Australian literature, work taking a similar methodological 
stance tends to be termed critical and included neo-marxist approaches 
utilising conflict rather than functionalist perspectives. (Taylor et al. 1997, 
p.38) 
 
This type of analysis can be criticised for focusing narrowly on one type of data 
and, perhaps, using this data to imagine the effects and impact on a notional 
constituency (c.f. Mills 2004, pp.140-141). And Fairclough acknowledges the 
arguments against “Text analysis in isolation from audience reception”, 
commenting that 
 
The argument is very relevant to CDA [Critical Discourse Analysis], for 
part of the critique is directed at analysts who postulate ideological 
effects solely on the basis of analysis of texts without considering the 
diverse ways in which such texts may be interpreted and responded to. 
But there is a danger here of throwing the baby out with the bathwater, 
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by abandoning textual analysis in favour of analysis of audience 
reception. (Fairclough 1995, p.9) 
 
Fairclough argues, therefore, that a focus on texts is legitimate and that analysis 
of them “is therefore an important part, if only a part, of the picture”. (Fairclough 
1995, p.9) 
 
The implications of this argument are clear for my own research; the focus is 
narrow, but the documents have institutional significance. And as to imagining 
the effects on an audience, I would argue that, now that creativity has become 
something that Ofsted is prescribing to schools and colleges in order to raise 
standards, the model of creativity which it has adopted, translated and 
reinforced will necessarily have some kind of impact. The nature of this impact 
is beyond the scope of this research, so I have restricted my speculations and 
conclusions to asserting that, for example, Ofstedʼs position on creativity 
determines and legitimates certain kinds of activities. It is also possible to assert 
that Ofsted has power and authority and that the implementation of its 
inspection regime regulates and modifies the behaviour of teachers and 
institutions. So even if it cannot be demonstrated that teachers and parents will 
read and interpret Learning: Creative Approaches that Raise Standards in a 
particular way (although I will argue that the mode of address and construction 
of subject positions limits the range of possible readings) it is reasonable to 
assume that in most schools and colleges there will be individuals who will have 
the responsibility of doing this and then translating it, resisting it or negotiating 
with it at a local level. Future research could examine this process of translation 
and implementation and consider the implications for meaning and conceptual 
production. This research, then, involves analysing texts as productive 
mechanisms and identifying the material consequences of their discursive work; 
Jeffrey and Troman argue (regarding policy texts generally) that: 
 
These texts are written documents but they also contain values through 
specific discourses mediated by language and beliefs about the role of 
education in society and the economy. These discourses bring objects 
into being…and they construct particular types of social relation through 
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the relative strength of the practices they determine. (Jeffrey and Troman 
2009, p.5) 
 
4.4 Widening the net 
In addition to the analysis of documents, another strategy which has been used 
to produce ʻdataʼ is the generation of definitions; at every opportunity during the 
course of the research – workshops, training days, conferences, teaching 
sessions – I have asked the participants to write their definitions of creativity. 
The value of such responses – included here as an appendix – is that they 
constitute evidence of the desire for and struggle with reification. They also 
provide a small bridge between the analysis of the documents (which inevitably 
lacks discussion of real people and real practices) and constituencies which 
might have a stake in creativity. Analysis of these responses reveals patterns – 
ʻrepeatable statementsʼ – which can be illuminated through analysis of their 
discursive features. It would be surprising if there were no rhetorical conformity 
between some of the responses and, although no cause and effect relationship 
is asserted, it is possible to argue that particular cultural myths about creativity 
obtain in both the documents and the participants and, in addition, that similar 
ʻtextual manoeuvresʼ are necessary in order to make sense of, operationalise 
and posses the concept. 
 
The method, overall then, is to look for things in texts which are contradictory – 
look for tensions within them and look for certain kinds of nomenclature. The 
questions I want to ask are: 
 
• Is there a sense of struggling against alternatives in the formulation of 
the idea of creativity? 
• What kinds of things are being drawn into the discursive ʻframeʼ? 
• What kinds of things are neglected or rejected in this frame? 
• What kinds of presuppositions are evident? 
• How do descriptions of and prescriptions for practice generate creativity 
conceptually? 
• How, generally, is creativity being modelled through rhetorical and 
ideological means? 
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The key documents have been selected because they have the concept of 
creativity embedded in them. My analytical strategy is to unpick the ways in 
which the concept has been embedded through using elements of critical 
discourse analysis – at the level of the word, the sentence and larger units of 
meaning. These larger units might include headings, the way a page is laid out, 
illustrations, typographical features and mode of address. There will be 
particular attention paid to moments in the texts where there is a need to 
articulate the concept, the moments where the implicit is made explicit. When 
the articulation of the concept is required to be explicit there is an opportunity to 
identify how certain approaches are rejected and others retained by examining 
the ways in which they are framed. The hunt is for the implicit concepts which 
become evident when the discursive frame is active and where it is possible to 
identify the kinds of discursive practices which are necessitated or validated 
through the mobilisation of such concepts. 
 
Clearly this work does not fit into the canon of creativity research in any 
particular field – not psychology and not pedagogy, for example. But it should 
illuminate aspects of both of these; it should reveal how ideologies, discourses 
and rhetorics of creativity circulate in a particular set of educational documents 
and how they borrow from (intentionally or otherwise) each other and from other 
discursive fields. 
 
4.5 Creativity and ʻsuperstructureʼ 
It is necessary to acknowledge arguments that the discursive production of 
creativity in the context of education is determined by the needs of the 
economy; some suggest that the inevitable requirements of the economic ʻbaseʼ 
lurk secretively behind the utopian rhetoric which is merely designed to deceive 
(“rhetrickery” to use Boothʼs (2004) term). These arguments are persuasive – it 
might be the case that post-industrial societies are investing in the idea of 
becoming knowledge economies, but this does not necessarily or wholly 
account for the ways in which creativity is framed/constructed. In fact one of my 
suggestions is that in the process of being defined, the concept of creativity 
disappears and appears simultaneously; if demonstrable this would make it 
hard to argue convincingly that creativity has been decisively co-opted in an 
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instrumental way to support the economy, despite overt strenuous efforts to do 
this (cf. Selzer and Bentley 1999). I suggest, at the moment, that whilst it is 
possible to see the ideological imprint of the political need for the ʻknowledge 
economyʼ in the documents in question, that ʻcreativityʼ is far too opulent and, 
paradoxically, impoverished a signifier to be contained in this way; elsewhere I 
have used the metaphorical adjective ʻslipperyʼ in relation to creativity and the 
image this conjures up of, perhaps, an eel may be appropriate in conveying 
something of the experience of attempts to pin down creativity. Sometimes it is 
possible to see the concept congealing in a particular way – the eel being 
jellied, perhaps – but this is only ever temporary and partial. 
 
Amernic and Craig (2004) provide a model for this kind of ʻinfra-structuralʼ 
analysis and their stance constitutes opposition to a perceived attempt at global 
domination by AOLTimeWarner. In their analysis of the companyʼs internet 
policy statement they state their aims clearly (referring to other work on 
organisational discourses): 
 
…we endeavor to dismantle dichotomies and expose them as false 
distinctions; examine silences or what is not said fill voids by ʻattending to 
disruptions and contradictions [in] places where the text fails to make 
senseʼ; decipher taboos by ʻfocusing on the element that is most alien to 
a text or contextʼ; and interpret metaphors ʻas a rich source of meaningsʼ. 
We conclude that the centrality of rhetoric in the AOLTimeWarner 
statement is a means of privileging strategic perspectives of a mega-
corporation and of influencing public policy and social expectations.ʼ 
(Amernic and Craig 2004, pp.22-23) 
 
My methodological strategy may have some common elements with this, but 
the ideological stance is different; I am not assuming that there is a ʻconspiracyʼ 
to define creativity in a particular way because this could be translated in to 
power and influence for particular stakeholders. So my aim is not to 
demonstrate that ʻauthorised versionsʼ of creativity are partial, deficient or faulty 
and, subsequently, offer a more ʻcompleteʼ or ʻproperʼ version; rather, the aim 
here is to demonstrate how these versions are, inevitably, constructed 
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discursively, ideologically and rhetorically, as any version is or would be. The 
point is not to counter one version of creativity with another, but to challenge the 
investment in a notional ʻessenceʼ of creativity by showing how this is effected in 
key texts. Is this just so much quibbling about words? In a way, yes. But, to 
construct it more persuasively, more rhetorically, it is an engagement with the 
construction of a concept – a concept which garners time, attention, money and 
which dictates changes to practice. It is also a set of case studies which reveal 
the necessary rhetorical strategies if an abstract concept is to be reified and 
operationalised and, in this sense, it tells us something about the relationship 
between knowledge, power and institutionalised education. 
 
The four documents which have been selected for analysis are: 
• All Our Futures: Creativity, Culture and Education (1999) 
• Creativity: Find it, Promote it (QCA 2004) 
• Nurturing Creativity in Young People (the ʻRoberts Report) (2006) and 
the Government Response to this document 
• Learning: Creative Approaches that Raise Standards (Ofsted 2010a) 
The rationale for this selection can be summarised thus: 
• All Our Futures produces a particular model for creativity in education 
which is partial, contradictory and explicitly ʻstipulativeʼ and ʻindicativeʼ. 
• This version has been adopted and translated by the Qualifications and 
Curriculum Authority (QCA) and is then manifested with explicit 
references to existing authorised practice in Nurturing Creativity in Young 
People and the Government response to this. The version acquires 
authority via the ʻcommentariesʼ and ʻtranslationsʼ, however, it also marks 
a shift towards a ʻcognitiveʼ, ʻinspectableʼ model of creativity which is 
utilised in the Ofsted document. 
• The Ofsted document produces a version of creativity which depends 
explicitly upon the authorisation which precedes it, and identifies it with a 
set of pedagogic practices within the standards framework. Thus it is 
operationalised and betrays the determinations of an inspection context. 
 
I argue that these documents form an ʻintertextʼ; they comment on and modify 
each other, reinforcing a definition of creativity via their individual, borrowed and 
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shared authority. This definition is necessarily limited and exclusive, despite the 
overt claims of inclusivity. However, it cannot be ʻexplained awayʼ by identifying 
determinants in the ideology of the ʻknowledge economyʼ; rather, it is necessary 
to attend to the specific details of the documents where we can observe 
creativityʼs shift from something abstract into something which can be regulated 
and administered.  
 
4.6 Analysing policy 
This application of discourse theory is characterised by an attempt to suspend 
the temptation to denounce everything which develops within education as an 
inevitable characteristic of a component of the ʻideological state apparatusʼ; 
instead it is characterised by an attempt to show that, despite the rhetoric, 
creativity is becoming something in official documents which can be managed 
within existing structures and translated into tasks. And in this sense I am 
examining ʻpolicy documentsʼ, although the inverted commas indicate that this 
term may be as contentious as many of the others roped into service in this 
thesis. Taylor et al. highlight some of the problems with defining policy, citing 
Cunninghamʼs observation (which sounds remarkably similar to a particular 
statement about creativity) that “policy is a bit like an elephant – you recognise 
one when you see it, but it is somewhat more difficult to define”. (Taylor et al. 
1997, p.23) They conclude that  
 
Policy processes accrue both prior to the production of a policy text and 
afterwards, through the stages of implementation and reinterpretation. 
Policy is rearticulated as it is recontextualised across the policy cycle. 
This is why it is difficult to pin policy down and give it a simple definition. 
(Taylor et al. 1997, p.35) 
 
It might be useful, therefore, to see these documents as constitutive of a policy 
process, whereby creativity is articulated and rearticulated, modelled and 
remodelled across a selective portion of space and time. However, this 
research is not ʻpolicy analysisʼ in the institutionalised, academic sense 
described by, for example, Hogwood and Gunn (1984), rather, it takes policy 
documents as examples in which creativity is discursively produced. 
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My approach is essentially ʻmicro-synchronicʼ, in that I am taking a temporally 
narrow snapshot of what I consider to be significant and important in four key 
documents dispersed over a ten-year period. There is, undoubtedly a larger 
scale diachronic job to be done here as well, of the kind, perhaps, begun by 
Fleming (2008) with his history of arts education. And whilst I am indebted to 
Foucaultʼs methods, I have resisted the temptation to even consider a 
diachronic macro analysis on the basis of some micro evidence, partly because 
of pragmatic reasons – the limitations of a PhD – and partly because I have 
tried to maintain the suspension of judgement throughout this work and reach 
any conclusions tentatively. 
 
One practical approach, illustrative of this kind of methodological strategy, is 
exemplified by Fairclough in his analysis of the use of the term ʻenterprise 
discourseʼ in Lord Youngʼs speeches in the 80s, and a Department of Trade and 
Industry brochure. Faircloughʼs strategy is to tease out  
 
an unstable picture of various senses being structured and restructured 
in relation to each other according to shifting strategies – a field of 
potential meaning, and sets of transformations upon that field according 
to wider political strategies – rather than a meaning. (Fairclough 1995, 
p.112) 
 
And his focus upon documentary evidence provides us with some examples of 
durable, assertive data. The ʻvarious sensesʼ referred to above are the different 
versions of ʻenterpriseʼ in this evidence, versions which Fairclough derives from 
the ʻnon countʼ dictionary definitions of the word. In this analysis he finds 
evidence of the different senses of ʻenterpriseʼ being “hierarchized” for strategic 
purposes through the means of different linguistic devices (he does not use the 
term, but I would suggest that ʻrhetorical devicesʼ would be an appropriate term 
of reference here) and argues, ultimately, that this particular discourse  
 
is not a well-defined closed entity, but rather a set of tendencies – 
transformations within fields that, at least at the level of transformations 
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across discourse types in the order of discourse, are of a diffuse nature. 
(Fairclough 1995, p.127) 
 
The key methodological gains, for me, from utilising this approach are: 
A focus on the construction of meaning rather than seeking to identify a gap 
between reality and representation; 
• A focus on vocabulary, grammatical features, syntax and rhetoric to 
account for the production of both creativity and authority; 
• A use of the concept of intertextuality to account for the ways in which 
discourses exist through and between texts (rather than merely within 
texts); 
• Identification of the importance of temporal and spatial dimensions in 
constructing meaning; 
• The use of the concept of equilibrium and instability to model the 
contingent nature of meaning. 
All of these suggest what things may be salient in the documents I am 
analysing, as well as offering some ways of engaging with them in a methodical, 
systematic way. There is even a link between our respective themes when 
Fairclough suggests that concept of enterprise may be opposed in different 
domains and, possibly therefore, subject to transformation as different 
discourses struggle over it: 
 
This may be, for example, a matter of struggle over the meaning of 
ʻenterprisingʼ by perhaps applying it to activities distant from business, or 
of drawing upon an alternative vocabulary (e.g. focusing upon cultivating 
creativity rather than enterprise in education). (Fairclough 1995, p.122) 
 
Despite the value of this approach, there are three areas in which I would like to 
push the methodology further or modify its assumptions. Firstly, although 
Fairclough focuses on the ways in which the concept of enterprise is modified, 
transformed and positioned within particular hierarchies, there is less emphasis 
on internal contradiction and conflict. Opposition and resistance are referred to 
as possibilities between domains, but I suggest that it is possible to find 
manifestations of this even within particular documents. In the analysis of 
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ʻenterpriseʼ Fairclough argues that particular inflections or “senses” of the term 
become dominant at particular points, but doesnʼt seek to argue that these 
different meanings may undermine each other, merely that they create a 
diffusion of meaning. Secondly, and this is a closely related point, there is a 
tendency to assume that the characteristics of a text are strategically 
determined by the producer and to ascribe this intention to broader political and 
economic changes in society. This creates a sense of inevitability about the 
nature of discourse in authorised contexts – that it will be subordinate to the 
aims of those in power and be a tool in a hegemonic process; despite any 
diffusion, it will essentially constitute an element in the plan to establish 
consent. Whilst I acknowledge that this possibility exists in the documents about 
creativity, I would suggest that the meanings and understandings of this term 
are so diverse that the attempts to marshal it in a particular, coherent, 
instrumental way are undermined. This constitutes then, on my part, a slight 
shift towards textual autonomy. Thirdly, I am uneasy about attributing names to 
discourses, as Fairclough does here; his use of the term ʻenterprise discourseʼ 
is a useful pragmatic move in the context of this analysis, but it suggests that 
there is a coherent, homogeneous, stable entity with specific characteristics – 
ʻdiscourseʼ in the popular sense, in other words.  But having said this, it would 
be remiss of me not to point out that ʻenterprise discourseʼ appears in inverted 
commas in the chapter title, which, in full, is “What might we mean by 
ʻEnterprise Discourseʼ?” so there are qualifiers here. And, in addition, 
Fairclough points out that 
 
A discourse type from this perspective is just a configuration of elements 
with greater or lesser durability – or rather  network of related (and 
perhaps quite loosely related) configurations across discoursal domains. 
(1995, p.128) 
 
which suggests a far less unitary conception of discourse than I have imputed to 
him above. The previous chapter explored in more detail the ways in which the 
terms discourse, rhetoric and ideology are used and, specifically, how I intend 
to work with them in this research. 
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Another set of methodologically useful strategies has been derived from Galeʼs 
work on Critical Policy Sociology (2001), in which he demonstrates how three 
different approaches to higher education entry policy in Australia may serve to 
reinforce the rigour of such research whilst helping to define the “what, how and 
why” of such work. He argues that these approaches are not mutually exclusive 
and that there may be overlap between them, depending upon the agenda of 
the researcher. His use of Foucaultian terms, such as archaeology and 
genealogy make them particularly appealing to me, especially as he admits “to 
not being fully attentive to Foucaultʼs renditions of archaeology and genealogy, 
even though these have influenced the methods of policy analysis I imagine 
here.” (Gale 2001, pp.384-385) He argues, in his defence, however, that 
Foucault invites researchers to take license with his methods and, for me, this 
offers a way of retaining Foucault as an epistemological influence whilst 
sometimes failing to maintain the methodological fidelity advocated by Kendall 
and Wickham (1999).  
 
Galeʼs categories of Critical Policy Sociology are: 
• Policy Historiography 
• Policy Archaeology 
• Policy Genealogy 
There are certainly elements in the first two of these which provide some 
analytical strategies and justifications for the kind of work I am doing on the 
documents I have identified as significant. Galeʼs period for his historiographic 
analysis was 1987 to 1996 and this enabled him to ask the following questions: 
 
(1) what were the ʻpublic issuesʼ and ʻprivate troublesʼ within a particular 
policy domain during some previous period and how were they 
addressed?; (2) what are they now?; and (3) what is the nature of the 
change from the first to the second?...(4) what are the complexities in 
these coherent accounts of policy?; and (5) what do these reveal about 
who is advantaged and who is disadvantaged by these arrangements? 
(Gale 2001, p.385) 
 
He explains that: 
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data analysed were predominantly documentary and included primary 
sources (such as government policy texts, departmental records and 
reports, commissioned research, media releases, and minutes of 
meetings. (Gale 2001, p.385) 
 
All of which provides a framework and some pertinent questions for my 
analogous work, given that it covers a comparable period, is designed to 
similarly revealing about complexities and shifts in meaning, and is interested in 
the implications for practice. Using this strategy I can, for example, identify the 
formation of a particular set of educationally applicable ideas about creativity at 
the start of the decade, examine their durability and transformations at key 
stages during the decade and, finally show how the inherent complexities have 
been repressed in the service of accountable evidence at the end of the 
decade. Admittedly, my data are more limited than those described here by 
Gale, but my claims are about particular, specific examples, rather than major 
trends. Using this approach he was able to argue that 
 
The organizing logic of entry policy had shifted, at least in its rhetoric, 
from ʻelite sponsorshipʼ (selection by association) to ʻfair contestʼ 
(selection by competition). (Gale 2001, p.386) 
 
It is also possible to find methodological ammunition in Galeʼs formulation of 
ʻpolicy archaeologyʼ, which he has developed from Joseph Scheurichʼs work, 
and which uses explicitly Foucaultian terminology. The emphasis here is on the 
policing of the policy agenda, the exclusion and inclusion of particular policy 
actors and the conditions that regulate the patterns of interaction of those 
involved. It is the concept of ʻpolicingʼ that has the most potential value for me, 
as it suggests the existence of some form of agency which has an impact on the 
nature of particular policy statements. However, this notion of agency does not 
simply attribute effects to the causes of “conscious actions of social agents”, as 
Gale comments that “archaeology in Foucaultʼs hands is purposely devoid of 
conscious subjects” (p.389) Instead he argues that, through his interviews with 
policy actors, he has  
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not been interested in subjective analysis of policy actors, but in their 
objectification. That is, what is important to uncover is not so much who 
speaks but what is spoken. (Gale 2001, p.389) 
 
Galeʼs third “lens”, policy genealogy, provides a similarly Foucaultian focus on 
conflicts, discontinuities and “temporary policy settlements” (p.389) through an 
analysis of the strategies of policy actors. In doing so it manages to reveal how 
such settlements are effected, through what means, and with what impact on 
our understanding of the end result. 
 
As I stated earlier, these approaches are not mutually exclusive and they are all 
partially connected by an interest in Foucaultian questions about power, 
relationships, histories and meaning. Similarities can be found in some of the 
research which has become labelled ʻActor Network Theoryʼ; Dugdaleʼs (1999) 
work on health policy making, for example, uses elements from all three 
categories above and emphasises the observation that “compromise or closure 
does not imply the stability of a single outcome.” (Dugdale 1999, pp.131-132) 
 
4.7 Concluding comments  
This discussion of methodological issues creates a number of questions and 
challenges which relate to this research, particularly the extent to which I can 
infer action, control and power from the discursive constructions of creativity in 
the documents under scrutiny. Fairclough points out, in relation to his analysis 
of HE prospectuses and whether or not they constitute a “restructured 
hegemony”:  
 
It would be unwise to leap too quickly to such a conclusion before there 
has been some sort of investigation of the reception of and response to 
the sort of changes I have illustrated amongst various categories of 
higher educational institutions. It may well be, for example, that largely 
ʻtop downʼ changes in discursive practices are widely marginalized, 
ignored or resisted by certain categories of staff and/or students in a 
significant range of their activities. (Fairclough1995, p.159) 
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However, given the authoritative position held by Ofsted and the general 
mobilisation of creativity in education as a desirable process and outcome in 
almost every respect, I suggest that creativity is a special case and that 
although the “reception and response” may take a variety of forms in education, 
this will inevitably be done in relation to the assertions and mobilisations of 
power in government documents.  
 
I cannot, of course, make any claims to be definitive or comprehensive, but this 
methodology provides a tentative way of exploring the production of meaning 
within a specific context and indicating how this sort of knowledge construction 
is linked with power. The issue then is philosophical, in that it cannot be 
resolved by any conclusive argument or ʻproofʼ, but my treatment of it is ʻanti-
essentialistʼ rather than ʻanti-realistʼ; the often expressed certainties about 
creativity are the provocation for this work and it is these that I seek to 
challenge. However, this may mean that I run the risk of slipping into the 
category of thinking which Norris describes with considerable contempt as  
 
A far-gone sceptical, anti realist, strong-sociological, or cultural-relativist 
viewpoint – that widely held beliefs have often been (and indeed still are) 
plain wrong, and moreover that their wrongness has much to do with the 
influence of certain linguistically entrenched or acculturated ways of 
thinking. (Norris 2006, p.79) 
 
I hope that my tinkering with the construction of creativity in some specific 
contexts does not fall into this trap; Norrisʼs ire seems directed against anti-
realist perspectives particularly and, as I have argued before, I am not seeking 
to deny the existence of objects, but to investigate how a particular concept is 
made meaningful. Hence the appeal to ideological theory in order to explain 
how particular beliefs become dominant and emotionally invested; an approach 
which has enabled me to argue that creativity depends upon an ideology of 
essentialism. As such, it seems irrelevant to argue whether a particular version 
of creativity is ʻtrueʼ or ʻfalseʼ, but important to investigate how particular truth 
claims are effected rhetorically and ideologically. This is a different enterprise 
from the ʻlanguage gamesʼ of Wittgenstein, so disparaged by Norris (2006 
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pp.155-157) because of the nature of the ʻtruthsʼ I am investigating; they are 
ʻtruthsʼ about creative behaviour, attributes, dispositions and domains, rather 
than ʻtruthsʼ about the nature of physical existence. However, at points I invoke 
philosophical perspectives on the nature of subjectivity and consciousness in 
order to reveal how they inform and reinforce particular concepts of creativity, 
but argue that these constitute examples of an implicit invocation of 
ʻphilosophical common senseʼ rather than examples of philosophical 
propositions. 
 
For Fairclough, grappling with similar issues regarding the “marketization 
discourse”: 
 
Critical discourse analysis cannot solve this problem, but it can perhaps 
point to the need for a struggle to develop such a new ʻlanguageʼ as a 
key element in building resistance to marketization without simply falling 
back on tradition, and perhaps give a better understanding of what might 
be involved in doing so. (Fairclough1995, p.165) 
 
And this goal of resistance gives the methodology distinct purpose, particularly 
with regard to the concept of creativity which ʻholds usʼ even as we critique it. 
 
Ultimately the methodology adopted in this research can be summarised simply 
by Stillar who presents the “principal goals for the critical analysis of everyday 
written texts” thus: 
 
Critical analysis must be capable of identifying and interpreting the 
systemic, functional and social characteristics of texts and text practices. 
It must be carried out with a theory that is requisitely diverse, systematic, 
and applicable. It must also enable researchers to produce explicit 
critique, participate in the textual practices they analyze, and provide a 
vocabulary with which to communicate their analyses. (Stillar 1998, p.7) 
 
I am putting this into practice by focusing on a specific set of texts and 
analysing their characteristics, ideological contexts and practices. My theoretical 
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framework is post structuralist and founded upon the belief that knowledge, 
power and meaning are interwoven and, therefore, the object of critique is 
 
not simply…to unpack the hidden assumptions of a given piece of 
language, but to press them to a point where they visibly buckle under 
the strain of their own (hitherto unnoticed) ambiguities. (Norris 1983, 
pp.20-21) 	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Interruption 4: The siren song of creativity 
Resisting the lure of creativity has been (and continues to be) a struggle – the 
conventional wisdom is that, like ‘love’, it hits you in the gut – you know it when you 
see it, you know what it is (Justice Potter Stewart of the US Supreme Court made a 
similar, often quoted statement about obscenity in 1964). The character John Morgan in 
David Hare’s film Wetherby says: 
 
I only know goodness and anger and revenge and evil and desire…these seem to 
me far better words than neurosis and psychology and paranoia. These old 
words…these good old words have a sort of conviction which all this modern 
apparatus of language now lacks. (Wetherby 1985) 
 
There is a similar emotional myth about creativity – one feels it, one knows it on a 
fundamental level, and do resist this, or do otherwise, indicates a deficiency. 
 
And having used the word ‘myth’ the door is open again for Barthes and, at this point, I 
can share with him some of the discomfort of navigating a course between being and 
knowing, between epistemology and ontology. Barthes recognises that the 
“mythologist…constantly runs the risk of causing the reality which he purports to 
protect, to disappear.” (Barthes 1973, p.158) He tries to resolve this problem by 
asserting that objects have particular qualities independent of myth; to use Foucaultian 
language, he seems to be describing the ‘extra-discursive’ dimension. Wine in France, 
for example, is wrapped up in narratives, ideas of potency and morality – it has a 
mythology – but, in order to address its existence, Barthes suggests: 
 
wine is objectively good, and at the same time, the goodness of the wine is a 
myth: here is the aporia. The mythologist gets out of this as best he can: he deals 
with the goodness of the wine, not with the wine itself. (Barthes 1973, p.158) 
 
This is a good summary of tensions in my own work and its implications for my 
methodological stance; I do not want to deny or cause to disappear the work that people 
do that is called ‘creative’, much of which I find exciting, entertaining, moving and 
beautiful, but at the same time I need to reveal that creativity is a myth. And this is not 
to use myth in the way that Grayson Perry uses it when he talks about “myths of 
creativity” (Grayson Perry on Creativity and Imagination 2010), or Scott Berkun when 
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he talks about “myths of innovation” (Berkun 2007), as lies or misconceptions, but 
myth as taken-for-granted assumptions, myth as something culturally and historically 
specific passing itself off as natural and inevitable. The relationship between reality and 
myth for the mythologist is one characterised by tensions, but myth cannot simply be 
seen as a mis-representation of an existing reality, but as something that exists in the 
dimension of beliefs and ideas that may, but need not, coincide with reality. Barthes, in 
a reflective footnote, comments that he “[finds] it painful constantly to work on the 
evaporation of reality” (Barthes 1973, p.158) – a state which I recognise, especially 
given the ‘value’ of creativity and the various investments in it.  
 
Barthes, at the end of Mythologies, cannot see a way of reconciling the “split in the 
social world” and comments: 
 
We constantly drift between the object and its demystification, powerless to 
render its wholeness. For if we penetrate the object, we liberate it but we destroy 
it; and if we acknowledge its full weight, we respect it, but we restore it to a 
state which is still mystified…And yet, this is what we must seek: a 
reconciliation between reality and men, between description and explanation, 
between object and knowledge. (Barthes 1973, p.159) 
 
Creativity is not an object, but it is a quality ascribed to objects and to people, therefore 
it should be subject to similar analytical ‘demystification’. The aim, of course is to 
create greater clarity around this particular myth, but this outcome is far from certain; 
Culler suggests that 
 
we can certainly infer from what has happened since the publication of 
Mythologies that demystification does not eliminate myth but, paradoxically, 
gives it a greater freedom. (Culler 1990, p.39) 
 
I am not assuming, of course, that this work will inevitably have impact, but even if it 
were to, it is quite possible to imagine creativity reasserting its mythological hold, even 
after a little ‘local disturbance’. 
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5 All Our Futures (1999) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This document was commissioned by the Department for Education and 
Employment, and the Department of Culture, Media and Sport. The National 
Advisory Committee on Creative and Cultural Education was chaired by Ken 
Robinson, “one of the UKʼs home-grown creativity gurus”. (Schlesinger 2007, 
p.382) 
 
Schlesinger also points out, with particular reference to the ʻcreative industriesʼ 
construction, that this report, together with Nurturing Creativity in Young People 
and the Cox Review constructs “a highly self-referential universe” in that 
particular definitions are reproduced from report to report. (Schlesinger 2007, 
p.383) I argue throughout my primary analysis of these policy and advisory 
documents that the ones I have selected also constitute a self-referential circuit, 
but that this in not one in which simple repetition and reproduction occur, rather 
it is one in which translation and modification occur. QCAʼs Creativity: Find it, 
Promote it (2004) uses All Our Futures as a primary reference point, and then 
modifies its definition in order to translate it into practice; Nurturing Creativity in 
Young People cites both the QCA documents and All Our Futures and fits them 
into a policy framework; Ofstedʼs Learning: Creative Approaches that Raise 
Standards includes All Our Futures in its reference list, but makes no explicit 
reference to it in the body of the document, favouring instead QCAʼs translation 
of creativity into specific practices which are then pushed further into 
prescriptive territory. 
 
In addition to its significant presence in the policy and advisory documents 
above, it is, more generally, an influential document in the field of creativity in 
education; it is cited in numerous subsequent UK works in this area, even if they 
are sometimes critical (e.g. Banaji et al. 2006) and its definition of creativity has 
acquired the status of orthodoxy because, I would argue: 
• It does not challenge common sense  
• It lends itself to a liberal/reformist education agenda 
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• It is amenable to operationalisation  
• It is rhetorically powerful 
• It is inclusive to the extent that any positive aspect of teaching and 
learning can come within the ambit of ʻcreativityʼ 
 
The rhetorical nature of the document is signalled by the title, All Our Futures, 
which could equally be applied to a document about climate change; the 
message is clear – change is needed in order to ensure happiness and 
prosperity for everyone in the future. And it is this sense of urgency, which is 
produced both rhetorically and through appeals to rational arguments about 
economic necessity, which serves to mask the rather chaotic nature of the 
document; there is an element of nearly every possible concept of creativity 
here – all connected by the urgency of the entreaty to embrace the project and 
their contradictions masked by this same urgency. 
 
My analysis of this document focuses on some key themes and strategies and, 
through this, I demonstrate how it produces creativity in particular rhetorical, 
discursive and operational ways. Moreover, I indicate that, because of the 
contradictory nature of the different versions of creativity invoked, the ultimate 
effect is simply a sense that some kind of vague ʻchangeʼ is desperately 
needed. Given the dimensions and scope of the document I will focus primarily 
on Part One in which creativity is defined and theorised. 
 
5.2 Marks of authority 
It is not a frivolous point to suggest that ʻsize mattersʼ; All Our Futures is a huge 
document – 242 pages including notes and references – and it makes 60 
recommendations. Its size constitutes a discursive statement – it is literally 
weighty and the metaphor follows easily. There is also the implication that, 
because of the quantity of information, it is likely to be comprehensive – an 
implication also created by the title, which encompasses what is to come for 
everyone – All Our Futures. 
 
Quantity is a significant factor in this document; there are five pages of 
references and it acknowledges ʻwritten submissions from over 200 groups, 
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organisation (sic) and individuals.ʼ (NACCCE 1999, p.228) There are fourteen 
pages at the end of the document in which every individual and organisation 
which contributed to the research and consultation process is listed in 
alphabetical order. The individuals are given with their institutional affiliation 
which confers authority upon them.  
 
This report is not signed by Ken Robinson – as Honan points out, ʻthe signature 
does not necessarily signify authorship, but does signify authorisation.ʼ (Honan 
2004, p.272) – but its authority is established through the statement that the 
committee was established by two secretaries of state (David Blunkett and 
Chris Smith respectively), and through the list of eighteen committee members, 
including any titles, honours and professional positions. The expertise of the 
committee and the complementary reinforcements from the marginal ʻcall outʼ 
boxes are where the authority of this document is located. There is very little 
formal citation of research and little sense that it is an ʻacademicʼ or scholarly 
report, yet its assertions are unambiguous, confident and bold. The sense of a 
committee of experts is a significant factor here in the potential for this 
documentʼs findings and assertions to be accepted as truth and, in turn, for this 
ʻtruthʼ to be acted upon in the form of educational policy and practice. At times, 
the address or enunciation is located in the ʻnon-humanʼ space of the 
document, for example, “This report argues that a national strategy for creative 
and cultural education is essential to that processʼ”(NACCCE 1999, p.5), 
suggesting that the proposals are more than just peopleʼs ideas, not merely the 
thoughts of individuals, but statements which carry the weight of authority, 
publication and the absence of a sole enunciator. “This report” is the ʻvoice of 
godʼ – omnipresent, yet absent. At other moments the plural pronouns “we” and 
“our” are used which provide a persuasive sense of consensus, but without 
locating opinion with individuals. 
 
All Our Futures is constructed, as most advisory and policy documents are, in 
relation to a problem – the problem in this case is that Britainʼs economic 
prosperity is in jeopardy unless the potential of every young person is unlocked; 
the solution is a national strategy for “creative and cultural education”. 
(NACCCE 1999, p.5) 
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Honan (2004), with reference to English education policy in Australia, argues 
that the address of the documentation she examines constructs the compliance 
of teachers: 
 
Their own assumptions about language and learning language must be 
subsumed by the [Education] departmental assumptions included in the 
texts. The compliance of teachers to this regulation (regulation of their 
own thinking it could be said) is unquestioned.  (Honan 2004, p.272) 
 
So who is All Our Futures for, and how might we identify similar textual 
manoeuvres? The introduction tells us that  
 
Formally, our report is addressed to the Secretaries of State, and many 
of our recommendations do call for Government action at various levels. 
But education concerns everybody: children and young people, parents, 
employers, those in work, out of work or in retirement. Consequently, our 
report is also written for a wider audience. (NACCCE 1999, pp.6-7) 
 
This appeal to wider audience has a rhetorical function – there is no-one who 
does not fit into one of the categories above and, therefore, the report includes 
everyone. But the word “concern” constructs “everybody” as stakeholders in 
education and, therefore, a position is produced from which the report does not 
merely speak to everybody, but for everybody. This rhetorical move has the 
effect of empowering the ʻvoiceʼ of the report and constituting it as a kind of 
petition to those in authority – those who need to be persuaded that action is 
necessary. But this championing of the masses takes a rather bathetic turn 
when the “wider audience” is nominated as “…parents…teachers and 
headteachers…school governors…other organisations…business and union 
leaders…” (NACCCE 1999, p.7) 
 
Schlesingerʼs reading of this document highlights the elements in it which seem 
to be determined by the requirements of the job market; he notes, for example, 
that the report was a response to policymakersʼ wish to develop young peopleʼs 
employability attributes, such as creativity, adaptability and communication. 
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(Schlesinger 2007, p.382) He positions this report in the context of other policy 
documents which, together with The Cox Review (2005) and The Creative 
Economy Programme, constitutes evidence of the establishment of creativity 
“as a hegemonic term in an increasingly elaborated framework of policy ideas.” 
(Schlesinger 2007, p.377) In this context All Our Futures has a unity and 
coherence which represent the political agenda of New Labour; the challenges 
to it come from ʻoutsideʼ in order to show how it constitutes and reinforces 
specific political shifts and how it is determined in some way by economic 
exigencies. This reading, with its attention to discursive features and explicit 
connections with a political agenda is valuable, however, I would like to put this 
document under a slightly different kind of pressure in order to reveal some of 
its inherent tensions and contradictions and, by doing this, reveal more about 
the ways in which creativity is mobilised conceptually by it. The strategy, as 
discussed in the methodology chapter, is to work with three conceptual 
touchstones: discourse, rhetoric and ideology which, I argue, can help us make 
sense of creativity in this document. 
 
The strategy is designed to tackle features of enunciation and address in the 
document, to show how its rhetorical elements have a discursive function and 
that there is an ideological underpinning to them. From a Foucaultian 
perspective I am interested in asking, what sort of statements about creativity 
are possible here, how inclusive and exclusive categories are constructed, and 
how does this document creates those conditions of possibility.  
 
5.3 The poetry of urgency 
The report contains the following statement: 
 
Above all, our aim is to urge the need for a national strategy which 
engages the energies of all of these [parents, teachers and heads, 
governors and other ʻstakeholdersʼ] to provide the kind of education, in 
substance and in style, that all young people need now, and to enable 
them to face an uncertain and demanding future. (NACCCE 1999, p.7) 
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It may be grammatical pedantry to point out that the phrase ʻto urge the needʼ 
does not survive parsing; the verb ʻto urgeʼ requires a human actor as its object, 
and then the sentence would conventionally proceed with the thing that needs 
doing; for example, ʻour aim is to urge everyone to accept the need for a 
national strategy…ʼ So is this merely a slip, a mistake? It is quite possible that 
there are comparable errors in this thesis, but perhaps I should acknowledge 
that they betray not only (not even?) grammatical ineptitude, but also represent 
an irruption of something desired, misunderstood or repressed. To treat this 
example as a symptom entails a temporary adoption of a kind of Freudian 
methodology – a perspective from which it might be legitimate to argue that the 
desire of the authors to impress upon the readers the urgency of the need for 
change has led to a slight syntactical breakdown. This extract also exemplifies a 
kind of ʻpoetry of urgencyʼ, which is perhaps consonant with its emphasis on 
creativity as Holy Grail and panacea. The repetition of ʻallʼ signifies inclusivity. 
ʻOurʼ refers to the committee. The words ʻurgeʼ, ʻengageʼ and ʻenergiesʼ with the 
repeated soft ʻgʼ sound, reinforce themselves and also create a sense, through 
phonic association, of ʻurgencyʼ. Again, to venture into the methodological 
territory of literary appreciation may be inconsistent with my stated approach to 
this document, but my point here is that, as with the other documents under 
scrutiny, it is possible to identify moments of over determination in which logical 
inconsistencies are multiplied and are reinforced, or masked by rhetoric. This 
observation of a ʻpoetry of urgencyʼ becomes a much more significant insight if, 
as I argue later, it constitutes a discursive move, whereby attention to 
contradictions is deflected by it. 
 
5.4 A stipulative definition 
This document positions creativity at its centre; creativity is the first term in the 
trio of terms in the subtitle. Yet it avoids defining it immediately. Instead, there is 
an urgent entreaty to accept the necessity of creativity, often offered as ʻcall 
outsʼ from politicians in boxes in the margins. So, for example, we read that  
“…we cannot rely on a small elite, no matter how highly educated or highly paid. 
Instead we need the creativity, enterprise and scholarship of all our people” 
from David Blunkett. (NACCCE 1999, p.5) Chris Smith (then Secretary of State 
for Culture, Media and Sport) adds “We must change the concept of creativity 
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from being something that is ʻadded onʼ to education, skills, training and 
management and make sure it becomes intrinsic to all of these.” (NACCCE 
1999, p.5)  
 
Perhaps because of the support from these authoritative statements, the 
document is able on the following page to make two unambiguous statements 
about creativity: 
 
Creativity is possible in all areas of human activity, including the arts, 
sciences, at work at play and in all other areas of daily life. All people have 
creative abilities and we all have them differently. When individuals find 
their creative strengths, it can have an enormous impact on self-esteem 
and on overall achievement. (NACCCE 1999, p.6) 
 
Creativity is not simply a matter of letting go. Serious creative achievement 
relies on knowledge, control of materials and command of ideas. Creative 
education involves a balance between teaching knowledge and skills, and 
encouraging innovation. In these ways, creative development is directly 
related to cultural education. (NACCCE 1999, p.6) 
 
What is remarkable, firstly, about these statements is the lack of doubt about 
what creativity is and what its benefits are; they have the quality of evangelical 
statements. (I comment later, in the discussion of the Government response to 
the Roberts Report, that the rhetoric of faith can be mobilised to seductive effect 
in the context of creativity). The all-pervading quality of creativity in the first 
statement is rhetorically seductive and performs a manoeuvre which takes it out 
of the purely ʻartisticʼ realm. For Schlesinger, there is a political/economic 
agenda evident here:  
 
There is a clear affinity between the notion that all are possessed of 
creativity and the idea that in businesses all personnel should be creative 
or, at the very least, support the creative endeavour of those specifically 
designated as ʻcreativesʼ. (Schlesinger 2007, p.382)  
 
  138 
There is also a seductive inclusivity in the statement that ʻall people have 
creative abilities and we all have them differentlyʼ; rhetorically it encourages 
assent because it produces a position for the reader which we could call the 
ʻcreative subjectʼ. If one were to reject the assertion, one would be rejecting the 
existence of oneʼs own “creative abilities” 
 
We should also note here the use of the ʻadjectival hedgeʼ – it is significant that 
the statement is not ʻall people possess creativityʼ, but ʻall people have creative 
abilitiesʼ. This may seem like a subtle distinction, but it is a characteristic of 
statements about creativity in general and here, in particular – as a noun it is 
bold and abstract, but the adjective often takes over for the purposes of 
reification.  
 
We can identify the same phenomenon in one of the Diplomas introduced into 
the UK education system in 2008 (incidentally, endorsed in Tom Bewickʼs 
section of Nurturing Creativity in Young People 2006, pp.57-59). In the title of 
the Diploma in Creative and Media the word 'creative' occupies the space of a 
noun, yet it cannot function in this way. Adjectives cannot become nouns unless 
they are altered in form - happy becomes happiness, ugly becomes ugliness 
and so on. So it is legitimate to ask why the form of the word has not changed in 
order to accommodate it grammatically within this context. This would make the 
title of the specification Diploma in Creativity and Media. There is a sense then, 
in which this formulation is being avoided. Why might this be the case? The 
formulation 'Diploma in Creativity and Media', as we have already identified, 
makes ʻcreativeʼ into the noun ʻcreativityʼ and 'creativity' is a much more 
troublesome term than 'creative'. As an adjective, creative can be applied to a 
range of disparate activities and entities, such as 'creative industries', 'creative 
process' and 'creative artist' without causing too much controversy, because it 
functions to enhance those things in a non-specific but generally positive way. 
'Creativity', conversely, must stand on its own; it cannot function to enhance 
another term, but is naked and vulnerable to scrutiny. 
 
In the second statement we might also reflect upon the phrase ʻserious creative 
achievementʼ with its concomitants ʻknowledgeʼ, ʻcontrolʼ and ʻcommandʼ. There 
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is evidence of a tension here between the ideas that creativity is available to 
everyone, but also exclusive, by virtue of the implied necessary work involved.  
 
5.5 The illusion of dialogue 
The report is built around five themes:  
• The Challenge for Education 
• Creative Potential 
• Freedom and Control 
• Cultural Understanding 
• A Systemic Approach 
 
Each of these has independent status in the report, but they are all underpinned 
by the notion of the need for urgent change. ʻChangeʼ is prominent in the 
document – in fact it feels more prominent than the eighteen instances of the 
word in 242 pages might suggest. The possible effect of the entreaty to accept 
the urgent need for change is to cause us to ignore some of the more 
unconvincing statements, such as the uneasy pairing of ʻcreativeʼ and ʻculturalʼ. 
The document also displays neophilia; there are well over a hundred instances 
of the word ʻnewʼ, usually in the context of an entreaty to embrace change, to 
see change as improvement. The rhetoric may be driven by the anticipation of 
dissent: 
 
For some people, the very theme of this report may seem a distraction 
from the main business of raising standards. We do not think so. Our 
concerns are the same as everyone elseʼs. (NACCCE 1999, p.13) 
 
So, rather like the Ofsted report which will be discussed later, there is a textual 
pre-emptive strike here; an acknowledgement that ʻcreativityʼ may be seen as 
peripheral or even irrelevant to the main business of education and, a 
consequent rebuttal of this view in advance.  There is also the use of the plural 
pronoun to give the committeeʼs position some weight and the committee is 
constructed as representative of common sense and common people. The 
negative questions which are anticipated  - preformulated - and responded to in 
the report are: 
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1. Isnʼt an emphasis on creativity and culture a distraction from the core 
concerns with literacy and numeracy? 
2. How are creative and cultural education relevant to raising academic 
standards? 
3. What has this got to do with helping young people get jobs? 
4. Is this committee a lobby group for the arts? 
5. Is this a return to the progressive teaching ideas of the 1960s? 
6. Teachers are already under enormous pressures. Are these 
recommendations going to add to the burden? (NACCCE 1999, 
pp.14-15) 
 
In the focus and articulation of these questions we can identify some interesting 
things, one of which is the way in which the figure of the nay-sayer uses the 
terms established by the report – connecting the adjectives “creative” and 
“cultural”, for example. We also need to examine how the questions have been 
preformulated in particular ways and their status within the document. 
Fairclough alerts us to the terms ʻdifference and dialogicalityʼ with reference to 
textuality and intertextuality, developing five scenarios which might obtain in 
texts and interactions: 
 
a) an openness to, acceptance of, recognition of difference; an exploration 
of difference, as in ʻdialogueʼ in the richest sense of the term; 
b) an accentuation of difference, conflict, polemic, a struggle over meaning, 
norms, power; 
c) an attempt to resolve or overcome difference; 
d) a bracketing of difference, a focus on commonality, solidarity; 
e) consensus, a normalization and acceptance of difference of power which 
brackets or suppresses differences of meaning and norms. (Fairclough 
2003, pp.41-42) 
 
I would argue that although All Our Futures appears to fall into the first of 
Faircloughʼs categories – that of being open to difference - that this is in effect a 
rhetorical move, and actually any potential dissent or opposition is being 
bracketed and neutralised. The neutralisation of these six potential oppositional 
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voices creates the effect of a comprehensive and irrefutable counter to all 
opposition, but, as we shall see, there are other absences which make their 
presence felt. The dialogue which is enacted here is rhetorical, persuasive, 
because it dramatises an encounter in which the ʻvoiceʼ of the report succeeds 
in countering a set of objections to a ʻcreativity agendaʼ. 
 
5.6 The creativity equation  
We are encouraged to accept many of the statements in this document as fact 
or truth, merely through assertion. The strategy, which Jordan (1978) refers to 
as “credibility by insistence”, is not guaranteed to be effective – “It is an 
unfortunate fact that we cannot make objective readers believe that a statement 
is a fact merely by saying it is.” (Jordan 1978, p.4) So how does All Our Futures 
constitute such a persuasive presence? There are some key characteristics 
which contribute to the power of this document convince; one is its appeal to 
common sense – a conceptual framework which, as Sara Mills suggests, is 
significant: 
 
In the process of apprehending, we categorise and interpret experience 
and events according to the structures available to us and, in the process 
of interpretation, we lend these structures a solidity which it is often 
difficult to think outside of. Foucault does not consider these structures to 
be simply the invention of institutions or powerful groups of people, as 
some Marxist thinkers have suggested in their formulating of the notion 
of ideology, nor does he propose that they are simply abstract and 
arbitrary. Rather, he considers that there is a combined force of 
institutional and cultural pressure, together with the intrinsic structure of 
discourse, which leads us to interpret the real through preconceived 
discursive structures. (Mills 2004, p.49) 
 
I would argue that one of the key strengths of this document in establishing a 
notional ʻnature of creativityʼ lies in its ability to rhetorically construct 
propositions which sound like common sense. However, when it produces a 
specific definition of creativity we can identify the emergence of fractures and 
fault lines. It is when creativity is defined that the discursive frame becomes 
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active – we can see the explicit modelling of ʻcreativityʼ. Saarinen (2007) makes 
a similar point when explaining why the notion of ʻqualityʼ in OECD and EU 
policy documents is not asserted explicitly: 
 
A test on the persuasiveness of the presuppositions might be to assert 
them explicitly in the text. If the existence of, for instance, valid 
judgements of quality of higher education as a commodity was asserted, 
these would be open to scrutiny and more easily challenged. (Saarinen 
2007, p.355) 
 
The authors of All Our Futures acknowledge that 
 
Defining a process that covers such a wide range of activities and 
personal styles is inherently difficult. Ours is a stipulative definition, but it 
takes account of what we understand about the nature of creative 
processes and of the ways in which key words are used in different 
contexts. It is also in a sense an indicative definition in that it points to 
features of creative processes that we want to encourage for educational 
purposes. (NACCCE 1999, P.30) 
 
There are a couple of elements here which need exploring: 
• The need for definition  
• The characteristics of ʻdefinitionʼ 
It is significant that the term ʻstipulative definitionʼ is used here; the analytic 
philosopher Arthur Pap notes that 
 
The question is often raised and discussed whether a definition can be 
true or false, or whether it is just an arbitrary stipulation to use a word in 
a certain way. The obvious answer is that some of the statements that 
are, in everyday life, and in science, called “definitions” are merely 
stipulative and others are not.  (Pap 1964, p.49) 
 
Pap distinguishes here between stipulative definitions and propositions; the 
latter constitutes an assertion, about which it is appropriate (within the context 
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of analytic philosophy) to ask whether it is true or false. The former, however, 
constitutes a “proposal” which one “can accept or reject”. Despite the explicit 
use of a ʻstipulative definitionʼ, the report goes on to use it as if it were one of 
Papʼs propositional definitions – an “empirical proposition” to be more precise, 
as it is one “whose truth or falsehood can only be determined by experience”. 
(Pap 1964, p.49) The fact that All Our Futures invokes a stipulative definition 
and then goes on to work with it as if it were an empirical proposition 
constitutes, arguably, a weakness in its argument, however, it could also be 
argued that it is a strength; it is a rhetorical manoeuvre in which a ʻproposalʼ 
becomes a ʻpropositionʼ without drawing attention to itself. If we return to that 
key defining section we can see that the report yokes together two of Papʼs 
ʻepistemological classificationsʼ; here an empirical proposition: 
 
[our definition] takes account of what we understand about the nature of 
creative processes… 
 
And here a ʻlinguistic proposalʼ: 
 
…and [it takes account of] the ways in which key words are used in 
different contexts. (NACCCE 1999, p.30) 
 
Arguably this constitutes methodological infidelity on my part; analytic 
philosophy sees language in terms of symbolic logic, rather than as socially 
invested performance. However, the report explicitly advertises the fact that it is 
using a ʻstipulativeʼ definition and, as I mentioned earlier, I am identifying this as 
a rhetorical manoeuvre, rather than attempting to use it as an indicator of fixed 
meaning. In other words, it is possible to argue that All Our Futures uses the 
rhetoric of logic and, therefore, my confrontation with it continues to be on 
discursive rather than logical grounds; I am not refuting the definition on logical 
grounds, but drawing attention to the rhetorical construction of that definition. 
 
With such discursive scaffolding, a subject position is constituted from which it 
is difficult to move – this is a document characterised by over determination – 
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the audience for it is universal, its definition all-encompassing, its enthusiasm 
promiscuous and rational probes are shrugged off with a rhetorical flourish. 
 
This report works harder, by which I mean it takes up many more pages than 
any of the other documents being scrutinised, to define creativity and, as I have 
mentioned above, its definition is quoted and modified in Creativity: Find it, 
Promote it (QCA 2004), Nurturing Creativity in Young People (2006), the 
Government Response to Nurturing Creativity in Young People (2006) and 
(indirectly) Ofstedʼs Learning: Creative Approaches that Raise Standards 
(2010a). It is, therefore, an influential definition, perhaps not least because it 
can be neatly summarised in four bullet points: 
 
Our starting point is to recognise four characteristics of creative 
processes. First they always involve thinking or behaving imaginatively. 
Second, overall this imaginative activity is purposeful: that is, it is 
directed to achieving an objective. Third, these processes must generate 
something original. Fourth, the outcome must be of value in relation to 
the objective. We therefore define creativity as: 
 
Imaginative activity fashioned so as to produce outcomes 
that are both original and of value. (NACCCE 1999, p.30) 
 
As will become apparent later, this definition has acquired the status of truth 
through repetition and modification, and we can note here an almost biblical 
quality in the way that the definition is ʻspoken into beingʼ. The problem with 
definitions, as Schlesinger notes (and I have referred to in an earlier chapter), is 
that to define something  
 
…is not by any means to offer a protocol for its study and analysis. We 
might agree on a definition but still disagree about the details of 
subsequent categorization and what is to count as an adequate method 
for assembling evidence. (Schlesinger 1991, p.7) 
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To apply this caveat to the definition provided in All Our Futures is to alert us to 
the multiple possibilities inherent in nearly every term of reference: 
“imaginative”, “purposeful”, “original” and “value”. The document works to 
exemplify these concepts in the context of creativity in such a way as to make 
them desirable and able to be implemented in education, but in doing so 
creates a rupture between rational assertion and rhetorical enthusiasm. I 
suggest that the central irony in this document is that it produces the most 
influential definition of creativity for a decade (in UK education) yet embraces, 
champions and promotes a chaotic melange of activities which undermine the 
apparent austerity of the definition. Nelson points out that: 
 
…it is only once creativity is reified and named that it makes itself 
available as an object for scientific study. Once named, it can be 
measured and dissected by psychologists and brain surgeons, and 
political and educational institutions can create policies for its cultivation. 
(Nelson 2010, p.68) 
 
This insight indicates the necessity for the report to name and reify, but also 
indicates that this process makes the concept more vulnerable and amenable to 
scrutiny. The rationalisation and codification of creativity in All Our Futures has 
the appearance of rationality and logic, but is most effective on a rhetorical 
level; its subsequent exemplification (without, to quote Schlesinger, “a single 
protocol for its study and analysis”) actually undermines it. 
 
5.7 A creativity smorgasbord 
Banaji et al. point out that 
 
While it may appear that the rhetoric used in the NACCCE report 
supports ʻdemocraticʼ notions of creativity, and encourages an 
appreciation of cultural difference, many of its promises about the 
benefits of creative education betray elements of more elitist and 
romantic notions of artistic endeavour, and the traditional artistic 
practices and forms associated with them. (Banaji et al. 2006, p.29) 
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While I would agree that there is evidence to support this assertion, I would 
disagree that the return of this particular ʻrepressedʼ ideology has the 
inevitability or coherence implied here. All Our Futures is a difficult document to 
analyse because it applies its stipulative definition of creativity in the most 
promiscuous ways and, in addition, attempts to make this cohere with notions of 
culture and cultural education. It has the qualities of an octopus; no sooner has 
one dealt with the activities of one tentacle, one finds multiple different issues to 
tackle and the cumulative experience is enervating. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to show how this document is made up of heterogeneous versions of 
creativity, yet constructs a rhetoric of homogeneity. This rhetoric of homogeneity 
and common sense is exemplified in the introduction to the document: 
 
There are many misconceptions about creativity. Some people associate 
creative teaching with a lack of discipline in education. Others see 
creative ability as the preserve of a gifted few, rather than of the many; 
others associate it only with the arts. In our view creativity is possible in 
all areas of human activity and all young people and adults have creative 
capacities. Developing these capacities involves a balance between 
teaching skills and understanding, and promoting the freedom to 
innovate and take risks. (NACCCE 1999, p.10) 
 
Implied here is that this document will put an end to any “misconceptions about 
creativity”; misconception is a serious word here, telling us that it is incorrect to 
associate creative teaching with a lack of discipline, to see creative ability as the 
preserve of a gifted few and to associate creativity only with the arts. The 
alternative, according to the rhetorical structure of this paragraph, instituted by 
the words “In our view…”, must, therefore, be correct. This phrase “In our view” 
has an understated rhetorical force; it is similar to the phrase “in my opinion”, 
which can be persuasive through the appearance of humility. But here it is far 
from humble, given that “our view” refers to the opinion of the many experts on 
the committee, expressed in 242 pages.  Also significant here is a kind of 
sleight of hand by which creativity, the abstract noun, becomes elided with 
“creative teaching”, “creative ability” and “creative capacities”. So, for example, 
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to “associate creative teaching with a lack of discipline in education” is to 
harbour a “misconception[ ] about creativity”. 
 
The more one reads this document, the more incoherent it becomes, and its 
meaning so blurred by so many assertions that one is left with two very general 
impressions:  
• All Our Futures is ʻrightʼ about creativity 
• Creativity is a ʻgood thingʼ. 
As a piece of rhetoric, then, perhaps it is successful, especially as it appears to 
offer a ʻscientificʼ, researched and fixed model of creativity which is actually a 
malleable one and, as we shall see in subsequent documents, therefore 
amenable to being operationalised in specific contexts. 
 
When we read that “Creativity is obviously to do with producing something 
original” (NACCCE 1999, p.28) and that “Creativity is a basic capacity of human 
intelligence” (NACCCE 1999, p.37) it is easier to accept than resist. These are 
rhetorical devices – the use of ʻbasicʼ suggests that creativity is as essential and 
innate to being human as, for example, oxygen and water being basic 
necessities for human existence.  The use of ʻobviouslyʼ, as with other 
strategies in this document, limits the possibility, or indeed, rationality of an 
alternative viewpoint. 
 
One final point about the universal embrace of this document; the marginal ʻcall 
outʼ boxes which appear on several pages, contain quotations about creativity 
and/or education, which are positioned in order to emphasise or provide 
illustration of the argument in the body of the document. In Chapter 9 on 
Funding and Resources, for example, the boxes tend to provide anecdotal 
evidence from trainers, politicians and beneficiaries which emphasise the value 
of ʻcreative and culturalʼ projects; “Information provided by Prue Leith”, for 
example, tells us that: 
 
A school in a deprived area set up an after-school cooking club. A couple 
of boys who had dropped out came, got so enthused that the next thing 
they asked was to be allowed back into French classes, believing that 
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they would never become great chefs without being able to speak 
French. (NACCCE 1999, p.169) 
 
This anecdote functions to reaffirm the congruence between ʻcreativeʼ extra-
curricular work and conventional educational standards. It also reinforces the 
notion underpinning the entire document that education should be learner 
centred and that motivation is most effective when it is intrinsic. The quotations 
in Part One, however, are a gnomic and contradictory collection. Jung is cited, 
for example: 
 
The creation of something new is not accomplished by the intellect alone 
but by the play instinct. The creative mind plays with the object it loves. 
(NACCCE 1999, p.32) 
 
And is followed by Einstein: 
 
Imagination is more important than knowledge. (NACCCE 1999, p.32) 
 
The document uses this strategy of ʻelite citationʼ in order to authorise, 
sometimes indirectly, its assertions. The above quotations sit next to assertions 
about the relationship between creativity and originality and provide rhetorical 
reinforcement, despite the fact that each, potentially undermines the explicit 
argument. This tension is both literal and discursive; the rhetoric of the Einstein 
quotation, for example, sits uneasily with the reportʼs need to retain ʻknowledgeʼ 
in a complementary relationship with ʻskillsʼ and ʻimaginationʼ in education. 
Discursively there is also a tension in the fact that, in this section, those 
afforded the privilege of a quotation box are ʻexceptional individualsʼ who have 
emerged from a traditional, ʻpre revolutionaryʼ education system. So the 
comment that: 
 
In our view exceptional individual achievement – that is, of historic 
originality – is also more likely to emerge from a system of education 
which encourages the creative capacities of everyone. (NACCCE 1999, 
p.32) 
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although it is voiced with confidence, has a questionable quality.  
 
5.8 Summary 
All Our Futures is a difficult document to analyse on a rational level because of 
its apparently boundless embrace and incorporation of a range of desirable 
activities and outcomes into the category ʻcreativityʼ. It seems grossly reductive, 
but tempting, to suggest that creativity in this document could be defined as 
ʻthings we like in educationʼ and stands in opposition to ʻthings we donʼt like in 
educationʼ. Despite its appearance of authority and rigour it is inherently 
contradictory and chaotic, glued together with the poetry of novelty and 
excitement and reinforced by the rhetoric of economic necessity. Despite this it 
is cited repeatedly, has provided the impetus for an entire collection of essays 
about creativity in education (Craft et al. 2001) and is seen as providing a clear 
agenda for creativity in education. Joubert, for example, argues that: 
 
In an ideal world we would want the government to commit to the 
promotion of creativity in education and to implement all the 
recommendations of the NACCCE report, ranging from a new curriculum 
structure to new assessment, inspection and teacher training 
arrangements…The government may be waiting to see if there is enough 
support from the teaching profession before committing to a creative 
education agenda. If this is the case I would urge the profession to 
provide this support. (Joubert 2001, p.31) 
 
Joubert suggests that “a new order of creativity in education” is being 
obstructed by a range of factors – political, ideological and bureaucratic, for 
example – but her most significant recognition threatens to undermine all of this: 
 
Creativity is a very elusive concept to define, and even when defined, it is 
interpreted in a variety of different ways, e.g. is creativity in education the 
same as creativity in business?...We still lack a common conceptual 
language, understood by all, to enable us to discuss creativity in 
education and across other sectors. It seems that even scholars of 
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creativity do not have a shared language for creativity. (Joubert 2001, 
p.29) 
 
However, the insight that there is no conceptual coherence is not sufficient to 
halt the passionate advocacy of the adoption of creativity in education. The 
lukewarm government reception of the many recommendations made in All Our 
Futures (see Joubert 2001, pp.28-29 and Buckingham and Jones 2001) may 
well be attributable to the barriers adduced by Joubert, but it may also be also 
be related in some way to the over determined, rhetorical quality of the 
document. 
 
Nevertheless, All Our Futures has provided the three remaining educational 
documents with a persuasive, authorised, yet stipulative, definition of creativity 
that we can observe undergoing particular transformations. 
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Interruption 5: Black holes and violence 
My epistemological shift is a transition from believing that there is ‘something’ to look 
for, to scepticism about this belief. Instead I am examining the construction of the 
beliefs that there is something there. An analogy might be the search for black holes; 
there is a belief that they exist because particular things happen that suggest they are 
there. But instead of joining the quest for black holes, I am asking questions about the 
ways in which belief in black holes is expressed and constructed. In a curriculum 
context, the analogy becomes a bit more tenuous – I am critiquing the ways in which 
particular pedagogic and administrative strategies are built upon the notional existence 
of black holes. 
 
I spent a long time asking ‘what is creativity?’ – a question which all of the documents 
under scrutiny ask (and answer). But the attempt to define it was impossible, and other 
definitions, despite making rhetorically similar noises (originality, purposefulness etc.) 
identify it in very different ways – as a mindset, as outcome, as attitude. One of the key 
problems, I have realised is the rhetorical unity of writing about creativity – it is 
generally positive and overlooks differences in methodology and philosophy; even if 
there is acknowledgement of differences in conception or causes, these are glossed over 
because there is general agreement on the outcomes or the value of the kinds of things 
that are included. As Cropley argues: 
 
It may thus seem that the term is so widely used that its meaning has become 
diffuse and uncertain. However, as will be shown in more detail in following 
sections there is a common core to all discussions, especially when educational 
or psychological considerations are emphasized. (Cropley 2004, p.5) 
 
The analogy with violence is not an outlandish one; there is a similar tendency to ignore 
contradictions, methodological incompatibilities and differences in categories because 
there is general agreement on the negative value of ‘violence’. Research in different 
modes in different traditions, therefore, is seen as having cumulative worth and 
contributes to a greater degree of certainty in the existence of the concept as an 
objective phenomenon.  
 
I keep coming back to violence – a common-sense word loaded with complexity. It 
occurs to me that the language of critical theory – post structuralist theory in particular – 
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is characterised by metaphors of violence; we talk of ruptures, interrogations, stretching 
things to their limits and ‘mobilising’ concepts and operations as if they were part of a 
military strategy. Perhaps this kind of language offers a kind of comfort – a set of 
metaphors of physical certainty in order to deal with the ambiguity of meaning. Norris 
(1983) points out that the conceptual language of philosophy is metaphorical and 
Althusser draws attention to the metaphorical basis of Marx’s theory of the state (1977), 
and these observations legitimate an approach to understanding concepts based on 
attending to rhetoric. But my own rhetoric must be subject to the same kind of scrutiny 
and I am aware that the muscular invasiveness of my analytical language may be a kind 
of compensation for a lack of certainty about the usefulness of a particular conceptual 
stance. It is also, certainly, compensation for the absence of robust empirical work 
which produces large quantities of data from which theories can be inferred. My own 
metaphors, I’ve realised, involve disease and infestation; I talk of ‘nit-picking’ or ‘scab-
picking’. I seem to feel that my ‘work’ is parasitical and an irritant. 
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6 Creativity: Find it, promote it 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This is a collection of materials which existed on the QCA website before being 
published as a print version “in response to…demand.” (QCA 2004, p.4)  This 
document explicitly addresses Key Stages 1, 2 and 3 in the UK education 
system – or ages 5 – 14 and, therefore, provides an interesting example of how 
the concept of creativity is modelled to be functional within the context of the 
National Curriculum. 
 
An application of discourse analytical techniques to it reveals how it represents 
a transitional stage between the more utopian, liberal language of Robinson and 
Roberts and the more prescriptive, operational language of Ofsted. I might 
venture, then, that those documents which have been commissioned as 
exploratory tend to emphasise philosophical issues of value and worth, whereas 
those concerned with practice and implementation tend to be pulled towards 
prescriptions of valid activities. In both cases there are tensions as they attempt 
to make sense of complexity, but in the latter case resolutions are found which 
depend upon practical, unambiguous means. So, my use of the term 
ʻtransitionalʼ may be misleading; I do not mean to suggest an inevitable 
progression from X to Y, rather that we can identify the occupation of a border 
between two different territories. It is also the case that although the QCA 
materials succeed the Robinson Report, they precede the Roberts Report, so I 
wish to avoid any specious conclusions based on chronology. Nevertheless, 
ʻtransitionʼ often incorporates a sense of the temporal as well as the spatial, so 
the metaphor may not hold.  
 
There are some significant characteristics which enable us to see this transition. 
The contents page, for example, reveals that, of the six numbered sections, four 
of them have interrogative titles: 
 
What is creativity? 
Why is creativity so important? 
  154 
How can you spot creativity? 
How can you promote creativity? (QCA 2004, p.3) 
 
The emphasis on questions suggests an openness to different interpretations, 
indeed the subheading for the first section tells us that it is “A starting point for 
agreeing what your school means by creativity” (p.3). But this openness to 
ambiguity is limited. One strategy for unpacking this particular text is to identify 
key points where two different discourses are in tension and conflict. These 
discourses can be conceived in the following terms: 
• A discourse characterised by complexity, ambiguity, questioning and 
freedom 
• A discourse characterised by simplicity, disambiguation, certainty and 
limits. 
 
My analytical strategy then is to identify key points in the document in which we 
can identify these discourses and explain how the tension is manifested and 
managed. This entails attention to vocabulary, grammatical features, mode of 
address, conceptual oppositions (explicit or implicit) and a consideration of the 
implications for putting particular procedures into practice. This is a document 
with an explicit aim – to introduce good practice around creativity, and an 
implicit aim – to standardise such practice. As such, it inevitably is engaged in 
the production of a category of teaching and learning and, therefore, it inevitably 
establishes boundaries around this category. Attention to the nature of the 
boundary (to what is and is not included) and how the boundary is policed (by 
what means differences and distinctions are maintained) will reveal the 
discursive and ideological constitution of creativity within this context. And to 
borrow from a deconstructionist approach to texts (cf. Norris 1983), I am looking 
for evidence of a ʻtextual economyʼ in which parities are established and values 
asserted. 
 
6.2 The cover image 
The image on the cover of this document is, in Mastermanʼs terms rhetorical, 
and I am reminded of his approach to image analysis in the media, when he 
argues that “[images] are continually used to authenticate a particular point of 
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view” and that “ambiguous visual images, containing many possible free-floating 
meanings, can come to legitimate particular interpretations”. (Masterman 1990, 
p.144) 
 
The image is a low-angle shot of a young girl, frozen mid-jump, suspended in 
the air and framed against the sky above and greenery below. Her outstretched 
arms suggest triumph, joy and freedom. The image is cropped so that we do not 
see her face – she represents all young people, perhaps. The purple of her vest 
is nearly identical to the purple of the word “Creativity” in the title, which is 
superimposed on a stylised splash of yellow, the kind that might be formed if 
Jackson Pollock had just loaded his brush. The replication of this configuration 
of text and colour splash below gives it brand status for this document. The 
splash icon also appears on the contents page, but without the text, which 
arguably has become unnecessary now that the image has been anchored to 
the word “creativity”.  
 
It is a strange image. It is ambiguous, even with the text to anchor it (cf. Barthes 
1977); like a news image with a caption, the splash of colour and the words 
“Creativity: find it, promote it” printed across the image invite us to read the 
image as representation or illustration of this. In what way, we might ask, does 
this image represent or construct creativity? Is the child jumping because of her 
joy at being creative? Or does her jumping signify that she is creative? Perhaps 
this approach to signification is too literal; perhaps this is not ʻiconʼ, but ʻsymbolʼ, 
to use Peirceʼs taxonomy of signs (Peirce 1955, pp.102-103) As a symbol it has 
a certain potency, but it would be possible to be cynical about it as a 
representation of creativity; it is a cliché – exuberance signified through an 
ʻevery childʼ jumping for joy and it is, in this sense an example of utopian 
rhetoric – creativity as a ʻgood thingʼ. But to understand the image in a 
ʻmythologicalʼ context we need to, as Barthes does, move beyond the notion of 
the symbol because “This type of focusing is that of the producer of myths, of 
the journalist who starts with a concept and seeks a form for it.” (1973, p.128) 
To read the myth means to examine what is being naturalised here which, is the 
equation of creativity with immediacy and ʻuntutorednessʼ. This reading is made 
possible by the apparent lack of artistry in the construction of the image – it 
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appears to be flash-lit (like a domestic photograph), on location (rather than in a 
studio or other controlled space) and the child is framed in such a way as to 
exclude her face, one of her arms and her feet (attributes which would be 
criticised as crude in a conventional photographic context).  
 
This serves to naturalise the idea that children are inherently creative, that 
creativity really is something which can be found or discovered, like any other 
naturally occurring object or quality. And we have come across this idea in the 
literature, in Willisʼ (1990, 1998) work, for example, the idea that almost any 
aspect of young peopleʼs activity – production and consumption – is always 
already ʻcreativeʼ. In the context of this document, however, this naturalisation is 
established in tension with the other term in the title – the idea of ʻpromotionʼ 
which, with its associated ideas of organising and reconfiguring raw material for 
a wider audience, has the potential to undermine the very thing which makes 
creativity worth finding in the first place.  
 
The form and address of the cover of this document threaten to limit the range 
of possibilities of creativity, partly through the corporate stamp of QCA in the 
bottom left corner – an imprimatur of official sanction and quality – and partly 
through the subtitle “Practical materials for schools” which suggests a set of 
standardised activities. Similarly, the abstract splashes of colour which continue 
throughout the document in various contrasting combinations of acid yellow, 
blue, red, pink, orange and green, promise abandonment and freedom from 
constraint – perhaps even freedom from the constraints of taste (cf. Bourdieu 
2010) – are literally marginalised after the contents page and restricted to the 
left hand fifth of each page. The vertical line marks the boundary between this 
free and liberal mode of expression and the ordered discourse of headings and 
bullet points which prescribe both the questions that must be asked and some 
of the answers to them. This antagonism between these two poles continues 
throughout the document. 
 
6.3 We seek it here 
The title of the document suggests a sequence of events; first one finds 
creativity and then one promotes it. The verb ʻto findʼ is reassuring because it 
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confirms that creativity exists to be found, that it has an existence independent 
of perception and opinion. The verb ʻto promoteʼ encourages collaboration in 
this worthy enterprise and offers a kind of recompense for the effort of finding 
creativity. Taken as a whole, the title is a terse imperative, an instruction barked 
at those who might have doubts that creativity is something worth finding or 
promoting. As such it echoes the urgency of All Our Futures in its entreaty to 
embrace creativity in schools. But the creativity in this document is not identical 
to that in Ken Robinsonʼs report, despite its apparent indebtedness to 
Robinsonʼs formulation. 
 
6.4 Circular logic 
The problem of perception and definition is one that this document attempts to 
efface through rhetoric and specious reasoning and is best exemplified here, in 
the sub-section on originality: 
 
When pupils are writing a poem, choreographing a dance or producing a 
painting, their work can be unique if it expresses their ideas and feelings. 
But what about work in subjects like science, history and maths? While it 
would be wonderful for a pupil to be the first person to discover a new 
scientific principle, this is highly unlikely. Does this mean that pupils canʼt 
be creative in these subjects? Not at all. Skilled teachers can help pupils 
tackle questions, solve problems and have ideas that are new to them. 
This makes pupilsʼ ideas original, the result of genuinely creative 
behaviour. (QCA 2004, pp.77-8) 
 
This section of the document is structured around the four characteristics of 
creativity outlined in All Our Futures (1999): “Imagination and Purpose”; 
“Originality”; “Value”. The suggestion is that “debating the characteristics 
highlighted by this definition can be a helpful starting point for agreeing what 
your school actually means by creativity.” (QCA 2004, p.7) Like All Our Futures, 
it uses the rhetorical device of question and answer in order to create the 
impression of debate and the sense of dialectical progress towards harmonious 
agreement. But the formulation used to explain how pupils can be creative in 
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science, history and maths reveals how ʻcreativity equationsʼ or ʻcreativity 
syllogismsʼ do not work.  Let us break this one down: 
Proposition: Pupils cannot be creative in science, history and maths because 
they are unlikely to produce original work. 
Counter: Not true, because they can learn how to tackle questions, solve 
problems and have ideas that are new to them. 
Result: Therefore their ideas are original, because they have resulted from 
creative behaviour. 
 
The image of Ouroboros comes to mind – the serpent which swallows its own 
tail, forming a circle; the suggestion is that originality is a constituent of 
creativity, but also that it is the result of creativity and, therefore, impossible to 
locate; it is everywhere and nowhere. The rhetoric is seductive because it elides 
creativity and originality and suggests that these treasures are available for 
everyone. But this breaches the taxonomical work of All Our Futures, upon 
which the document depends. Cropleyʼs book on creativity (2004) features the 
cover image of a chicken and an egg – symbolically and axiomatically potent, 
but perhaps unwittingly deconstructive of scientific and logical approaches to 
creativity in that it represents a comparable circular story. There is a similar 
example of this in the section headed “Why is creativity so important?”, where 
we read that “Creativity improves pupilsʼ self-esteem, motivation and 
achievement” (QCA 2004, p.9) – all characteristics of behaviour and action that 
sound like indicators of creativity, rather than products of creativity. To put it 
another way, pupils who are encouraged to do things we call ʻcreativeʼ, tend to 
do these ʻcreativeʼ things. 
 
Heidegger describes a similar logical problem when defining a work of art: 
 
What art is can be gathered from a comparative examination of actual art 
works. But how are we to be certain that we are indeed basing such an 
examination on art works if we do not know beforehand what art is? And 
the essence of art can no more be arrived at by a derivation from higher 
concepts than by a collection of characteristics of actual art works. For 
such a derivation, too, already has in view the definitions that must 
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suffice to establish that what we take in advance to be an art work is one 
in fact. But selecting characteristics from among given objects, and 
deriving concepts from principles, are equally impossible here, and 
where these procedures are practiced they are a self deception.  
(Heidegger 1978, pp.149-150) 
 
Heidegger acknowledges that this is a “circle”, but argues that “we are 
compelled to follow the circle” (p.150) and, rather than seeing the situation as 
presenting an insurmountable logical obstacle he sees it as providing a 
necessary examination of the “thingly element” in the work of art. However, no 
such philosophical strategy is proposed here, or in any of the policy documents 
under scrutiny, rather an analogous, but implicit, leap of faith is masked by the 
appearance of rational reasoning. 
 
A key problem for this document is that, despite appearing to introduce 
creativity as a debate, it needs to define it, to define how it is manifested and to 
define its worth. Consequently it is rife with contradictions. We move from the 
apparently interrogative domain of Section One into the assertive domain of 
Section Two, featuring sub-headings in which uncertainty does not exist any 
more: 
 
Creativity improves pupilsʼ self-esteem, motivation and achievement. 
Creativity prepares pupils for life: an important aim of the National 
Curriculum. 
Creativity enriches pupilsʼ lives. (QCA 2004, p.9) 
 
As we have seen previously, the strain of maintaining conviction in a concrete 
phenomenon of creativity inevitably gives way to a utilitarian approach. In this 
section it does not matter what creativity is, it only matters what creativity does 
and, therefore, the concept is modelled in reverse; the desirable outcomes are 
clear and real, so the nebulous concept can be reified in order to fit these. 
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6.5 Look whoʼs talking 
Jakobsonʼs work reminds us to attend not merely to lexical, grammatical and 
syntactical features of language: 
 
Insistence on keeping poetics apart from linguistics is warranted only 
when the field of linguistics appears to be illicitly restricted, for example, 
when the sentence is viewed by some linguists as the highest analyzable 
construction or when the scope of linguistics is confined to grammar 
alone or uniquely to non-semantic questions of external form or to the 
inventory of denotative devices with no reference to free variations. 
(Jakobson 1988, p.34) 
 
This realisation means that we must give equal attention to the function of 
language and texts, and their communicative contexts, in order to avoid 
attributing meaning too simplistically to languageʼs notional ʻinternalʼ operations. 
In the case of all of the documents under scrutiny this means, for a start, 
considering the way in which an addressee is produced by the texts – the way 
in which a reading, practising subject is constructed in particular ways.  
 
I have commented above how the imperative nature of the title of the document 
produces a subject which is essentially passive; even though s/he is 
encouraged to act (by finding and promoting creativity), s/he is the recipient of 
an instruction delivered by an authoritative institution. The second person 
pronoun is implied here – there is a notional ʻyouʼ who is being instructed to find 
and promote creativity – but its literal omission diminishes this potentially 
unappealing tone and creates, instead, what we might call a ʻmanifesto toneʼ in 
which the individual may buy into the mission, without feeling like a conscript. 
So, as with the urgent entreaty to save “all our futures” in the Robinson Report, 
we have a hegemonic mode of address in which consent is sought by any 
means necessary. The difference here is that this document contains “practical 
materials for schools” and, therefore, it contains examples of activities which 
represent good practice and which should be adopted in some form. This 
instructional mode, which assumes and constructs power in its relationship with 
the addressee, can be found at various points in this document. 
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But the instructional mode exists alongside another mode of address, a mode 
which is less overtly powerful, less overtly authoritative and more ʻcollegialʼ. On 
the contents page, for example, we see: 
1. What is creativity? 
A starting point for agreeing what your school means by creativity (QCA 
2004, p.3) 
 
As I have mentioned already, the interrogative form of the section title suggests 
openness to debate and discussion, and this is confirmed by the subheading 
which invites the (now personalised) reader to begin the discussion at a local 
level. The offer here is for creativity to be result of local negotiations and for the 
reader to gain a degree of ownership of it. The fact that a “starting point” is 
nominated suggests that this negotiation could go in a variety of directions. 
There is similar degree of personalisation in the headings on the contents page 
for sections three and four: 
 
3. How can you spot creativity? 
What you are likely to see when pupils are thinking behaving creatively in 
the classroom 
4. How can you promote creativity? 
How can teachers promote creativity? 
How can teams of teachers promote creativity?  
How can senior managers and governors promote creativity? (QCA 
2004, p.3) 
 
There is a noticeable shift in address here from the second to the third person; 
section three maintains the address to ʻyouʼ and suggests that the addressee 
can acquire expertise in identifying creative behaviour. This positions the 
teacher/reader/addressee as a professional locus of some kind of power to 
observe and judge. (I will return to the implications of judging creativity on the 
basis of visual evidence later). The heading for section four seems, initially, to 
continue to position the reader as professional, with a similar interrogative 
prompt and second person address, but the sub-headings move into the third 
person and therefore constitute a kind of rupture in the mode of address. If the 
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question is now about how “teachers” can “promote creativity”, then who is 
being spoken to? And if “teachers” are being spoken about rather than to, they 
are now removed from the collegial embrace set up in the earlier mode of 
address. One could argue that this is merely an example of the kind of 
imprecision and inconsistency that one often finds in official documents, but I 
would argue that we can find in it the central tension identified above; the 
tension between creativity as something open to negotiation and subject to local 
agreements, and creativity as something limited, accountable and subject to 
institutional supervision. The heading for section two stands out in this context 
because there is no suggestion of this collegial gesture and no use of the 
second person address: 
 
2. Why is creativity so important? 
Improving pupilsʼ self-esteem, motivation and achievement: preparing 
pupils for life; enriching pupilsʼ lives (QCA 2004, p.3) 
 
This represents a significant break from the mode of address adopted in the 
headings for section one; there is no explicit addressee and the subheading is 
in the form of a list, rather than the prose we find in sections 1 and 3. In 
addition, despite its construction as a question, the heading limits the range of 
possible responses by making it impossible, without an aggressively 
oppositional reading, to challenge the notion that creativity is important. And in a 
further act of closure, the list which constitutes the subheading provides 
ʻanswersʼ to the question in the heading. The absence of an addressee moves 
the question about creativity from the particular to the universal; there is no 
possibility of local negotiation here, no suggestion of a debate to be had, 
instead we have a declaration of a universal truth – creativity is important – and 
this is reinforced by some reasons why. 
 
6.6 Service provider and client 
The stated audience for this document is:  
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mainly…teachers, headteachers, senior managers and governors, 
although others with an interest in education may find it useful. (QCA 
2004, p.5) 
 
and this may provide a rationale for the shifts in address. However, I would 
argue that there is a relationship between the construction of subject positions 
and the construction of creativity and that by analysing one the other is 
illuminated. Unfortunately there is no simple correlation between, for example, 
the second person mode and a conception of creativity as fluid and open and, 
conversely, the third person mode and a conception of creativity as fixed and 
standardised. But an analysis of specific moments of enunciation can reveal 
how the tension manifests itself and also enables further exploration of my idea 
that what is at stake in constructions of creativity is the status of the subject. A 
good example in this respect occurs in the introduction: 
 
Using this booklet and the examples 
Sections 1, 2 and 3 could provide a starting point to: 
• discuss what pupils and teachers think is meant by creativity 
• reconsider the schoolʼs learning and teaching policy and how 
pupilsʼ creativity is currently being promoted through their schoolʼs 
curriculum. (QCA 2004, p.5) 
 
The bold heading uses what we might call a ʻservice discourseʼ, in that it offers 
guidance to the potential user; it is the same mode of address that we find in 
manuals for technical equipment – my ʻAirport Expressʼ manual, for example, 
tells me to “read this guide to get started using it”. This mode is also evident in 
the foreword, where we find that 
 
Many people have expressed interest in obtaining a print version of 
Creativity: find it, promote it. These materials are published in response 
to this demand. (QCA 2004, p.4) 
 
Both of these examples produce a reading subject that is a service-user or 
client and, within the structural economy of service-provider and client, creativity 
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(or, more accurately, understanding creativity) here becomes, temporarily, a 
commodity to be provided. The ʻgiftingʼ verbs in the introduction provide further 
evidence of this – “Section 3 provides…”; “Section 4 provides…”; Section 5 
gives…” What is significant here is that the subject is not a ʻcreative subjectʼ, 
but a ʻconsuming subjectʼ and this focus on mode of address helps us to see 
how creativity appears, disappears and mutates at various points. In the context 
of this document creativity functions as a reason for dependence – the 
dependence of the teacher upon the expertise of the authority – but this is 
masked by the rhetoric of freedom and self-fulfilment.  
 
To return to the example at the beginning of this section, which begins with the 
ʻuser guidanceʼ, we can identify inconsistencies in the mode of address which 
further reveal the complex network of temporary bonds around creativity. The 
tentative tone with which it begins, for example, is produced with a modal verb, 
“could”, which is a verb of possibility rather than compulsion. It is followed by 
the verb “provide”, which is consistent with the ʻservice discourseʼ noted above, 
and the thing which could be provided is “a starting point”. There is an implied 
addressee here; the sentence could be reconfigured to address a notional 
teacher if the words “for you” were inserted after “starting point” and this would 
be consistent with the quality of the second person mode described above. 
However, this would not work in this context, because the succeeding bullet 
points seem to address a second person who does not fall into the category 
“pupils” or “teachers”. This second person is positioned as hierarchically 
superior to ʻthemʼ – the “pupils and teachers” – and is offered the privilege of 
discussing what they “think is meant by creativity”. (QCA 2004, p.5)  
 
Again, we might argue that this is merely a case of syntactical infelicity, but I 
suggest that the fleetingly glimpsed subjects are constituted by different 
degrees of power regarding their ability to control how creativity is realised in 
institutions. It is clear from the first bullet point that the addressee is not a 
teacher (or, indeed, a pupil) and this recognition is confirmed by the second 
bullet point, in which the subject is invited to “reconsider the schoolʼs learning 
and teaching policy and how pupilsʼ creativity is currently being promoted 
through their schoolʼs curriculum.” (QCA 2004, p.5) Creativity here is something 
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which should be encysted in policy and should be promoted – in other words, it 
is something over which the school should assert control and ownership. But is 
also something ʻownedʼ by pupils (in as much as they are given a possessive 
relationship with it) so, as I mentioned above, what is at stake is agency – how 
creativity is ʻenactedʼ or performed within an educational context – and who can 
claim it, retain it and maintain it.  
 
This shifting between subjects could well be a feature of educational policy 
more generally, but it is particularly revealing in relation to the nature of the 
tensions around creativity. 
 
6.7 From incompetence to competence 
Section 5 of the report: “About QCAʼs creativity project”, is exemplary in its 
moves towards a ʻcreativity hegemonyʼ; by this I mean that through a range of 
rhetorical manoeuvres it encourages acceptance of a set of principles about 
creativity in education. 
 
The description of project represents it in terms of academic research and 
governmental authority. We read first that QCA was asked by the Secretary of 
State for Education and Skills to investigate creativity as a national curriculum 
priority, which confers upon the research the power of official sanction. The 
research then describes a fairly conventional academic process, which includes 
a review of literature, and practice and policy relating to creativity in other 
countries. This is then mobilised in an empirical project with practising teachers, 
informed by the research and “discussions with experts.” (QCA 2004, p.18) 
 
It is significant that QCA in this research claims to have “adopted the definition 
of creativity in All Our Futures” (QCA 2004, p.18) which, as I have pointed out 
previously, was offered as “stipulative” and “indicative”. Here it is cited with a full 
reference, including every word in the committeeʼs name so that it covers nearly 
three lines – a quantitative representation of its significance – and there is no 
suggestion that it may constitute the “starting point” suggested in the first 
section. Given this disparity, I would argue that it is the act and the fact of 
referencing that is more important here than any particular use of the content of 
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the original document. And even though the reader is referred to section one, 
the engagement with the key concepts from All Our Futures (“Imagination and 
Purpose”; “Originality”; “Value”) is so general that they can easily be yoked into 
service to lend credibility to the QCA research. In short, then, there are moves 
here which signify authority through the mobilisation of what we might call 
ʻacademic discourseʼ. This authority is, by association, conferred upon its 
development of a particular model of creativity. 
 
The use of “we” to refer to the QCA research team connotes a personal form of 
address to the reader and the headings “what did we do?” and “what did we 
learn?” mark a return to the collegial address noted previously. However, in this 
second section, the QCA team is not referred to at all, rather it is the teachers 
involved in the project who seemed to learn things. Given this disparity, the 
“what did we learn?” question seems to represent an illusory collectiveness – 
rather like a teacher may ask her class “what did we learn today?”, and it is in 
this section that the persuasive rendition of group enlightenment about creativity 
is executed. What is described here is story of progress from ignorance to 
understanding and, because QCA is no longer implicated in the “we” form of 
address, it is the teachers who make this journey and QCA which guides them 
as the authority. This means that the final set of bullet points about creativity are 
supported by the strength of an apparently rigorous research project and 
winning the consent of “120 teachers” (QCA 2004, p.18). 
 
An analysis of the rhetorical strategies employed in the “What did we learn?” 
section reveals how creativity is allied with certain kinds of pedagogic activity 
and differentiated from others – to return to one of my key research questions, it 
enables us to understand how the category ʻcreativityʼ is produced through the 
production and maintenance of boundaries around it. In addition we have a 
teleological narrative structure, which has a persuasive function in that it 
describes the gradual accumulation of knowledge and experience towards the 
goal of sophisticated engagement with creativity; it implies, in effect, that the 
movement towards this particular understanding of creativity is a necessary and 
valuable form of epistemological development for teachers. The section begins: 
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Initially, the teachers involved in the project had very specific views on 
how to promote pupilsʼ creativity. Some thought that creativity arose from 
unplanned or unstructured activities. Others thought that activities such 
as role-play, visits and debates were key. Many art and design and 
music teachers assumed that because their subjects involve a creative 
process, pupils were thinking and behaving creatively all the time. (QCA 
2004, p.19) 
 
The implication here is that the teachers at the start of this project were naïve; 
their understandings of creativity were limited, too rigid or simply wrong. As this 
was the initial stage of the project, the narrative expectation is established that 
there must be some progression from these positions, and so the boundaries 
and divisions begin to emerge: creativity is not the product of anything 
“unplanned or unstructured”, neither is it inevitably characteristic of work in art 
and design and music. Because these boundaries emerge by implication and 
through the rhetorical attribution of a ʻcreative fallacyʼ to untutored teachers, the 
danger of losing an ʻessenceʼ of creativity is not explicit. But it is this notional 
essence which is at stake, particularly in the next paragraph: 
 
As the project progressed, the teachers began to realise that creating 
something is not the same thing as being creative. They saw that being 
creative has as much to do with the quality of thought taking place and 
the process or journey as with what is ultimately produced. They also 
discovered that creativity can happen in extended project work, 
discussion and short question-and-answer sessions. (QCA 2004, p.19) 
 
The key differentiation here is between a product and a “quality of thought” and 
a “process or journey”; to be ʻcreativeʼ pupils must demonstrate a certain kind of 
thinking and a certain kind of behaviour. The problem created here is how this 
kind of thought and behaviour can be distinguished from any other kind of 
thought and behaviour, particularly when the teachers in the research equate “a 
creative moment in a lesson” with “a moment when there appeared to be a 
breakthrough in thinking.” (p.19) This equation threatens to absorb or efface the 
ʻspecialnessʼ of creativity so it then reappears in this paragraph as something 
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which “happen[s]” and something which “flourish[es]” as a consequence of 
effective pedagogic practice: 
 
Teachers also realised that creativity did not happen in a vacuum. Pupils 
needed subject-specific knowledge and skills for their creativity to 
flourish. (QCA 2004, p.19) 
 
Despite its apparent indebtedness to All Our Futures, this report marks a shift 
from the formerʼs liberal inclusivity to something more standardised and, 
therefore, less ʻdifferentʼ. All Our Futures argues that the “key is to find what 
children are good at” (NACCCE 1999, p.14), but this openness to diversity is 
not apparent in the QCA document; instead we find a set of prescriptions for 
more effective teaching and learning onto which ʻcreativityʼ is grafted as a 
brand. This can be seen clearly in the conclusion to the research summary: 
 
By the end of the project, all of the teachers agreed that: 
Opportunities for creativity arise in all types of activities 
• By making only minor adjustments to their lesson plans, they 
could promote creativity 
• To teach creatively, they needed to feel confident in their skills 
and subject knowledge 
• Sharing practice with teachers of other subjects and age groups 
was helpful 
• Pupils canʼt be expected to think and behave creatively in every 
single lesson 
• Thinking and behaving creatively is not appropriate in all lessons. 
(QCA 2004, p.19) 
 
It is worth noting the achievement of consent from “all the teachers” which has a 
rhetorical function here in that it serves to make the list of realisations more 
plausible. But more importantly it is striking how invisible creativity has become: 
it is something which can be promoted via an adjusted lesson plan; it is a 
possible attribute of the application of traditional pedagogic ʻcraftʼ skills; and it is 
something which cannot be expected in every lesson, and is positively 
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unwelcome in some. Only one of these points ties in explicitly with the stated 
aim of this document and I suggest that this represents a retreat from 
complexity; creativity exists here as a vague, but exciting promise of otherness 
that can, paradoxically, only be achieved through rigorous application of 
pedagogic craft skills. The illustrative case studies, which all emerged from the 
research project, can provide further evidence of this. 
 
6.8 Creativity in action 
Section 2 of this document, “Why is creativity so important?” represents a break 
from the ambiguities of definition and value and an embrace of utility. In other 
words, this brief section liberates itself from the requirement to pin down a 
concept and simply implements that concept, as if it were secure, within some 
concrete scenarios.  
 
As I have noted already, the use of questions as titles for the different sections 
creates a space for the reader to respond and thereby become complicit in the 
project by filling the gap. Arguably this is a strategy for winning consent, 
although the quality of the consent at this stage is not fully worked out. The title 
of Section 2, unlike the others, dispenses with the second person form of 
address and, despite the appearance of interrogation, is actually declarative; it 
is stating that creativity is important and the only space left for the reader is to 
suggest different ways in which it is. It is worth examining the nature of some of 
these declarations in order to show how ʻcreativityʼ functions here as a kind of 
rhetorical glue which brings about the adhesion of disparate, otherwise ʻnon-
stickʼ elements: 
 
CREATIVITY IMPROVES PUPILSʼ SELF-ESTEEM, MOTIVATION AND 
ACHIEVEMENT 
Pupils who are encouraged to think creatively and independently 
become: 
• more interested in discovering things for themselves 
• more open to new ideas 
• keen to work with others to explore ideas 
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• willing to work beyond lesson time when pursuing an idea or 
vision 
As a result, their pace of learning, levels of achievement and self-esteem 
increase. (QCA 2004, p.9) 
I have reproduced the capitals here as they express something of the 
importance and weight of the declaration – perhaps one might even argue that 
they are over determined – they ʻprotest too muchʼ. It is a big claim to assert 
that creativity improves self-esteem, motivation and achievement, especially as 
the measurement of such things is problematic, but the bludgeoning ʻvolumeʼ of 
the capitals diminishes such cavils. This statement, however, is followed by 
one, in lower case letters, which is more modulated and uses the passive voice 
to suggest that what is needed is the encouragement to think creatively and 
independently. What is at work here is the rhetoric of the tabloid newspaper, in 
which an arresting, assertive, unambiguous headline is subsequently 
moderated by successive elaborations and refinements. In this case the 
qualitative assertions in the heading become more tentative quantitative 
assertions in the list of bullet points; the encouragement to think creatively and 
independently will bring about increases in interest in discovery and openness 
to new ideas as well as increases in the willingness to work with others and to 
work for longer hours. The final statement here performs the function of a 
registration of proof – a kind of Quod Erat Demonstrandum – the hypothesis 
has been declared, the evidence presented and the hypothesis proved. The 
repetition of the terms from the ʻheadlineʼ statement, “achievement” and “self-
esteem”, are persuasive in encouraging us to accept that a logical process has 
been followed, but this rhetorical structuring masks, or diverts us, from the shift 
in terminology from “creativity” to being “encouraged to think creatively and 
independently”.  
 
Like all of the arguments in this section, it is essentially utilitarian and, 
consequently, creativity becomes a panacea, important for what it does, rather 
than what it is. As such it acquires a protean quality here, which is useful in 
terms of the general project to persuade us to accept the value of creativity, but 
it also threatens to undermine the notion of creativity as something distinctive 
and special. In the second declaration and ʻproofʼ there is almost a sense that 
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creativity is functioning like a quantum particle, simultaneously present and 
absent. The declaration is that: 
 
CREATIVITY PREPARES PUPILS FOR LIFE: AN IMPORTANT AIM OF 
THE NATIONAL CURRICULUM 
The National Curriculum Handbook outlines the importance of creativity: 
ʻBy providing rich and varied contexts for pupils to acquire, develop and 
apply a broad range of knowledge, understanding and skills, the 
curriculum should enable pupils to think creatively and critically, to 
solve problems and to make a difference for the better. It should 
give them the opportunity to become creative, innovative, enterprising 
and capable of leadership to equip them for their future lives as workers 
and citizens. 
 
It should enable pupils to respond positively to opportunities, 
challenges and responsibilities, to manage risk and to cope with 
change and adversity.ʼ (QCA 2004, p.9) 
 
The capitalised declaration is implicitly syllogistic: creativity prepares pupils for 
life; preparing pupils for life is an important aim of the National Curriculum; 
therefore creativity is an important aim of the National Curriculum.  It is worth 
noting that this constitutes a discursive move, in that the statements are quoted 
from the authoritative source of the National Curriculum Handbook and used to 
reinforce other statements in this document. And it is also worth noting that this 
constitutes a distortion; firstly the use of bold typography – a kind of meta-
discursive statement telling us that these statements constitute evidence to 
support the argument – which is absent in the original document (National 
Curriculum Handbook 2004, p.11). In an academic context one might indicate 
that one had italicised key phrases or, alternatively, that the italics (or 
emboldening) were present in the original source. The absence of such explicit 
reference to the source here constitutes a rhetorical manoeuvre, bringing about 
coherence by association between the emboldened items and implying that this 
coherence exists in the authoritative source document. Secondly, the absence 
of ellipsis fails to make it clear that the statement beginning “It should enable 
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pupils…” comes from a different section in the handbook, albeit on the same 
page; the subject is still the curriculum, but there is no mention of creativity in 
this section. So, once again, we have an example of rhetorical glue being used 
to stick together:  
• Thinking creatively 
• Thinking critically 
• Solving problems 
• Making a difference for the better 
• Becoming creative 
• Becoming innovative 
• Becoming enterprising 
• Responding positively to opportunities, challenges and responsibilities 
• Managing risk 
• Coping with change and adversity 
And this rhetorical elision of creativity and virtually anything positive in the 
National Curriculum means that it emerges sometimes as cause, sometimes as 
function and, most curiously, cause and function. It is not clear, for example, in 
the excerpt from the National Curriculum Handbook, whether “think[ing] 
creatively” is the same as “becom[ing] creative”; there is a suggestion that 
through thinking creatively students will become creative – a formulation which 
creates a kind of tautologous collapse. There is a shift after this into two further 
assertions: 
 
Creative thinking and behaviour can be promoted in all national 
curriculum subjects and in religious education. 
 
Pupils who are creative will be prepared for a rapidly changing world, 
where they may have to adapt to several careers in a lifetime. Many 
employers want people who see connections, have bright ideas, are 
innovative, communicate and work well with others and are able to solve 
problems. In other words, they need creative people. (QCA 2004, p.9) 
 
The rhetorical urgency here is reminiscent of that in All Our Futures, in that 
there is similar expression of the need to equip young people for a fluid job 
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market. But it is also a further instance of that collapse of difference into 
homogeneity and the co-opting of a litany of employability skills in order to 
consolidate rhetorically a concept of creativity. The key phrase here is “In other 
words, they need creative people”, for it constitutes an explicit equation between 
employability and creativity. But, in this move, ʻcreativityʼ loses its ʻothernessʼ. 
 
The final declaration is an attempt to reclaim that ʻothernessʼ: 
 
CREATIVITY ENRICHES PUPILSʼ LIVES 
 
By promoting creativity, teachers can give all pupils the opportunity to 
discover and pursue their particular interests and talents. We are all, or 
can be, creative to some degree. Creative pupils lead richer lives and, in 
the loner term, make a valuable contribution to society. (QCA 2004, p.9) 
 
The final point is, of course, a utilitarian one – it is a long term investment, but 
“creative pupils” will eventually “make a valuable contribution to society”. But it 
is significant that the nature of this contribution is not specified and that the 
notion of enrichment dominates here. Enrichment is not quantifiable, indeed it is 
barely qualifiable except in the most personal terms, so it exists here as a stake 
in the otherness of creativity. I have used the term ʻover determinationʼ already, 
which has Freudian, Althusserian and rhetorical connotations, and would argue 
that it is a legitimate concept in contributing to an understanding of the 
construction of creativity in this document and the others under scrutiny. If 
something is over determined it is constituted through multiple causes and, as 
Freud has argued, these causes may be contradictory or incompatible. 
Creativity can be allowed to retain its wraithlike quality in a poetic context, but in 
a policy context it is forced to materialise, and the means by which this 
materialisation is effected are often mutually destructive. But these 
contradictions are ignored or effaced so that we can see the coexistence of 
multiple discourses and attributions of cause and effect; it is as if the quantity of 
enthusiasm should carry the argument, regardless of the logical 
inconsistencies.  
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6.9 A return to behaviourism 
Section 3 of this document asks “How can you spot creativity?” and suggests 
that: 
 
When pupils are thinking and behaving creatively in the classroom, you 
are likely to see them: 
• Questioning and challenging 
• Making connections and seeing relationships 
• Envisaging what might be 
• Exploring ideas, keeping options open 
• Reflecting critically on ideas, actions and outcomes (QCA 2004, 
p.10) 
 
At stake is the creative subject and here the creative subject is inferred through 
specific behaviours. These behaviours are problematic, because it is assumed 
that they mean something specific. Arguably one could be “thinking creatively” 
when one is staring into space scratching oneʼs head, but this is not listed as 
valid evidence. So we can identify here a set of behavioural prescriptions which 
assume that character and ʻspiritʼ are inevitably indicated through particular 
activities. We can identify the same mobilisation of behavioural characteristics 
in the Ofsted document, which also models creativity as something defined by 
observable activity. Here we have the promise that the website: 
 
Shows pupils thinking and behaving creatively across the national 
curriculum and religious education at key stages 1 to 3. (QCA 2004, p.4) 
 
This elision of behaving and thinking which seems to be necessary in a project 
to make creativity accountable, is a problem; thinking itself cannot be observed. 
How does one show that one is thinking? How can one be sure that someone 
else is thinking merely by observing them? Michael Simkins in Whatʼs My 
Motivation? tells the story of how, in acting class, he and his peers desperately 
try to “express the sensation of beads of mercury travelling up and down our 
various limbs”. Others are told by the tutor that theyʼve “got it”, but not Michael, 
who tries so hard that he is criticised for “signalling”:  
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Then eventually, one lesson, just when Iʼm least expecting to, I hear her 
say the words Iʼm aching to hear: 
ʻThatʼs it, Michael, youʼve got it.ʼ 
It takes me by surprise because Iʼve actually fallen asleep on the floor. 
(Simkins 2003, p.41) 
 
A light-hearted anecdote, but it has illustrative potential; if behaviour is believed 
to provide access to thought it becomes the most important thing to observe. It 
is, in effect, a manifestation of one type of behaviourism – a moderate version 
which does not deny the existence of internal mental states, but which seeks to 
identify them through the outward manifestation of action. There is an irony 
here, that creativity which, in other contexts represents at least freedom from 
constraint, is represented as something which only exists (for administrative 
purposes) if it can be inferred through particular modes of behaviour.  
 
There is also an irony in the subsection entitled “Questioning and challenging” 
where we are told that: 
 
Creative pupils are curious, question and challenge, and donʼt always follow 
the rules. They: 
• ask ʻwhy?ʼ ʻhow?ʼ ʻwhat if?ʼ 
• ask unusual questions 
• respond to ideas, questions, tasks or problems in a surprising way 
• challenge conventions and their own and othersʼ assumptions 
• think independently. (QCA 2004, p.10) 
 
Again we can identify the tension between freedom and constraint – the 
freedom which characterises the “creative pupil” constrained by a set of bullet 
points which define it. It also significant that creativity has now become an 
essence; it is possible to be a “creative pupil”. This ontological bias is evident in 
the verb “becoming” in the previous section, but this is the first time in which 
pupils are described as being creative. In a classic empirical move, existence is 
inferred through observation and it is this move that lays the foundations for the 
rationale in the Ofsted document, discussed later.  
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But this does not solve two central problems, which become apparent at various 
stages in the document. The first is that, if pupils are creative, according to this 
list, they could be manifesting this in ways which are difficult to categorise – 
how ʻunusualʼ does an “unusual question” get before it becomes a bizarre and 
counter-productive question, for example? Just how “surprising” can a response 
to a problem be in order to be considered the work of a creative pupil? Such 
difficult questions reveal the underlying pro-social common sense in this work of 
classification, because what is not said, but clearly essential, is that these 
manifestations of independence and rule-breaking should not be designed to 
subvert or undermine institutionalised education. The second is a logical 
problem; if pupils can be creative then for whose benefit should this be 
exhibited? If it is something which they can own (suggested by “pupilsʼ 
creativity” (p.13)) then, presumably their lives will inevitably be enriched and 
their employability enhanced and there should be little need for it to be pursued. 
 
The key observation then is that this document constructs creativity in ways 
which are not only in conflict with constructions in other documents, but in 
conflict with themselves. The over determination of creativity here gives it 
rhetorical force, but results in something which is everything and nothing, 
everywhere and nowhere: it is something ephemeral and enriching, achievable 
by all, but it is also a set of observable skills which will mark out exceptional 
learners; it is something surprising and rule-breaking, but only within the 
confines of prescribed activities. 
 
6.10 Foot note 
The final image in this document is a call back to the cover image – it is the 
cropped portion, missing from the cover, showing the childʼs right foot, frozen, 
mid-jump, partially bleached out by the flash, illuminated against a garden fence 
and shrub. We may speculate about the content of the image – is a foot, like 
Christy Brownʼs left foot (My Left Foot 1989), with which he proved himself to be 
an artist and writer, a symbol of creativity? Perhaps this is too arcane and 
oblique a reference. Rhetorically, though, the image acts as a second bracket 
around the document and functions to persuade us that this document 
maintains an investment in the ʻothernessʼ of creativity that comes from play, 
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experiment and abandonment – an instance of Banaji et al.ʼs rhetoric of ʻPlay 
and creativityʼ (2006, pp.35-38) exemplified in, for example, the work of Sandra 
Russ (1998). As we have seen, however, there is little space here for such 
playfulness, as the discourse of simplicity, disambiguation, certainty and limits 
tends to occupy a superior position. 
 
My approach to this document has been driven by the assumption that creativity 
is a problematic concept and, therefore, that a policy document which promises 
to offer ways of identifying it and promoting it would exhibit tensions and 
peculiarities of construction. Such a document depends upon clarity of 
definition, assertion and simplicity and I have argued that it is at moments when 
it is most assertive that the cracks and contradictions can be identified. The 
mode of this document strives for neutrality and objectivity – it avoids rhetorical 
tropes such as metaphor, simile and hyperbole – but its aversion to poetry does 
not mean that it escapes analysis on the basis of rhetoric. I have suggested that 
its use of interrogatives (sometimes misleadingly) and its positioning of the 
reader are equally rhetorical, equally persuasive in encouraging the acceptance 
of particular things as unarguable or inevitable. I argue that its mobilisation of 
familiar discursive constructions, such as that of ʻservice provisionʼ and that of 
academic research also perform a rhetorical function in that they suggest, 
respectively, that a need is being fulfilled and that authority is being invoked. 
Both, in different ways, contribute to the construction of ʻtruth effectsʼ.  
 
In the context of the other documents being scrutinised in this research, this one 
is significant in its use of selective quotation from All Our Futures, its 
authoritative institutional context as a QCA publication and its use by Ofsted in 
justifying a model of creativity which is built on observation of behavioural 
characteristics. 
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Interruption 6: Promoting creativity 
It is ironic that I have played a part in ‘promoting creativity’; in 2002 I am approached 
by the editor of a series of books aimed at teachers of film and media studies. She 
already knows me because we have worked for an exam board as senior 
examiners/moderators and she also knows that I have taken a sabbatical year with the 
explicit aim of getting into the creative industries as a writer or script editor. So I am 
offered the title Teaching scriptwriting, screenplays and storyboards for film and TV 
production. (Readman 2003) Flicking through this slim volume several years later, I am 
struck by how casually I refer to creativity: 
 
It can also provide a much needed creative outlet for those students who have 
strong narrative and visual ideas, but, for whatever reason, find that they cannot 
give satisfactory realisation to these ideas via cameras and editing equipment. 
(p.5) 
 
The aim is to enable students to combine these elements in finished products 
which are creatively informed as well as critically engaged. (p.6) 
 
Unthreatening, confidence-building exercises are necessary to create a supportive 
environment for sharing and discussing creative ideas. (p.7) 
 
While the creative dimension is crucial to this work, it is important that we 
recognise that we are not simply assessing good ideas, but the command and 
application of a range of skills designed to tell a story in an effective way for a 
specific medium. (p.7) 
 
It is useful for teachers to have access to some of these texts for reference and, 
although they may be a bit daunting for many students, they would be of interest 
to those who are particularly creative and motivated - especially those producing 
screenplays for AS/A level Film Studies. (p.16) 
 
Criticisms might be that it is a prescriptive, formulaic approach to a creative 
activity, that it is biased towards the mainstream Hollywood film and that it leaves 
little room for deviation from a conventional linear mode of storytelling.'(p.18) 
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Some students will seek to avoid conventional modes of narration and insist that 
their ideas cannot be creatively constrained, but it is unlikely that their knowledge 
of convention is sufficiently sophisticated to challenge it successfully. (p.18) 
 
I can barely remember what I meant by this, but I seem to be suggesting that creativity 
is, variously: 
• About ideas rather than physical production  
• Different from critical engagement 
• Nurtured by a supportive environment 
• Dispositional 
• Not formulaic or prescriptive 
 
These assumptions are not surprising, but the absence of critique is, especially when the 
term is used to provide a rationale for certain kinds of behaviour and thinking. 
Interestingly, references to creativity dry up after page 18 when I start to outline specific 
activities – it is as if I have realised that creativity has conceptual value when it is ideal 
and aspirational, but little operational value in a practical context.  
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7 Nurturing Creativity in Young People 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter actually deals with two documents: Nurturing Creativity in Young 
People and the Government Response to Paul Robertsʼ Report on Nurturing 
Creativity in Young People. Through my analysis of these documents I argue 
that: 
• It is possible to discern ideological conflict, both within them and between 
them, over the ʻnatureʼ of creativity 
• They represent a bridge between the unwieldy rhetoric of All Our Futures 
and the terse prescriptions of Ofstedʼs survey 
• The latter document performs a limiting operation on the former, whilst 
appearing to endorse it in its entirety  
 
Nurturing Creativity in Young People (Roberts 2006) provides useful examples 
of how some of the tensions and contradictions around creativity are 
manifested. It was commissioned by both the Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport and the Department for Education and Skills and, given this status, it 
arguably constitutes an ʻauthorised versionʼ of what creativity in education might 
be. In addition, its subtitle is ʻA report to the government to inform policyʼ, so its 
recommendations had the genuine potential to become translated into 
legislation and practice. And although quantitative measures are crude and 
limited indicators, the fact that the document features the noun ʻcreativityʼ 356 
times and the adjective ʻcreativeʼ 426 times suggests a degree of confidence in 
its application and gives some kind of indication of its significance. Unlike some 
others, this document is not afraid of ʻcreativityʼ as a noun – it is in the title and it 
forms the basis of some bold assertions. But, to mix metaphors, this brave 
embrace gives a hostage to fortune. 
 
It is also significant in terms of its relationship with the other ʻauthorised textsʼ in 
this research, given the way it makes reference to both All Our Futures and the 
QCA document Creativity: Find it, promote it: 
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The review draws on the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority work on 
creativity. This in turn takes a starting point of creativity as defined by the 
report of the National Advisory Committee on Creative and Cultural 
Education that there are “four characteristics of creative processes…” 
(Roberts 2006, p.12)  
 
The inter-citation between these documents suggests that there is coherence 
and a high degree of homogeneity between their respective conceptions of 
creativity, but closer inspection reveals some significant differences which, 
along with other internal conflicts, tend to be disavowed, ignored or glossed 
over. The Ofsted document, for example, includes All Our Futures in its 
reference list, but avoids its ʻfour characteristicsʼ formulation, preferring instead 
the more cognitive model proposed by QCA as a translation of this. As we shall 
see later, the Roberts Report maintains a focus on imaginative, purposeful, 
valuable, productive activity because its model of creativity is tied firmly to a 
model of the ʻcreative industriesʼ. 
 
7.2 Authorship 
Paul Roberts is explicitly nominated as the author of the report (although 
sections within it which are authored by others are credited appropriately) and 
his personal address to the reader in the introduction is a good example of how 
he is constructed as an authority in his field: 
 
I was delighted to be asked by Ministers in DCMS and DfES to undertake 
this review. In it I have drawn on my experience as teacher, inspector, 
Director of Education in Nottingham and Haringey – but most of all on the 
large number of colleagues in Education/Childrenʼs Services and 
Creativity Sectors who have contributed to the debate and writing for this 
report.  
 
I am particularly grateful to the Improvement and Development Agency 
for allowing me to undertake this work. (Roberts 2006, p.2) 
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It is straightforward enough to analyse this preface in the way that Stillar (1998) 
analyses the prefaces in two writing handbooks, that is, by identifying in it the  
 
ideational resources of language [which] are called upon to structure 
experience, to represent a particular arrangement of “reality.” (Stillar 
1998, p.28) 
 
Making use of the components used by Stillar, namely: process type and 
participants; circumstances; time and perspective; and concept taxonomies, it is 
relevant to note, firstly, that Roberts as the author/ʻprocessorʼ demonstrates a 
ʻreactiveʼ mental process in that he is “delighted” to be asked to undertake the 
report. Secondly that he draws upon ʻcircumstantialʼ elements, such as his 
various professional roles, which have the effect of validating and authenticating 
his reactions and proposals. And this micro-level analysis of language, inspired 
as Stillar indicates, by Hallidayʼs functional linguistics, can be valuable in 
revealing the meaning of utterances within a language system. However, 
following Foucault, we can take a step back, adopt a wider field of vision and, in 
doing so, suggest that it is possible to identify a discursive function in this 
preface. Firstly, Robertsʼ “delight” is significant as it sets up a connection 
between creativity and pleasure; but to be “delighted” is to be more than 
“pleased” so, arguably, creativity as the focus for this review, is the subject of a 
familiar enhancement – it is magical and extreme. Secondly, Robertsʼ expertise 
in education and experience in the challenging areas of “Nottingham and 
Haringey” serve to model creativity as something which requires expert 
intervention; just as, historically, certain human behaviours were ʻmedicalisedʼ 
(cf. Foucault 1989), creativity, here, is being ʻeducationalisedʼ. These two 
observations can be made to cohere by suggesting that the latter is determined 
by the former; creativity is something extreme, therefore it needs to be 
contained and tamed in some way. The metaphor of nature which I am teasing 
out here can be more easily seen working in the Government Response to this 
report, which I discuss towards the end of this section. 
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7.3 methodology 
As I have mentioned elsewhere, reaching conclusions about the meaning(s) of 
a text is always problematic if one accepts that meaning is generated through 
the dynamic process of reading (cf. Fish 1988). However, this should not negate 
attention to the textual characteristics which play some part in producing 
possible readings. This document, like All Our Futures, but unlike the others 
under scrutiny here, includes a response from its audience – an official 
ʻgovernment responseʼ with a foreword from the ministers at the time, David 
Lammy and Andrew Adonis. It also includes an appendix in which there is a 
summary of the responses to Paul Robertsʼ ʻCreativity Reviewʼ. These 
elements, taken as a whole, could be argued to constitute a ʻdialogicʼ quality; 
appendix 2 is even titled ʻThe voice of children and young peopleʼ and, 
consequently, there are more seams and fissures in this document than in, say, 
the Ofsted survey.  
 
My use of the term ʻauthorised versionʼ in inverted commas above is indicative 
of a particular stance taken in relation to knowledge and power and with those 
two words Foucault is again invoked. A Foucaultian approach to this document 
entails examining the mechanisms it uses to attempt to fix creativity in particular 
ways. It means paying particular attention to specific details of articulation and 
identifying how these function to reify this concept in relation to others which are 
included or excluded. For Foucault, this conflict is never finished or complete; 
discourses are always vying with one another, overlapping with each other and 
any domination is always tenuous and contingent. 
 
My earlier analysis of this document (Readman 2009) took as its template The 
Rhetorics of Creativity (Banaji et al. 2006) and, whilst the categories given in 
this work provide a way of disentangling different languages of creativity from 
each other, it is worth attempting to engage with it without necessarily seeking 
to impose a set of pre-existing categories. It may be more useful to attempt to 
identify, for example, internal conflicts and contradictions and to suggest that 
the document constitutes an example of ʻcreativity wranglingʼ. I am aware that 
my own metaphors which pertain to creativity tend to be animalistic – I have 
described it as ʻslipperyʼ (like an eel) and, here, something which needs 
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ʻwranglingʼ (like cattle). And this expresses something of my hunch about 
creativity in these documents; despite their attempts to fix it, to co-opt it, to 
annexe it, there is something about its connotations, its conceptual baggage, 
which makes this impossible. No matter how ʻstipulativeʼ or pragmatic the 
definition, ʻcreativityʼ always threatens to subvert it; we might argue, following 
Freud and Althusser, that it is ʻover determinedʼ.  
 
Despite this goal of avoiding pre-judgements and pre-categorisations, it is 
difficult to ignore a strong imprint here of what Fairclough (1995) calls the 
“marketization discourse” in education, particularly in the ʻkey messagesʼ 
section where we read that, despite the “rich array of creativity work” in schools, 
it is not systematically supported and: 
 
Stronger connections between that creativity work and the emerging 
policy context in education and childrenʼs services would produce a “win-
win” – creativity embedded in these developments and, reciprocally, 
these developments enhanced by the impact of creativity. (Roberts 2006, 
p.5) 
 
This “win-win” concept, the notion that creativity will benefit everyone and 
everything, is similar to the celebration we find in All Our Futures, but unlike All 
Our Futures which, as an independent report, is able to indulge its utopiansim 
unfettered, Nurturing Creativity in Young People has to conform to existing 
policy initiatives, such as the Every Child Matters agenda, the impending new 
inspection regime and the expectations for the 14-19 Creative and Media 
Diploma. Consequently there is tendency in this report to construct creativity as 
something which can be offered in a pseudo-commercial sense: 
 
There is a need to construct a more coherent ʻcreativity offerʼ which is 
then actively managed/brokered into the new context of school and 
personal autonomy. (Roberts 2006, p.5) 
 
This construction is particularly problematic in this report, given the economic 
configuration established here; the constitution of creativity as a commodity 
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which can be ʻofferedʼ, as the capital in a deal which can be ʻbrokeredʼ is 
continually in tension with a notion of creativity as something already possessed 
and which can be released through ʻnurturingʼ. Despite its dominant place in the 
title of the document, I would argue that ʻnurturingʼ is subordinate to 
implementation, but that there is a fault line between the two. 
As Dugdale suggests, in her analysis of an Australian IUD consumer 
information leaflet,  
 
It is standard procedure of semiotic analysis to explore how it is that 
readers are constituted by textual moves of one kind or another. It is 
therefore not breaking new ground to argue that this text is performing its 
reader in a particular way. (Dugdale 1999, p.127)  
 
And in this document the readers, the government ministers perhaps, are 
constituted as those who can ʻmake creativity happenʼ in education through the 
implementation of strategies and policies. This is certainly the implication of the 
Governement Response document which was published just a few months 
later. 
  
7.4 Play and the arts 
Banaji et al. draw our attention to the “almost overwhelming visual emphasis on 
drama, dance and art projects” in the NACCCE report (2006 p.26), a 
characteristic which, as I have observed elsewhere, also obtains in their own 
report. Nurturing Creativity in Young People exhibits the same tendency; the 
images in this report are: 
• A circle of children sitting and lying on the floor sketching (cover image) 
• An ornamental sculpture (inside cover image) 
• A closer, ground level shot of (the same?) children sketching (p.4) 
• Children working with clay (p.8 and p.10) 
• A large group of people on a beach, dressed in white, arranged in a line, 
arms raised as if in triumph (p.16) 
• A ballet dancer on stage in front of an audience of children (p.18) 
• A child glimpsed through fronds of paper (p.20) 
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• A long-exposure image of a tracery of lights, within which children can be 
glimpsed (p.26) 
• A group of children dancing/performing (p.32) 
• A group of children playing brass instruments (p.38) 
• Children painting a mural on the floor (p.44) 
• A girl using a large interactive exhibit/console  (p.50) 
• A child in elaborate carnival costume (p.56) 
• Young children on a window seat, reading books that seem to have 
come from the ʻBookstart treasure chestʼ between them (p.60) 
 
My descriptions are sparse, but even so it should be clear that these are all 
arts-related images which, by implication, offer illustration and definition of 
creativity in this document. They also show a range of children engaged in 
purposeful work – work which requires (or has required) craft skills, patience 
and discipline. There is certainly no sense of the ʻuntutorednessʼ that is evident 
in the image of exuberance on the cover of the QCA document, from which we 
might infer that any theories connecting play with creativity have now been 
firmly excluded. 
 
As I have mentioned already, this document is overtly wedded to a notion of 
creativity that sees it as integral to the creative industries; the stated impetus for 
the report is given as James Purnellʼs 2005 speech at the Institute for Public 
Policy Research in which he: 
 
…reflected on what it was about our educational system that fosters 
creativity, indicating that “we should build our policies on that success… 
to look at what more we can do to nurture young creative talent”, and to 
look for “a clear set of policy assumptions which will help to inform the 
basis of our future policy on creativity”. (Roberts 2006, p.11) 
 
This statement falls into Banaji et al.ʼs (2006) “creativity as economic 
imperative” category – the argument that the ʻcreative industriesʼ (a term which 
some would argue already represents a triumphant rhetorical marriage of two 
incompatibles) constitute an area on which the future of the economy will 
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depend to an increasing degree. Consequently a creatively skilled workforce is 
required in order to facilitate its continuing growth and profit, so we find that TV 
programmes such as Dragonsʼ Den and The X Factor are valuable reference 
points for students because “successful participants go through a process of 
auditioning, presenting and pitching, honing their skills through criticism and 
turning themselves into a brand...These programmes are all about self-
improvement and risk-taking in a creative and entrepreneurial economy.” 
(Roberts 2006, p.23). But also we find that creativity is equally valuable in a 
generic employment context:  
 
The capacity for creativity - to work in teams, to share ideas, to identify 
problems and critically analyse solutions - is increasingly important in all 
walks of life. Indeed these are the attributes most often valued by 
employers in particular when making recruitment decisions. Creativity is 
not just about self-expression. It requires teamwork and discipline. 
(Roberts 2006, p.57). 
 
It is here that we can identify the ʻpull of the genericʼ – the tension between a 
creative industries model and a ʻgeneric skillsʼ model of creativity. Generic skills 
appear to have ʻwonʼ in the Ofsted survey (although the tension still exists), but 
here they are merely flirted with momentarily, as James Purnellʼs challenge 
“…to make Britain the worldʼs creative hub” dominates the proceedings. If this 
challenge is to be met by changes in policy, then these policy initiatives must be 
required to demonstrate specific outcomes and it is likely that these would need 
to be quantitative increases in the scale and success of the creative industries, 
rather than just a general increase in ʻemployabilityʼ. This aspect is referred to 
as “the wider context”, together with the assertion that “creativity is increasingly 
required across the whole workforce – not just that of the Creative Industries.” 
(Roberts 2006, p.11) 
 
7.5 Nurturing, fostering, promoting 
I have suggested that there is a significant difference between this document 
and the Ofsted document – a difference between the operational verbs used in 
relation to creativity. Here creativity is something which is nurtured and fostered, 
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there it is something which is promoted. This is perhaps indicative of the 
different contexts and forms of the documents – the Roberts Report is about 
informing policy, advising on the conditions in which creativity can thrive, 
whereas the Ofsted survey is about changing practice, ensuring that particular 
tasks generate particular outcomes. But this distinction may be too crude. 
 
One significant difference can be seen in the different conceptions of the 
relationship between creativity and the National Curriculum; for Ofsted there is 
no conflict – the two are complementary, but for Roberts this complementarity is 
limited: 
 
Britain will need an education system that encourages the widespread 
development of generic skills of creativity which include: idea generation; 
creative teamwork; opportunity sensing; pitching and auditioning; giving 
criticism and responding to it; mobilising people and resources around 
ideas to make them real. The national curriculum may support the 
acquisition of many of these skills. But an award or qualification more 
directly focused on creative skills may be needed. (Roberts 2006, p.22) 
 
7.6 The rhetoric of release 
The metaphor of unlocking or releasing potential has transferred easily to 
creativity here. We read of Ofstedʼs report on the Secondary National Strategy 
which “paints a mixed picture of the use of ICT in schools: a tool which has 
enormous potential for releasing pupilsʼ creativity, or deadening it.” (Roberts 
2006, p.62) It is not too difficult to recognise the rhetorical allure of such an 
image; ʻunlockingʼ and ʻreleasingʼ are things which are done to captives – if ʻweʼ 
(society) have the ability to bring about the unlocking of young peopleʼs 
creativity then, by implication, it is we who are playing the part of ignorant 
jailers. Enabling young people to throw off their shackles becomes an 
imperative and, as with all imperatives, the urgent need to do something is at 
odds with the time needed for critical scrutiny. We can identify a similar rhetoric 
of urgency in All Our Futures, where the overwhelming sense that ʻsomething 
must be done!ʼ inhibits a critical engagement with the concept(s) of creativity 
being proposed and made instrumental. 
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7.7 Creativity, culture and personal growth 
There is another tension in this document, which is evident almost from the 
outset. The fourth “key message” states (after asserting the need for creativity 
to be embedded in education policy): 
 
This would provide a more secure, valued and cost-effective framework 
for the further development of creativity, both its own right (sic) and as a 
support for economic growth, with better outcomes for children and 
young people. (Roberts 2006, p.5) 
 
The syntactical stumble here may indicate a conceptual stumble; creativity is 
being claimed as a social and personal ʻgoodʼ as a justification for policy 
initiatives which nurture it, but in every sense it is an after thought, an over 
determination. We read later that: 
 
While this economic and regeneration driver is compelling it is matched 
by an equal and moral imperative – the intrinsic importance of giving 
children and young people creative experience – both to develop 
personal identity and confidence and to understand and prepare for a 
21st century society. (Roberts 2006, p12) 
 
We might call this, after 1066 and All That (Sellar and Yeatman 1930), the ʻgood 
thingʼ rhetoric; it provides a persuasive safety net which, even if the arguments 
about making Britain into the worldʼs creative hub do not convince, will catch 
those with doubts and challenge them to refute the assertion that creative 
experiences must always be enriching in some way. 
 
This rhetoric is made to harmonise with the rhetoric of assessment and 
attainment in the “creative portfolio” section of the document, in which there is a 
commitment to recognising young peopleʼs existing creative skills: 
 
The iPod generation can already listen to music, watch videos and play 
games virtually wherever and whenever they want. Increasingly they can 
create at will, using software such as Garage Band and Sibelius. Yet this 
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creativity and the knowledge they pick up is largely left tacit and hidden. 
(Roberts 2006, p.21) 
 
This democratic and uncritical embrace of youth culture smacks of Willisʼ (1990) 
celebration of young peopleʼs symbolic consumption and production, but unlike 
Willis, the argument here is that it should be recognised as ʻworkʼ. And perhaps 
this notion of work, rhetorically produced and ideologically loaded might provide 
a conceptual lever with which to crack open this document. If ʻplayʼ and leisure 
can be accredited they can be seen as work, but only if they are productive, 
only if there are concrete outcomes. And if the everyday activities of young 
people are to count as ʻcreativeʼ then these must also be productive. We could 
identify this as a discursive move – one which produces and legitimates 
particular activities and which, by omission, negates others. 
 
Despite the embrace of ʻcommon cultureʼ, a tension is established here 
between an uncritical, democratic inclusivity and a more exclusive elite rhetoric. 
The democratising impulse is clearly demonstrated in the previous extract, 
which goes on to nominate as the key constituency: 
 
…children who are highly creative but not academic and do not like 
school. The generation brought up with ʻrip-mixʼ-burnʼ as their motto will 
feed Britainʼs creative and cultural industries. (Roberts 2006, p.21)  
 
Here then it is vital to recognise and celebrate diverse manifestations of 
ʻcreativityʼ in order to provide encouragement to the disenfranchised. There is 
no qualitative distinction being made here between different products or 
processes (which, incidentally, is another unresolved tension) and there is even 
the suggestion that, through blogging, MySpace and Garage Band, all young 
people are equally creative. However, in relation to Creative Portfolios, the 
notion of creative excellence emerges: “EMI should host a site for children with 
highly musical Creative Portfolios” and “At a higher level one could imagine an 
award scheme, for people who have gone through a number of creative 
projects…perhaps this could be called the Dizzee Rascal Award or the Simon 
Cowell Award or the Damien Hirst Award.” (Roberts 2006, p.24). The 
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nomination of a figurehead for each award here is an indication of an 
investment in an elitist conception of creativity, regardless of whether or not one 
considers that Simon Cowell (the music executive and entrepreneur) is a 
ʻcreative geniusʼ 
 
Generally this ʻpro socialʼ rhetoric serves to provide bridges between more 
contradictory areas or to create the illusion of homogeneity. Banaji et al. argue 
that “This rhetoric emerges largely from contemporary social democratic 
discourses of inclusion and multiculturalism” (2006, p56), and this is apparent in 
the Early Years section of the report: 
 
 …it is crucial that we see our youngest childrenʼs creativity at the heart 
of these new formations. Creativity here is a necessity not a luxury. 
Evidence from early years practice suggests that creativity is essential to 
all five of the ECM (Every Child Matters) outcomes. (Roberts 2006, p27) 
 
The key example in this section describes a nursery school in which a 
pedagogical strategy involving the use of play, outdoor space and exercise has 
been implemented and had a range of benefits, including increased parental 
engagement. The point here is not to question whether or not this is good, 
innovative work (as indeed it seems to be), but to query the co-opting of the 
term creativity and highlight the way in which it is validated through the ʻplayʼ 
rhetoric as well as the ʻpro socialʼ rhetoric. Despite the involvement of ʻarts and 
artistsʼ there is no suggestion that the childrenʼs creativity is defined through the 
production of an artefact, but rather through the exploratory process. And the 
emphasis on health, happiness and engagement effects a connection between 
ʻcommunity projectʼ and ʻcreative workʼ which can be seen in other contexts. In 
a sense the ʻproductivenessʼ is elided with purposefulness in this project; if play 
has a purpose it is valid, and therefore ʻcreativeʼ. 
 
7.8 Other voices 
Appendix 1 of the Roberts Report is a summary of the responses to the 
Creativity Review, for which ʻPaul Roberts wrote to 106 people in the creative 
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and educational sectors asking for specific responses to five key questionsʼ. 
The questions were: 
 
• What is the notion of creativity for children and young people that 
underpins your organisationʼs work? 
• What is it that generates creativity in children and young people? 
• How do you assess the creative impact of work with children and 
young people and the outcomes for them? 
• What is necessary to ensure sustainable provision for children and 
young people in respect of creativity? 
• What does the evidence of your work indicate should be 
assumptions on which DCMS and DfES should base future policy 
with regard to further encouraging the development of creativity in 
children and young people? (Roberts 2006, pp.67-70) 
 
The “illuminating quotes” included in this section function to suggest that the 
conclusions of the report have been reached via some kind of democratic 
process – like the ʻresearch projectʼ carried out by QCA and as with the large 
committee that produced All Our Futures, there is persuasiveness in numbers. 
But unlike the imaginary negative interlocutor in All Our Futures, there are no 
dissenting voices here, no voice challenging the ʻcreativity projectʼ and this 
creates an impression of coherent assent. However, there are contradictions; in 
response to the question “what generates creativity?” one contribution states 
ʻ”Creativity can be taught in a structured and disciplined fashion”, but is followed 
by another stating “Creativity is generated by childrenʼs own natural curiosity 
and imagination and cannot be ʻtaughtʼ in a traditional way”. Another 
contribution says “Creativity does not need generating. It is an innate quality in 
children and young people. However is does need nurturing and protecting from 
being constrained or even extinguished by fear of failure…” (Roberts 2006, p68) 
 
These suggest that, on any kind of logical or rational scale, interpretations of 
creativity are chaotic and that it is unworkable as a term of assessment or as a 
measurable goal in education policy. Yet this document proposes exactly that, 
indeed this is its reason for being, and the discursive work we can identify here 
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is determined by the need to resolve, gloss over, ignore, negate and otherwise 
deal with the contradictions and conflicts which continually threaten to 
overthrow it. The repression of dissent and alternatives is more explicit in the 
Ofsted survey, in which assertions become prescriptions, and we can see the 
emergence of this in the Government Response to Paul Robertsʼ Report on 
Nurturing Creativity in Young People (2006), discussed below. 
 
7.9 The government response  
It is usually the case when analysing texts that the question is asked: “who is 
this for?”, which then prompts more or less informed speculations about how it 
might be read or interpreted. In the case of the Roberts Report we know that its 
intended audience is “Government” – specifically the departments of Culture, 
Media and Sport, and Education and Skills – and we have evidence of how it 
has been read in the form of a short official response. The function of this 
document seems to be to ʻcookʼ the raw material provided by Roberts, by which 
I mean that it uses particular rhetorical strategies in order to contain and limit 
some of the excess of meaning which is indulged in the initial report. An 
analysis of rhetoric reveals that the metaphors which underpin these 
manoeuvres are structured around ʻfaithʼ and ʻnatureʼ. In addition, by adopting a 
more prosaic semantic analysis, it is possible to reveal how particular 
arguments are tautologous and why this seems to be necessary in order to 
convert findings from Roberts into policy commitments. 
 
7.9.1 The rhetoric of faith 
I have suggested in the discussion of All Our Futures that creativity can be 
constructed as an object of faith and, therefore, something about which it is 
possible to evangelise and proselytise. I think we can identify something of this 
in the Government Response to Paul Robertsʼ Report on Nurturing Creativity in 
Young People (2006), particularly when the authors say 
 
This publication is a response to that report. It demonstrates the 
importance that we place on creativity; shows how we believe creativity 
can contribute to other key agendas and highlights the main actions that 
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we will be taking to ensure that creativity can flourish. (Lammy and 
Adonis 2006, p.2) 
 
The word “believe” is clearly important here; rhetorically it has the same 
construction as an article of faith and is not so very different from “We believe in 
God, the Eternal Father, and in His Son, Jesus Christ, and in the Holy Ghost” 
from the Christian liturgy. Of course the similarities are limited, for Lammy and 
Adonis are not claiming to believe ʻinʼ creativity, but merely that it can 
“contribute to other key agendas”, thus reminding us of the tension between 
creativity as a moral good, in and of itself, and creativity as utilitarian – 
something valuable because its effects are valuable. A little later, however, 
there is a statement which is constructed more strongly as a set of articles of 
faith: 
 
We believe, as QCA makes clear, that: 
• Creativity involves thinking or behaving imaginatively; 
• This imaginative activity is purposeful: that is, it is directed to 
achieving an objective;  
• These processes must generate something original; 
• The outcome must be of value in relation to the objective. (Lammy 
and Adonis 2006, p.4) 
 
This, of course, is the creed handed down from All Our Futures, via QCAʼs 
Creativity: find it, promote it and, like all good creeds, it can be interpreted in a 
variety of ways, which is probably why the Ofsted survey abandons it in favour 
of a model requiring less interpretation – a move we might see as a kind of 
conceptual schism. Perhaps there is an irony here, given that the Ofsted survey 
directly resulted from the commitment to “key actions” in this report: 
 
We will make more explicit that schools and teachers should undertake 
activity that fosters creativity. From 2007-2008, creativity will be a theme 
which is incorporated in and picked up as part of all Ofsted subject 
surveys and we will work with them as they develop the details of the 
surveys. (Lammy and Adonis 2006, p.8) 
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But as I suggest in my discussion of the Ofsted survey, this research reveals 
that creativity in education ʻpolicyʼ is subject less to conceptual coherence and 
more to the exigencies of administration. 
 
ʻFaithʼ can underpin important discursive moves in these documents and, 
despite its philosophical conflict with the utilitarian rhetoric, the two are often 
pressed into the appearance (sound?) of harmony. It is the work of this thesis to 
identify the dissonance and consider the implications. Earlier in the report we 
read that: 
 
The commissioning of the review of creativity in schools sprang from a 
genuine belief that creativity is important and that, from a position of 
strength, it is vital that we continue to build on those things that make 
creativity thrive in this country. (Lammy and Adonis 2006, p.6) 
 
The “genuine belief” expressed here asserts a degree of sincerity which, if 
accepted here, must diminish the quality of belief expressed on p.2. In any case 
it is redundant as a qualifying adjective because it conjures up the notion of 
believing ʻfalselyʼ, which, arguably is an oxymoron, given that the act of 
believing is inherently sincere, even if it is in error. This semantic nitpicking I 
think reveals the way in which faith functions rhetorically here to efface the 
notion that this commitment to creativity is merely utilitarian; the notion of belief 
sets up a resonance with notions of spirituality and faith, which represent an 
ʻexcessʼ beyond the everyday economic and institutional concerns. But, as I 
have already pointed out, it is something which needs to be retained, whist 
being inoperable – hence the tension. My argument, or rather my primary 
methodological principle, here and throughout, is that described by Norris in a 
discussion of Paul de Man: 
 
…meaning is always undone by the radical uncertainty which leaves it 
suspended between statement and suasion, logical form and rhetorical 
force. (Norris 1983, p.19) 
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From a Foucaultian perspective we can find meaning not through semantics or 
definition, but from identifying the function of this document as an instrument of 
control – a move to assert power over conceptual terrain; it represents a move 
to hold creativity, to fix it within a regulatory network of governmental and quasi-
governmental bodies, to equate it with existing criteria for good practice and to 
align it with existing policy initiatives in education. But because creativity and 
what creativity represents only exist rhetorically, the enactment of this move to 
power is continually threatened by the suspension of meaning described by 
Norris above. In the following section I show how the metaphor of ʻnatureʼ 
underpins the rhetorical strategies by which this Government Response 
attempts to ʻcookʼ creativity. 
 
7.9.2 Creativity: raw and cooked 
Perhaps because this Government Response is short and focused on 
implementation its rhetorical operations are clearly identifiable. I suggest, first of 
all, that we can make sense of them by introducing the technology/nature dyad. 
This is a classic analytical strategy of structuralism and, although I have pointed 
out the limitations of such an approach elsewhere, it seems like a fruitful way of 
revealing how this opposition provides the conceptual poles of the document. 
And, significantly, the document features explicit denials that any such 
opposition exists, given its frequent appeals to inclusivity. So the starting point 
for the analysis may be one based on a binary opposition, but methodologically 
it will develop beyond positing fixed meanings to signs and suggest, instead, 
that these signs are subject to forces by which they are constituted differently 
within a signifying system in conflict with itself. The ʻtechnologyʼ pole of the dyad 
I am equating with references to and use of science, logic, education and policy; 
the ʻnatureʼ pole I am equating with the ʻotherʼ of creativity, which is only 
referred to obliquely through metaphor. 
 
The technologisation of creativity in this document is evident in aspects of its 
style. The foreword, for example, constructs it as something with primarily 
economic benefits; it puts the Roberts Report into a historical context and links 
it with a political agenda and it concludes with a statement that a new advisory 
board is to be set up in order to “drive forward this agenda”. (Lammy and 
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Adonis 2006, p.3) The style is terse, the paragraphs short, the mode assertive; 
there are businesslike capitalisations (DCMS, GDP), percentages of economic 
growth and references to “new technology”. (Lammy and Adonis 2006, p.2)  
 
However, even here, there are suggestions of the ʻotherʼ which resists 
technologisation; we are told that “Creativity is something we do well” – a 
reference to the “creative industries” sector (itself a problematic category as 
discussed in an earlier chapter). It is hard to make logical sense of this 
statement – how does one “do” creativity? It may be an adoption of a 
contemporary rhetoric of business and politics in which an ʻinactiveʼ noun is 
yoked together with an active verb – Alastair Campbell (2010) telling a journalist 
that “we donʼt do God”, for example – and constituting a kind of grammatical 
violence. In addition to this, the sentence suggests that “we” (the British people? 
British industry?) have a particular aptitude for creativity – a statement which 
contains the possibility that creativity might be a human trait and, therefore, 
potentially problematic when it comes to teaching, training and learning. The 
tension is evident in this paragraph: 
 
More and more young people are finding ways of exploring their own 
creativity outside of formal education settings – not just through 
traditional forms of arts and culture but increasingly through the use of 
new technology, which allows them to shape their own creative 
experiences. This interest and enthusiasm needs to be harnessed and 
translated into the school setting. Engagement can boost self-confidence 
and motivation and helps young people to achieve their goals, especially 
those who, for whatever reason are disengaged from the learning 
process. (Lammy and Adonis 2006, p.2; my italics) 
 
The opposition is established here between activities which take place “outside 
of formal education settings” and notional activities which should take place 
inside formal education settings. Currently young people are “exploring their 
own creativity” in an untutored way – their creativity is like something wild and 
untamed and they are aided and abetted – empowered and permitted – by “new 
technology” which also carries something of the unknown with it. Despite the 
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rhetoric of inclusivity and the promise of boosting “self-confidence and 
motivation”, the means of resolving the structural conflict here is to “harness” 
and “translate” these activities, to formalise them, standardise them and, by 
implication, make them amenable to assessment. I have commented elsewhere 
on my own mobilisation of animalistic metaphors and considered the 
implications of these on how I understand creativity and want it to be 
understood. In this document the verb “harness” features only twice, but it is a 
potent metaphor, conjuring up the image of an animal, tamed and recruited for 
service with a set of restraining straps. Similarly, the verb “translate” has 
connotations of colonialism, suggesting that the ʻnativeʼ activities of young 
people need to be made comprehensible inside formal education settings, if 
they are to be of any value. To use Levi-Straussʼs (1992) terms, I argue that this 
constitutes evidence of creativity being conceived as ʻrawʼ and, therefore, 
something requiring ʻcookingʼ in order to make it functional and acceptable 
within an institutional context. 
 
A different metaphor, with a similar function is also evident throughout this 
document, and the Roberts Report itself; that of plant growth. This metaphor is 
less potent than the ʻharnessingʼ metaphor discussed above, but it has similar 
implications and can be found first in the verb ʻnurtureʼ. Nurture on its own is a 
word so commonplace that it perhaps has no metaphorical significance at all, 
however, it forms part of an image system in this document which includes the 
concept of ʻflourishingʼ (which has more obvious etymological roots in flower 
growth), ʻenrichmentʼ and ʻthrivingʼ. This image system produces a notion of 
creativity as something organic, wild and natural, but which requires tending, 
organising and feeding; like a plant in a garden, it cannot simply be allowed to 
grow in an undisciplined way. The section heading “Where does it thrive?” 
provides an example of this, using the key word “thrive”, but also the spatial 
preposition “where”, suggesting that particular conditions can be produced 
which will generate growth. The first response to this question is also significant: 
 
Creativity thrives where: 
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• It is embedded in the ethos of the school and a range of creative 
experiences within and beyond the national curriculum is a normal 
expectation of teachers and young people. (p.4) 
 
So creativity, like a plant, thrives when it is “embedded” somewhere nourishing 
and, like something essentially wild, it has enormous vitality. However, the 
process of “harnessing”, “translating” and “embedding” must, within the 
relational framework of the document, run the risk of taking away that which 
makes creativity special, that which makes it vital and desirable. This tension 
between logical form and rhetorical force is reflected in the rather tortuous 
configuration here, particularly if we omit the first object phrase in the sentence, 
which results in this: 
 
Creativity thrives where… a range of creative experiences within and 
beyond the national curriculum is a normal expectation of teachers and 
young people. 
 
In other words, creativity thrives where people expect creative experiences – an 
example of creativity being offered as something self-evident and self-identified. 
This rhetorical closed loop of definition is self-perpetuating and is indicative of 
the logical and definitional problems with creativity in this document, which will 
be discussed in more detail below. 
 
7.9.3 The creativity equation (again) 
This document, a Government Response to a review, does not want to engage 
with the problems of defining creativity – this was the job of the review, after all. 
However, it cannot avoid offering and working with definitions which can be 
converted into policy actions and its terms of reference, therefore, are more 
limited than the rather more promiscuous and plural versions of creativity in the 
Roberts Report itself. I have commented above on the ways in which particular 
metaphors create a state of tension with the overt argument in the Government 
Response, but here I examine examples of assertions about the ʻnatureʼ of 
creativity and how this necessitates particular courses of action. This is explicit 
at the beginning of the document: 
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WHAT IS CREATIVITY? 
In order to be clear about the action that needs to be taken it is first 
necessary to clarify exactly what it is we are trying to achieve. To do that 
there needs to be a clearly stated and widely accepted definition of what 
we mean by creativity. Nurturing Creativity in Young People took a lead 
from the National Advisory Committee for Creative and Cultural 
Education (NACCCE) ʻAll Our Futuresʼ report and from the work 
produced by Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA). (p.4) 
 
There then follows the now familiar definition of creativity quoted verbatim from 
All Our Futures, although credited primarily to QCA, and then: 
 
Creativity is not limited to the arts but should be embedded across the 
whole curriculum. Creativity is not at odds with raising standards or an 
end in itself but should produce outcomes of real value. (p.4) 
 
In the first extract there is no explicit reference to the possibility of multiple 
interpretations of creativity; All Our Futures and Creativity: Find it promote it 
both include acknowledgement that there are different perspectives and 
Nurturing Creativity in Young People includes the different definitions from the 
respondents and refers to “the important emphases on the overlap between 
creativity, independent and effective learning and critical thinking.” (Roberts 
2006, p.12) So the “clearly stated and widely accepted definition” which is 
necessary in order for action to be taken is the one which has been authorised 
by two other bodies, and the reiteration of that definition by this particular body, 
both benefits from and reinforces its authority.  
 
As I mentioned earlier, when discussing the connotations of faith in the 
statement “we believe”, this definition of creativity is ʻspoken into beingʼ by a 
pair of government departments and its authority is sealed. The second quoted 
section, however, is not a direct quote or paraphrase from the NACCCE or QCA 
documents, but the continuation of the argument implies that it is. The 
assertions that “creativity is not at odds with raising standards or an end in 
itself” is an act of classification which incorporates creativity into a general 
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category of ʻactivities which raise standardsʼ. Similarly the assertion that 
“creativity is not…an end in itself” indicates the way in which the Government 
Response uses creativity as an ʻalibiiʼ for an existing project of ʻraising 
standardsʼ; in other words, creativity becomes a category for alternative 
teaching and learning work which still gets results. This is also indicated by the 
statement that “creativity…should produce outcomes of real value”, about which 
there a couple of interesting features. Firstly, the qualifier “real” here is as 
redundant, logically, as the qualifier “genuine” in “genuine belief” commented on 
above; but rhetorically and implicitly it warns us not to be fooled by ʻfake valueʼ 
of the sort that less controlled definitions of creativity might indulge. Secondly, 
the notion of value is not subject to any kind of scrutiny or questioning and 
neither, incidentally, is the concept of standards.  
 
The message is clear: creativity will be accommodated, but only within existing 
frameworks of assessment. As a consequence there is a struggle throughout 
the document to define creativity as something distinctive, but without allowing it 
to be too distinctive. This results in a sense that creativity has been sprinkled 
throughout the document a bit like magic dust, providing a quality of general 
enhancement, without ever being distinctive or clearly identifiable. It is only 
operationalised, therefore, in association with existing policy initiatives, such as 
raising standards, personalised learning and Every Child Matters (ECM). The 
“creativity and standards” section, for example, reveals the struggle to make 
creativity function as an operational element in a set of assertions about 
learning: 
 
Creativity and standards go hand in hand. Basic literacy and numeracy 
skills are a fundamental building block: without these children do not 
have the skills to express themselves fully or to access material and 
activities that will stimulate their creativity. However, creativity is also a 
key component of English and many other curriculum subjects – for 
example, good spelling and grammar alone are not sufficient to achieve 
a good grade in English Language GCSE. (pp.4-5) 
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The union of equals suggested by “hand in hand” is undermined by the 
construction of creativity as something vague and desirable that can be 
accessed after the acquisition of basic skills and, as such it is both more and 
less valuable than these skills. The conjunction “however” is curious here; it 
implies that creativity was the subject of the first clause and was being spoken 
about in connection with things other than “English”. Apart from noting the irony 
of such awkward use of language in a paragraph about English skills, I am 
tempted to suggest that statements about creativity, when they avoid the 
metaphorical and overtly rhetorical, often seem to stumble and tie themselves in 
knots. The final statement in this paragraph equates creativity with generic skills 
of composition and, significantly, employs this skill in the service of 
standardised assessment. 
 
7.9.4 The policy connection 
The Roberts Report has structured its feedback to its government sponsors in 
the form of “scoping papers on eight themes”. (p.13) These themes are 
summarised in the Government Response under the heading “Key Actions” and 
the summary is significant because of the degree to which it incorporates 
creativity into existing initiatives and, in addition, constructs it as something 
which must be measurable. The opening statement is: 
 
Nurturing Creativity in Young People focussed on eight areas in which 
action needed to be taken in order to ensure that creativity was fostered 
amongst children and young people. A new Advisory Board…will 
oversee action against each of those areas and will monitor progress on 
specific deliverables. (p.6) 
 
As we have seen before, the assertion of the need for action provides a 
rhetorical excuse for stipulative definition and then pragmatic implementation. 
Here, the use of “foster” indicates the potential problem with measuring the 
success of this set of initiatives and it is perhaps significant that Robertsʼ 
preposition “in” has been changed to “amongst” which locates creativity much 
less precisely in relation to the target body. But in order to mitigate this there is 
the invocation of a regulatory body which will perform an assessment of 
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“specific deliverables”.  Consequently we find that the implementation of the 
strategies which will “ensure” that creativity becomes more measurable is 
woven into existing policy practice.  
 
The Creative Portfolio, for example, will be modelled on the Arts Award and the 
14-19 Creative and Media Diploma will “be rooted in the needs of the Creative 
Industries” (p.6). Under the heading of “Early Years” we find that “Current 
Government policies offer unprecedented opportunities for creativity to be at the 
heart of…provision” and that “we will ensure that creativity continues to be of 
fundamental importance in the Early Years foundation stage.” (p.6)  
 
The existing project of Building Schools for the Future will now “provide 
inspirational learning environments that foster creativity by enabling a range of 
teaching and learning styles.” (p.6) Under the heading “Leading Creative 
Learning” we read that “Head teachers and other school leaders can raise the 
priority of creative education and can regard every subject as a creative subject 
in which young people are encouraged to think and work creatively” (p.6) and 
“Practitioner Partnerships” will benefit from being made less “patchy”.  
 
Finally, “Pathways to Creative Industries” will be mapped and progression 
routes made explicit and under “Frameworks and Regulation” we learn that 
“Primary and Secondary National Strategies promote creativity by providing 
teachers with a basis for new and innovative approaches to teaching. Teachers 
who inspire creativity have a clear understanding of what it means to be 
creative and develop creativity in all young people, whatever their ability.” (p.6) 
 
7.10 An effective translation 
Nurturing Creativity in Young People effectively incorporates creativity into 
existing policy; whereas All Our Futures called for a revolution, Nurturing 
Creativity calmly suggests that this revolution is already taking place and that 
the evidence is abundant in a range of government sponsored initiatives and 
good practice in schools. Consequently it has needed to tame the rhetoric of All 
Our Futures in order to make it possible for ʻcreativityʼ to stand at the top of a 
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diagram (p.6) which connects such diverse areas as “programmes, projects, 
agencies” and the “education policy context”. 
 
This document, and its government response partner document, can be seen to 
perform a key function in the translation of creativity from something amorphous 
into something rational, technological and implementable, but they both betray 
the tension involved in performing this operation at moments when the rhetoric 
erupts. As I have argued already, this is inevitable because, without the rhetoric 
of creativity all that remains is a fragmented collection of disparate knowledges 
and practices. 
 
All of the initiatives described in 7.9.4 incorporate creativity into existing policy. 
The final one is most significant because it sets a creativity agenda for Ofsted 
which will be examined in the next chapter. 
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Interruption 7: Methodological doubts 
I continue to have anxiety about the absence of a grand empirical research plan – there 
are no interviews, no focus groups, no marshalling of samples and processing of data. It 
would, of course be possible, to carry out ‘elite interviews’ with policy makers as Gale 
does in his ‘policy archaeology’ but, even though he professes that this is “not an 
interest in authorship, but in vocality” (Gale 2001 p.389) I am not convinced; as D.H. 
Lawrence suggests in a proto-post structuralist statement “Never trust the artist. Trust 
the tale”. (Lawrence 1964, p.2) 
 
I am utilising an approach that I learned in relation to films and literature – 
consequently I tend to treat everything as ‘text’ – objects which are 
ideologically/discursively encoded and which need unravelling in order to make sense 
of them. I am also a pluralist, in that I accept that different readings are possible. But I 
am also aware of the ethical implications of value-free pluralism and, therefore, wary of 
the moral suspension involved in pure relativism; I hope I am sensitive to ‘truth effects’ 
and their implications and, therefore, prepared to object to some discursive formations 
more than others. The fact that we can observe common processes of construction does 
not mean that every discursive construction is equally worthy.  
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8 Learning: Creative approaches that raise standards  
 
8.1 Operationalising creativity 
It is in this document that we can identify most clearly the way in which creativity 
is ʻoperationalisedʼ, that is, as Marcuse tells us, ʻthe concept [is made] 
synonymous with the corresponding set of operations.ʼ (Marcuse 1972, p.80) In 
this chapter I examine how this latest policy document, explicitly concerned with 
creativity, activates statements from the previous documents, represses others 
and, through its exemplification of good practice, produces a material dimension 
which consolidates a discourse of creativity. Jeffrey and Troman argue that 
texts such as this 
 
…are written documents but they also contain values through specific 
discourses mediated by language and beliefs about the role of education 
in society and the economy. These discourses bring objects into 
being…and they construct particular types of social relation through the 
relative strength of the practices they determine. (Jeffrey and Troman 
2009, p.5) 
 
Ofsted, The Office for Standards in Education, Childrenʼs Services and Skills, is 
the government department charged with improving standards in education in 
England. It does this, primarily, through the regular inspection of schools, 
colleges and Local Education Authorities. (Ofsted 2010b) As I have mentioned 
previously, it has authority and power through its regulatory, standardising 
operations of inspecting and grading schools and colleges. 
 
8.2 A prescriptive survey 
This document takes the form of a ʻsurveyʼ, but its status as an Ofsted 
document means that it is unlikely to be read merely as a neutral set of 
observations. It is more likely that this will be read as a set of guidelines for 
good practice – practice which, if adopted, is likely to lead to a favourable 
Ofsted grade in the future. In this sense the document operates as a discursive 
statement – it is regulatory, administrative and ʻlimitingʼ. The link between 
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creativity and ʻgood inspection gradesʼ is explicit from the outset: 
 
All the schools selected for the survey had been judged good or 
outstanding in their most recent inspection in terms of their pupilsʼ 
enjoyment of learning, their preparation for future economic well-being 
and the curriculum. (Ofsted 2010a, p.1) 
 
The suggestion is that this document contains good practices which, if adopted, 
could lead to ʻgoodʼ and ʻoutstandingʼ grades. These good practices have been 
labelled ʻcreative approachesʼ. This equation is reinforced in the contents 
section where the term becomes ʻcreative learningʼ: 
 
Design for creative learning: the curriculum 
Creative learning: higher standards 
Creative learning: personal development 
Creative learning: effective teaching 
Technical skills to support creative learning 
Creative approaches to learning and assessment 
(Ofsted 2010a, p.2) 
 
Jeffrey and Tromanʼs work suggests that the nexus between ʻstandardsʼ (they 
use the term “performativity discourse” to describe the emphasis on targets and 
attainment) and creativity is a particularly awkward one in the schools included 
in their ethnographic research. This has resulted in some teachers negotiating 
the risks by implementing a “cautious creativity” – “Teaching creatively was the 
preferred form over teaching for creativity”. (Jeffrey and Troman 2009, p.29) 
The Ofsted documentʼs production of a creativity discourse in which there is no 
contradiction between standards and creativity is, therefore, significant and 
attention to the construction of (or effacement of) the boundary in this liminal 
area is revealing. My reading of this document emphasises the following: 
• The tension between ʻcreative learningʼ and the National Curriculum 
• The reification of the abstract concept ʻcreativityʼ into specific tasks and 
activities 
• The translation of ʻcreativeʼ activities into ʻstandardsʼ 
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• The way in which a notion of creativity inflects the conception of the 
relationship between teaching and learning 
 
It is important, for the purposes of this analysis, not to anticipate or pre-judge a 
particular version of creativity, but to attempt to identify the discursive influences 
– the existing concepts and documents, the institutional determinants and the 
notional social/pedagogic practice which may result – all of which cause this 
document to be ʻdiaologicʼ, despite its overt ʻmonologismʼ. The evidence of such 
dynamics can reveal the tenuous and contingent nature of the authority which is 
produced by the document and how creativity, specifically, operates as a 
problematic term for it. The overt aim of this document is to demonstrate how 
ʻcreativityʼ can complement the National Curriculum and how particular ʻcreativeʼ 
teaching and learning activities can improve ʻstandardsʼ, but this is also a work 
of classification, definition and authorisation, and these functions are implicit, 
rather than explicit. As Fairclough argues, albeit in relation to a different 
document, its “assertions are ʻcategoricalʼ in the sense that they are not 
modalized.” (Fairclough 2003, p.43) In other words, the statements in this 
document are not qualified by linguistic modifiers, such as ʻmayʼ or ʻcouldʼ, but 
make unqualified assertions. So, for example, we read that 
 
A greater emphasis on pupilsʼ independence as creative learners did not 
imply any lessening of rigour; challenging topics were explored in 
creative ways. (Ofsted 2010a, p.14) 
 
The status of the institution, its regulatory power and its rhetorical strategies all 
contribute to the authority of such statements. The notion of the “creative 
learner” is not problematised at all, but a given; there clearly is such as a thing 
as a “creative learner” which can be produced through the facilitation of more 
independence. But, I would argue, creativity continues to be a problematic term 
given its polymorphous polysemy and, therefore, represents an ever-present 
threat to the pedagogic project into which it has been ʻpress-gangedʼ in this 
document. 
 
Creativity, then, provides us with a loose thread, which enables us to untie this 
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particular text; when particular activities are described in this context they are 
automatically legitimised as ʻcreativeʼ and, if adopted by schools and colleges, 
they will undoubtedly be categorised thus in inspection reports. But the 
translation into practice is not as coherent or seamless as is implied. 
 
8.3 Defining creativity 
Inspectors found that the term 'creativity' was subject to a variety of 
interpretations and applications. Teachers were seen to promote creative 
learning most purposefully and effectively when encouraging pupils to 
question and challenge, make connections and see relationships, 
speculate, keep options open while pursuing a line of enquiry, and reflect 
critically on ideas, actions and results. (Ofsted 2010a, pp.5-6) 
 
Here we can observe a strategy which Fairclough has called “producing an 
impression of consensus through generalising away form specific evaluations or 
statements in a way which reduces difference.” (Fairclough 2003, p.51) The 
“variety of interpretations and applications” are undermined implicitly by the 
statement in the following sentence that the most purposeful promotion of 
creative learning is characterised by (defined by, perhaps) the encouragement 
of a specific set of activities. These activities are not traditionally ʻarts-basedʼ so 
the statement simultaneously enlarges the field within which “creative learning” 
might take place, and narrows it into a set of observable operations. The 
concept of observability is crucial here, and evident in the statement “Teachers 
were seen to promote creative learning…” (Ofsted 2010a, p.5; my italics). Later 
we read that: 
 
During the survey visit, observations of lessons and scrutiny of the 
studentsʼ work confirmed that creative styles of learning kept them 
focused on tasks, interested and eager to succeed in all subjects across 
the curriculum. (Ofsted 2010a, p.17) 
 
Such a confident assertion of cause and effect, despite the absence anywhere 
in the document of methodological considerations, has the effect of truth. 
Creativity, then is translated into specific activities which can be observed and 
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then graded. As I have mentioned in the discussion of the QCA document, there 
is a modelling of creativity here which depends upon observable evidence; in 
Creativity: find it, promote it (QCA 2004) students can be observed to be 
thinking and behaving creatively and the same presupposition obtains here. But 
given Ofstedʼs role as a regulator of institutions, there is an additional layer of 
observation involved here – the observation of teachers. So creativity is not 
merely something that students do, it is something that teachers and schools 
must demonstrate through the implementation of specific strategies and 
activities which are amenable to a superior observer in the hierarchy – the 
inspector.  
 
There is further evidence of this strategy: 
 
The survey found that the term 'creativity' was widely used in the schools 
surveyed but there were variations in what was meant, ranging from an 
innate attribute to an approach and set of skills that could be cultivated. 
All the schools initially offered examples of 'creativity' in subjects 
commonly thought of as intrinsically creative, such as the visual and 
performing arts. However, when the inspectors asked about 'creative 
ways of learning', examples were offered from most subjects across the 
curriculum. Teachers and senior leaders most confidently identified and 
evaluated creativity as an aspect of learning when it was translated into 
specific activities such as those set out by the Qualifications and 
Curriculum Authority's publication Creativity: find it, promote it, rather 
than expressed as an abstract idea. Creative learning was widely 
understood to be characterised by: 
• questioning and challenging 
• making connections and seeing relationships 
• envisaging what might be 
• exploring ideas, keeping options open 
• reflecting critically on ideas, actions and outcomes 
(Ofsted 2010a, p.8) 
 
It is clearer here that the document is performing an act of classification; again 
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we have a reference to a generalised population of educators who seem to 
express confusion about the nature of creativity, even revealing their (implied) 
naivety in focusing on “subjects commonly thought of as intrinsically creative, 
such as the visual and performing arts.” (This simplistic connection between the 
arts and creativity is, as we shall see, something which continues to be 
problematic in this report.) The turning point in the argument – the ʻhoweverʼ 
momentʼ – is based on implied consensus: “teachers and senior leaders” are 
able “confidently” to identify and evaluate creativity when it is “translated into 
specific activities”. The activities described (prescribed) here are significantly 
different from the model of creativity in All Our Futures and Nurturing Creativity 
in Young People, most obviously in the absence from this definition of a focus 
on an objective. This is a curious omission, given the reference to the QCA 
document Creativity: find it, promote it, in which the “What is Creativity?” section 
begins with an explicit reference to the model in All Our Futures: 
 
First, they (the characteristics of creativity) always involve thinking or 
behaving imaginatively. Second, overall this imaginative activity is 
purposeful: that is, it is directed to achieving an objective. Third, these 
processes must generate something original. Fourth, the outcome must 
be of value in relation to the objective. Debating the characteristics 
highlighted by this definition can be a helpful starting point for agreeing 
what your school actually means by creativity. (QCA 2004, p.7) 
 
A closer look at the QCA document reveals that the process of operationalising 
creativity starts here, particularly in its efforts to relate the whole curriculum to 
the concept, and, in this extract, to the requirement for ʻoriginalityʼ: 
 
But what about work in subjects like science, history and maths? While it 
would be wonderful for a pupil to be the first person to discover a new 
scientific principle, this is highly unlikely. Does this mean that pupils canʼt 
be creative in these subjects? Not at all. Skilled teachers can help pupils 
tackle questions, solve problems and have ideas that are new to them. 
This makes pupilsʼ ideas original, the result of genuinely creative 
behaviour. (QCA 2004, pp.7-8) 
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We can see here a transition from the abstract to the concrete; the difficult 
concepts in the NACCCE report, such as ʻoriginalityʼ and ʻvalueʼ are quickly 
translated into activities which are demonstrable by pupils and, therefore, more 
amenable to inspection, if not assessment. The reference point for the Ofsted 
document is the QCA document in which the work of translating abstracts into 
concretes has been done. So it is now possible for Ofsted to draw attention to 
an authoritative text which has legitimised particular activities and to state that a 
general population of teachers has embraced and found meaning in these 
activities, as if they had emerged spontaneously, naturally and inevitably. The 
legitimacy produced for this knowledge about creativity is effected, we might 
say, intertextually and through a generalising, unsubstantiated claim about real 
practices – an assertion via consensus. 
 
The activities described in the Ofsted ʻsurveyʼ then are not merely illustrative, 
but prescriptive; by implication they represent not only ʻgoodʼ practice, but 
ʻcreativeʼ practice. Some examples of these will be considered later. 
 
8.4 From ʻnurturingʼ to ʻpromotingʼ 
Although the Roberts Report, Nurturing Creativity in Young People, is cited in 
the references for this document, it is not quoted at all and neither is the word 
ʻnurturingʼ mentioned. We might infer from this that the model of creativity 
produced in the Roberts Report is not one which works for Ofsted. We have 
seen how QCAʼs Creativity: Find it, promote it is a key reference point for the 
Ofsted document and, to re-invoke the concept of operationalism, I would argue 
that the QCA document provides a model which is more amenable to practical 
implementation. The concept of ʻnurturingʼ with its more passive, maternal 
connotations has been neglected in favour of the more active, masculine notion 
of ʻpromotingʼ. And given that the Roberts Report (2006) succeeds the QCA 
document (2004) this also provides a good example of a ʻdiscontinuous historyʼ 
in which, arguably, a particular version of a concept becomes dominant, not 
because it is ʻrightʼ or ʻtrueʼ, or because it evolves inevitably in a particular way, 
but because it is amenable to implementation, administration and regulation. 
The QCA document is subtitled: 
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Promoting pupilsʼ creative thinking and behaviour across the curriculum at 
Key Stages 1, 2 and 3. Practical materials for schools. (QCA 2004, p.1) 
 
which provides a more tangible, practical model for creativity than the Roberts 
Report, with its emphasis on policy and frameworks. 
 
8.5 The question of standards 
The title of this document indicates that ʻcreative approachesʼ are only of value 
if they lead to an improvement in standards. The standards here are very 
definitely those enshrined in the National Curriculum and creativity, therefore, 
becomes something which can be administered in the service of those 
standards. In a section entitled ʻCreative learning: effective teachingʼ, creativity 
is linked to the Every Child Matters agenda; we learn that  
 
The schools that encouraged creative approaches to learning deliberately 
set out to promote a variety of ways of thinking and problem solving. The 
survey judged eight of the 24 nursery and primary schools to be 
outstanding in boosting pupilsʼ achievement and enjoyment of learning, 15 
were good, and one was satisfactory. (Ofsted 2010a, p.22) 
 
A statement which indicates that not only can ʻcreative approachesʼ be 
measured and graded, but that they are not legitimate as creative approaches 
unless they conform to this assessment regime. 
 
Creativity, however, as we have seen is not a concept that lends itself to easy 
definition and which carries with it a range of meanings, many of which are 
about resistance, opposition and subversion. This document manages this 
problem by using the authority of QCAʼs Creativity: find it, promote it to model 
creativity as, essentially, a set of generic skills, but tension between the 
regulated order of the National Curriculum and the potential wildness of 
creativity is ever-present. We read, for example that: 
 
Good examples of creative styles of learning were embedded successfully 
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within the National Curriculum, both through the presentation of individual 
subjects and through cross-curricular approaches. (Ofsted 2010a, p.4) 
 
And: 
 
In schools with good teaching, there is not a conflict between the National 
Curriculum, national standards in core subjects and creative approaches 
to learning. (Ofsted 2010a, p.4) 
 
So the argument is that there is no inherent contradiction, no intrinsic problem 
with the relationship between the National Curriculum and creativity, in fact it is 
the index of a good school that creativity has been ʻembeddedʼ and pressed into 
the service of ʻcore subjectsʼ. The tension here is between the regulated regime 
of assessment and the absent voice which might propose an alternative model 
of creativity; it is the tension evident in All Our Futures when the dialogue about 
ʻfreedom and controlʼ is articulated. 
 
The tension is also clear in the examples in the report of work observed in the 
survey, which includes ʻfailuresʼ as well as ʻsuccessesʼ. An example of a failure 
is described thus: 
 
A number of year groups had inexperienced staff who did not make the 
most of enjoyable activities to develop pupilsʼ skills in enquiry, decision-
making, inventive problem-solving and self-evaluation. Pupils were, for 
example, clearly enjoying designing a time machine so they could travel 
back to meet the Egyptians for their topic work. The impact of this 
potentially very good activity was limited because the teacher failed to 
promote any higher order thinking. (Ofsted 2010a, p.14) 
 
Creativity (or its applications/manifestations as ʻcreative learningʼ and ʻcreative 
approaches to learningʼ) is not mentioned here because the absence of the 
development of ʻskills in enquiry, decision-making, inventive problem solving 
and self-evaluationʼ means that, in the terms of this document, it does not exist. 
The example goes on to explain that: 
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Pupils were not encouraged to evaluate each otherʼs ideas and 
opportunities were missed to make connections with mathematics and 
science, even though there were clear opportunities to do so. (Ofsted 
2010a, p.14) 
 
Which suggests that creativity resides in the activity of teachers, that, in order 
for ʻcreative learningʼ to occur, it must be driven and promoted by teachers in 
the direction of National Curriculum standards. In this sense Ofsted retains the 
notion of ʻpurposeʼ which we first found in All Our Futures and which occurs 
repeatedly in this document, although not in its ʻworking definitionʼ. But purpose 
is always in tension with pleasure and enjoyment and this is rhetorically 
resolved by combining them. Here, for example: 
 
The end products were recorded and pupils then evaluated them. They 
were able to explain the purpose and impact of this activity. It had 
extended their understanding of pattern and structure, strengthened their 
recall of multiplication tables and been hugely enjoyable. (Ofsted 2010a, 
p.12) 
 
8.6 Performativity and Creativity 
The regulatory work of this document in modelling creativity in such a way that it 
becomes instrumental in achieving the aims of the National Curriculum is 
clearest when it assigns validity to particular activities: 
 
In a small number of the schools visited, pupils' personal development as 
creative learners was not matched by their progress in core academic 
skills such as literacy and numeracy. This happened where curriculum 
planning was not sufficiently well-rooted in the content and skills of the 
National Curriculum. The acquisition of basic skills remains of fundamental 
importance. (Ofsted 2010a, p.6)  
 
This statement is predicated on the assumptions that  
• Personal development as a ʻcreative learnerʼ is measurable 
• This measurement is comparable with measurement of development as a 
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ʻtraditional learnerʼ 
The function of the statement is to caution schools and colleges against simply 
allowing ʻcreativityʼ to flourish without ensuring that it is subordinate to the 
National Curriculum, but by establishing the notion that creativity is measurable 
it opens up the possibility of assessing it, formalising it and operationalising it.  
 
The cautionary note is struck again here: 
 
Pupils made little progress when the outcomes expected were 
insufficiently challenging and when they received insufficient guidance. 
Occasionally, teachers failed to grasp that creative learning was not simply 
a question of allowing pupils to follow their interests; careful planning was 
needed for enquiry, debate, speculation, experimentation, review and 
presentation to be productive. (Ofsted 2010a, p.6) 
 
8.7 The irresistible arts 
Despite the attempt to model creativity as a set of generic skills and, therefore, 
resist the tendency for anything arts-based to automatically be valid, we can, 
nevertheless, identify a tendency in this document to exemplify creative 
activities in arts-based scenarios. A brief description of each case study will 
reveal this: 
 
• A curriculum based on “learning journeys”, beginning with a “wow” event 
and ending with “a presentation to parents or an exhibition or a 
performance” 
• A Year 7 “Fashion Week” 
• “Counting the beats” – a maths and drumming project 
• Studying medieval England – leading to a performance of the Robin Hood 
story 
• Responding to a painting by Paul Klee 
• A performance of Macbeth to engage “hard to reach” families 
• A “dramatic approach to science” in order to motivate low-attainment 
students 
• A drama lesson based on stories around a 17th Century painting 
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• A production of Jack and the Beanstalk 
• The use of narratives in a physics lesson 
• Role play in a citizenship class 
• Using imaginative “real life cameos” to facilitate understanding of maths 
• A radio station project 
• Imaginative scenarios to facilitate understanding of the natural world 
• “Op Art” in mathematics 
• “Hot seating” role play in history 
• Role play in Macbeth 
• Film criticism 
• A furniture design project to support students at risk of exclusion 
• A “show and tell” approach in a primary school 
• Producing a video advert 
• The use of role play, “freeze frames” and “talking partners” to improve 
learning 
• The raising of self-esteem “through excellence in the expressive arts” 
• A collaborative arts project linked to the re-opening of the townʼs arts 
centre 
• A “thinkering space” involving an artist, scientist or engineer 
• Improvements in attainment through becoming a Creative Partnerships 
“change school” (and, for example, working with an artist) 
• Using sculpture in geography work on plate tectonics 
• Creative writing (Ofsted 2010a, pp.10-44) 
 
There are only a few examples in which arts-oriented work is absent and these 
tend to refer to the ʻmacroʼ work of curriculum development and organisation. 
We can identify, then, across all of the reports, a kind of disavowal of the arts 
followed by implicit confirmation; first we are told that creativity does not belong 
exclusively in the domain of the arts, then it is modelled as a set of ʻextractedʼ 
generic skills and then these generic skills are exemplified within particular 
scenarios. But the scenarios tend to be arts-based. This tension continues to be 
problematic for such attempts to render creativity generic and operational. 
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8.8 Assessment versus Inspection 
There is a tension, it seems, between assessment and inspection. As I have 
mentioned previously, with reference to Rowntree, assessment tends to 
demand objects which can be quantified, transported and contained. But the 
activities described by Ofsted, particularly given its detachment from the 
objective focused model in All Our Futures, do not inevitably provide such 
evidence, rather, they provide evidence of primarily cognitive processes. How 
might we account for this contradiction? One strategy is to suggest that 
education is not an ideologically coherent institution, but that it is a site of 
discursive conflict, and that the recent focus on creativity can be used to reveal 
something of this conflict. The need for urgent ʻchangeʼ, argued for so 
passionately in All Our Futures, may have been driven by the requirements of 
the knowledge economy, social justice and educational reform, but any actually 
changes resulting from it directly (minimal, according to Buckingham and Jones, 
albeit only two years later in 2001) or indirectly, are not inevitably coherent or 
demonstrably in the service of powerful interests. These examples of political 
interventions in creativity in education reveal how resistant ʻcreativityʼ is to 
definition and categorisation and how attempts to do this have necessitated a 
translation into particular practices which may be at odds with existing 
educational practices. In other words, the process of attempting to sort out the 
ʻmessʼ of creativity actually results in more ʻmessʼ. 
 
8.9 Creative learning/creative teaching – a taxonomy 
The status of creativity in this document is ambiguous; rarely is it confronted 
directly as a noun, more often is used adjectivally before “teaching” or 
“learning”. It is also subject to a kind of secondary displacement by being used 
before “approaches”, as in “creative approaches to learning”. But despite the 
appearance of homogeneity – an appearance helped by the title – these 
different formulations can be read as referring to quite different things. 
 
Creative learning  
This is something which learners/pupils do in response to ʻcreative teachingʼ 
and ʻcreative approaches to learningʼ. 
Creative approaches to learning 
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This is something which institutions and educators do, but the fact that it can be 
ʻeffectiveʼ implies that it may also have the potential to be ineffective. It depends 
upon “careful planning” (p.5) 
Creative styles of learning 
This may be identical with ʻcreative learningʼ, but the use of ʻstyleʼ suggests that 
it may not actually be creative – merely creative-esque. 
Creative teaching 
This is a subset of ʻcreative approaches to learningʼ and refers specifically to 
what goes on in between teachers and pupils. 
The promotion of creative learning 
As with ʻgood practiceʼ below, this category entails a range of operational 
requirements, but also implies a commitment in principle to creative learning. 
Good practice which supports creative learning 
Effective management, effective pedagogy, effective curriculum planning, 
purposeful work, effective partnerships. It is worth noting that ʻeffective 
curriculum planningʼ is bound up with ʻthe promotion of creative learningʼ, but 
not exclusively; it also includes an emphasis on “not losing touch with the 
content, skills and assessment targets of the National Curriculum.” (Ofsted 
2010a, p.9) 
 
8.10 Methodological inadequacy 
There is an irony in this report regarding methodological issues. There is no 
evidence that a particular methodology has been implemented or even 
considered, yet definite conclusions are drawn regarding cause and effect  - 
particularly the beneficial effects of ʻcreative approaches to learningʼ. It is also 
the case that, whilst extolling the virtues of approaches to learning which are 
ʻcreative and open endedʼ and in which it is clear that there is “no single right 
answer” (p.15), it embodies none of this open-endedness itself and is often 
dogmatic about ʻrightʼ and ʻwrongʼ approaches that teachers might adopt. 
 
This may represent another difficulty with the concept of creativity in this report; 
there is a conventional view that, although it is resistant to definition, ʻyou know 
it when you see itʼ, and, perhaps, the absence of methodological rigour in this 
survey reflects something of this, despite its efforts to operationalise it in 
  223 
particular ways.  
 
8.11 A movement away from conventional interpretations of creativity 
The Ofsted document exhibits a desire to construct a definition of creativity 
which is different from ones which locate it conventionally within the arts: 
 
Approaches developed successfully in traditionally ʻcreativeʼ subjects, 
such as the arts and English, were often incorporated into other areas, 
such as science and mathematics.ʼ (Ofsted 2010a, p.5) 
 
The use of inverted commas here clearly indicates doubt about such a limited 
conception of creativity and/or a desire to undermine it (I have performed 
exactly the same operation at particular points in this thesis – something which 
should also be subject to scrutiny). No such qualification is implemented when 
the adjective is used in, for example,  “creative learning” and “creative 
approaches”, which has the effect of rendering these terms unproblematic and 
legitimate. We have seen how, in all of the documents under scrutiny, there is a 
drive to locate creativity across the curriculum, rather than just in the arts 
(although as Banaji et al. point out, this is undermined by their visual rhetoric), 
but the “working definition” (pp.7-8) in this document constitutes the most 
significant move away from anything product-oriented towards a set of cognitive 
skills: 
 
• questioning and challenging 
• making connections and seeing relationships 
• envisaging what might be 
• exploring ideas, keeping options open 
• reflecting critically on ideas, actions and outcomes 
 
Here, some of Banaji et al.ʼs final questions become most pertinent: 
 
What is the difference between ʻgoodʼ pedagogy and ʻcreativeʼ pedagogy? 
How is creative teaching and learning different from ʻgood or ʻeffectiveʼ 
teaching and ʻengagedʼ or ʻenthusiasticʼ learning? What is the added value 
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of using the term ʻcreativityʼ in this context? (Banaji et al. 2006, p.60) 
  
These questions are not answered in The Rhetorics of Creativity, but their 
relevance is clear; arguably there is no applicable difference in the Ofsted 
document between ʻcreativeʼ and ʻgoodʼ or ʻeffectiveʼ. This has implications for 
real teachers in real circumstances; the modelling of ʻcreative learningʼ (or the 
re-framed ʻcreative approaches to learningʼ) as effective pedagogy legitimates 
further statements about teachersʼ competence: 
 
Pupils' enthusiasm and sense of achievement were shared by almost all 
staff in the schools visited. In the four primary and four secondary schools 
where any concern was expressed about creative approaches to learning 
being a successful preparation for external assessments or where pupils' 
achievement was not in fact enhanced, this reflected teachers' lack of 
confidence in their ability to combine the two effectively or their limited 
skills in developing pupils' ability to question, speculate, solve problems 
and evaluate what they had done. (Ofsted 2010a, p.14) 
 
“Concern” here becomes an index of ineptitude; concern about the efficacy of 
the approaches described in this document is invalid and is the result of either 
“lack of confidence” or “limited skills”. Again, we might refer to the rhetorical 
devices used here: the use of “any concern” suggests that it is minimal; the 
reporting of this concern in the passive voice generalises it, distances it from a 
locatable voice and renders it merely vaguely negative, whereas a quote from 
an individual might resonate and be disruptive to the flow of establishing 
consent. It is also worth noting that ʻcreative approaches to learningʼ are here 
wholly identified with “developing pupilsʼ ability to question, speculate, solve 
problems and evaluate”. The reference to teachersʼ concerns about assessment 
is also significant; I mentioned earlier that the focus in this document is on 
observable activities rather than (externally) assessable activities, but any 
problem with the lack of fit here has been firmly shifted onto the teachers, rather 
than acknowledging the imperatives of inspection. 
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8.12 Creativity ʻin practiceʼ 
 We might speculate about the reasons for the use of ʻcreativityʼ in this 
document; we might propose that ʻcreativityʼ offers the opportunity to revitalise 
the familiar with new terminology, or that the document is achieving the 
necessary goal of appearing to fall in with the ʻknowledge economyʼ agenda 
whilst hanging on to ʻtraditionalʼ pedagogic values and practices. But such 
speculation about motives and origins is less important than identifying the way 
in which ʻcreativityʼ is modelled and remodelled in relation to pedagogy here. To 
return momentarily to the concepts of rhetoric, ideology and discourse, we can 
see that this document employs rhetorical strategies in order to create a 
persuasive case for particular pedagogical approaches, that it bears the 
ideological imprint of a governmentʼs ʻknowledge economyʼ agenda, but, most 
importantly, it operates discursively to produce and legitimate particular 
activities as valid and particular interpretations as ʻknowledgeʼ. 
 
The Creative Partnerships website posted a comment on this report on 15 
January 2010. The sub head reads “Ofsted recognises the benefits of Creative 
Partnerships in its latest report: ʻLearning: creative approaches that raise 
standardsʼ.”  The emphasis is on utility; “creative learning practices” (not 
ʻcreativityʼ, per se)  “are improving standards and pupilsʼ personal 
development”. The piece notes the impact that such approaches has had on 
aspects such as achievement, attendance and motivation “particularly for 
schools in challenging circumstances”. (Creative Partnerships 2010) 
 
So, here, the value of creativity is its utility; there is no sense that creative work 
is valuable in itself, but merely that it can improve performance in other areas. 
And these other areas are ones in which performance can be measured, which 
in turn, legitimates the use of ʻcreative approachesʼ. As is typical, however, the 
image which accompanies this story is of two children painting. 
 
One final example illustrates the way in which creativity can be discursively 
framed to be subordinate to conventional notions of educational standards. 
Figures 6 and 7 show a flyer for an educational conference in which creativity is 
offered as a discrete commodity which can be ʻembeddedʼ in order positively to 
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influence a range of self-evidently important things. The subtitle: “Embedding 
creativity throughout your school to enhance learning and raise pupil 
performance” reveals that creativity here is merely one (albeit a currently 
significant one) of a number of rational technologies that can be employed in 
the school/“factory” (see Kendall and Wickham 1999, p.133) in order to 
generate particular desirable outcomes. 
 
My key point in relation to this example is not that it is a ʻbad thingʼ or even a 
ʻmistakeʼ, but that it is non-acknowledged thing; there is no suggestion that 
creativity is subject to different interpretations, no possibility of alternative 
perspectives, but, instead, a mobilisation of the conceptual translation 
performed by Ofsted and, indeed, endorsed by the presence of Patricia Metham 
“author of the report ʻLearning: creative approaches that raise standardsʼ, to 
give you an exclusive insight into how creativity will be assessed in the new 
Ofsted framework so you can prepare for inspection.” (Figure 7) 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7
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Interruption 8: A final reflection 
 
As I approach the final chapter of this thesis the familiar uneasiness about the nature of 
the research returns; within the technological/rational structure of the thesis I feel as if 
the conclusion should present some ‘proofs’, that there should be a sense of ‘QED’. 
 
And in the concluding chapter I try to address the ‘so what?’ question in order to justify 
the analysis that has preceded this – clearly there has to have been some purpose and 
some sense of a goal. Although this research has not been ‘policy analysis’ in a 
conventional sense, I have felt the need to make some suggestions regarding the use and 
construction of creativity in a policy context, and also the contexts of research and 
practice. 
 
My purpose has been to investigate the production of a key concept and to present some 
evidence to challenge foundational or essential notions of creativity. By doing this I 
hope to have make an intervention in the relentless, uncritical rise of creativity in 
education which, I think, is constituted by rhetoric, confusion and vague aspiration. 
 
But I have to acknowledge that I am a subject of discourse too; ultimately this work has 
merely been a certain kind of reading of some specific texts. And it has been a reading 
performed by someone who did a ‘pre-critical theory’ literature degree, a post-critical 
theory MA and who has taught media studies for several years. All of these domains of 
knowledge and performance have ‘produced’ me in different ways and inevitably 
determined the kind of analysis I have carried out. 
 
Despite my scepticism about Romantic notions of creativity, I am in part a product of 
this discourse too, which is why, in these interruptions for example, there is evidence 
that I have constructed this work as a ‘quest’ through the rhetoric of the ‘Hero’s 
Journey’ (see Vogler 1999), complete with the preparatory stages of assembling 
‘armour’, ‘weapons’ and planning a strategy to increase my chances of returning with 
the ‘elixir’. To recognise that one sees oneself as a self-determined actor in a narrative 
is to accept a central irony in a piece of work which seeks to undermine such 
foundational notions. But it also makes it possible to accept that such work is inevitably 
contingent and compromised by the overt desire to produce knowledge whilst 
challenging the concept of knowledge.  
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And, again, it is ironic that acceptance of this ‘failure’ is ameliorated through literature 
– one of Beckett’s many existential voices, for whom life and death are universals, 
experienced subjectively: 
 
Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better. (Beckett 
2009, p.81) 
 
Which, at least encapsulates the sense of having attempted something. 
  231 
9 Conclusions 
 
The wide range of approaches to creativity – the ways of thinking about it which 
are embedded in the many different popular, everyday and academic 
documents that I have examined here – are all engaged in the process of fixing 
creativity – of making it into a ʻthingʼ with value and benefiting from that value. It 
has been necessary to explore and establish these various orders of thinking 
before examining a small selection of education policy documents in which we 
can identify, to differing degrees, comparable conceptual structures. These 
documents mobilise creativity as something which can be identified, nurtured, 
implemented and assessed. As I stated at the beginning of the analysis, this is 
precisely the reason for selecting them; they are documents with authority 
which constitute educational policy through advisory and administrative 
operations. As such they necessarily define creativity and mobilise it as a 
feature of education, and this combination of explicit modelling and implicit 
theorising make them particular valuable objects of study for research which 
seeks to expose the discursive construction of a concept. 
 
9.1 So what?  
Nelson argues that: 
 
It is perhaps unlikely that the term ʻcreativityʼ will be ʻerasedʼ any time 
soon. However, by denaturalising the discourse – by questioning the 
ʻcommon senseʼ appeals of creative industries rhetoric and romantic 
appeals of the creative arts – we can begin to understand the multiple 
and contradictory ways in which creativity is deployed in the present. 
(Nelson 2010, p.70) 
 
This is insightful; ʻcreativityʼ is not going to vanish as a term, and it seems 
unrealistic to adopt Barkerʼs stance in relation to the term ʻviolenceʼ, 
characterised by “an argument for refusing to operate with the category.” 
(Barker 2004, p.57) 
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So what are the applications of this research? How might it be useful? How 
might it contribute to understanding and more informed practice? I would 
suggest there is potential in each of three different areas: research; policy; and 
practice and that in every area the development of a meta-discursive mode in 
relation to creativity could represent a more helpful way of conceptualising it. 
 
In order to make explicit the gains of this research it is worth returning to the 
questions that I established at the beginning of this thesis – I will deal with each 
one in turn. 
 
• How is creativity implicitly theorised? 
• How is creativity explicitly theorised? 
• What can an analysis of key examples, such as educational policy 
documents, reveal about this theorisation? 
• To what extent can creativity be demonstrated to be a social, rhetorical 
and discursive construction? 
• What are the implications for research, policy and practice of such a 
demonstration? 
 
9.1.1 HOW IS CREATIVITY IMPLICITLY/EXPLICITLY THEORISED? 
It is the co-existence of complexity and simplicity in the theorisation of creativity 
which makes it a fascinating case. Implicitly it tends to depend upon a notion of 
extraordinary, individual agency – a notion which is only made explicit in 
discussions of historiometry. (e.g. Simonton 1999) And, arguably, it is on this 
implicit level that it is most coherent and simple because it is here, as Žižek 
(1989) explains, that we are ʻheldʼ ideologically by it.  
 
Creativity is a word which carries multiplicity within it, yet masquerades as 
unitary, so that despite the fact that neuroscientists and educational researchers 
are examining completely different things, the name ʻcreativityʼ still obtains. And 
this situation is indicative of the ideological hold mentioned above.  
 
We have seen how creativity is explicitly theorised in a variety of ways – as 
specific mental processes, as particular skills and aptitudes, for example, but I 
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would argue that all of these explicit assertions of knowledge about creativity 
are inevitably in thrall to implicit theories of creativity – implicit theories that we 
could call ideological.  
 
The starting point for any explicit theorising of creativity is an act of classification 
– an assertion of what is and what isnʼt included. This initial classificatory move 
is inevitably specific to a domain and a culture and, therefore, is often supported 
with reference to ʻobviouslyʼ creative phenomena (the work of Van Gogh or Da 
Vinci, for example) or existing research (references to a ʻpersuasive body of 
researchʼ rarely take into account methodological assumptions and 
inconsistencies). Such starting points, then, are inevitably flawed and 
questionable and, given the enormous range, and contradictory nature, of 
explicit theorising about creativity it is remarkable that it continues to be feasible 
to operate with it as a concept in academic circles.  
 
One strategy to ameliorate this has been the fragmentation of creativity into 
smaller, more easily defined elements – the theoretical division between 
“personal” and “historical” creativity instituted by Boden, for example. Similarly 
All Our Futures produced a distinction between “Teaching creatively and 
teaching for creativity” (NACCCE 1999, p.102). But this strategy of 
fragmentation reveals that creativity as a concept depends upon more than the 
sum of its notional parts and, even when subject to fragmentation, the idea of 
ʻvaluable productivityʼ is still present. 
 
I suggest that the implicit (and emotional) investment in the notion of an 
essence of creativity holds us so tightly that, even in the face of such chaos, the 
belief persists. 
 
9.1.2 WHAT CAN AN ANALYSIS OF KEY EXAMPLES, SUCH AS 
EDUCATIONAL POLICY DOCUMENTS, REVEAL ABOUT THIS 
THEORISATION? 
As I have explained earlier, I have made a selection of education policy and 
advisory documents which deal explicitly with creativity in order to identify how 
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the concept is produced, modified and translated within a specific area of a 
specific domain. 
 
The key finding is that this small set of examples, which appear to offer clarity 
are, in fact characterised by contradiction. It has been possible to demonstrate 
that creativity is a site of conflict and struggle in these documents, even when it 
is presented as something amenable to implementation and regulation. I have 
suggested that, in all of the documents under scrutiny, creativity has been 
produced through rhetorical and discursive means, which include the poetic 
invocations of spirit and self determination as well as the moves of power 
constituted by authoritative citation and the construction of subjects.  
 
Perhaps inevitably, given the exigencies of education, there is a tension evident 
between the rhetoric of self-determination – the ʻcreative learnerʼ – and the 
discursive machinery which situates this learner within a network of valid 
practices and knowledge. This word ʻinevitablyʼ suggests an inexorable logic of 
regulation (but not a ʻgrand narrativeʼ) and it has been possible to argue that the 
concept of creativity has, of necessity in this system, been modulated from the 
chaotic manifestations in All Our Futures to a rhetorically terse reification in 
Ofstedʼs operational document. ʻCreativityʼ is, arguably, more coherent in this 
last iteration, but it is not the ʻcreativityʼ produced by Robinsonʼs committee.  
 
The processes of translation evident in these documents reveal something 
about the process of knowledge production and the ways in which limits and 
boundaries are produced in order to validate and invalidate certain things, and 
they also reveal something about the ways in which creativity operates as a 
concept. Instead of ʻcreativityʼ we might, after Foucault, (1977a) talk of the 
ʻcreativity functionʼ; these documents (and, by extension, education) mobilise 
the concept in order to effect particular operations, to assert and delimit, for 
example: 
• The function of education 
• The necessary congruence between the economy and education 
• The status of the ʻselfʼ (as learner and teacher) 
• The boundaries of self-determination 
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• The necessity of regulation (and, therefore, the inevitability of monitoring, 
assessment and inspection). 
 
In this context creativity has provided a valuable site of penetration into such 
operations; the productive nature of the documents has provided insight into not 
only the wrestling with a difficult concept, but also provided an example of how 
knowledge, authority and legitimacy are produced. This is at the heart of the 
concept of discourse which has underpinned this work; these documents imply 
certain kinds of practice, and prescribe certain kinds of practice, but they also 
constitute a kind of administrative and regulatory practice. 
 
9.1.3 TO WHAT EXTENT CAN CREATIVITY BE DEMONSTRATED TO BE A 
SOCIAL, RHETORICAL AND DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION? 
I have argued consistently that creativity is not a ʻthingʼ, that, in other words, it 
does not have ontological status. This is a theoretical starting point and it has 
required reference to post structuralist thought in order to argue that there is a 
difference between concepts and ʻthingsʼ. I have also recognised the danger in 
this stance – that it could lead to a post modern nihilism in which meaning is 
endlessly deferred and intellectual inertia sets in.  
 
But I argue that an anti-essentialism is necessary and valuable for particular 
concepts – concepts which masquerade as ʻnaturalʼ and ʻobviousʼ, concepts 
which divide and classify, concepts which have real effects. Creativity is such a 
concept and I have demonstrated a range of ways in which it is constructed in 
different ways.  
 
This would be little more than an academic exercise were it not for the ubiquity 
of ʻcreativityʼ in education and its treatment as a measurable capacity or 
attribute. As I suggest a little later, the attempts of research and policy to treat 
creativity as such an thing sometimes seem as absurd as an attempt to 
implement ʻloveʼ would be, although their respective discursive operations 
would, no doubt, produce it as a convincing knowledge object. 
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No statement about creativity in this thesis has been presented as transparent, 
as merely a conduit to a ʻthingʼ. This represents a degree of methodological 
fidelity on my part – a commitment to the need to assess ʻtruth claimsʼ and to be 
systematically sceptical about conceptual certainty. This is particularly so when 
those truth claims are constructed with authoritative machinery and when the 
ʻright to knowʼ is assumed and practised by institutions – an ironic state of 
affairs given creativityʼs rhetorical investment in the autonomous, self-
determining subject. 
 
9.1.4 WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH, POLICY AND 
PRACTICE OF SUCH A DEMONSTRATION? 
My conclusions above point in a clear direction regarding the implications here; 
I will deal with research, policy and practice separately, but generally I suggest 
that there is a need for founding assumptions about creativity to be questioned 
as part of a meta-discourse.  
 
RESEARCH 
It is, of course, easy to be critical of other research – there will always be 
founding assumptions, methodological quirks and logical lacunae with which 
one can find fault. Nevertheless, I would argue that creativity research needs to 
address its starting points in a more critical way. A research proposal which 
came my way recently (and has secured funding) is based on measuring the 
effects on “creative functioning” of particular educational interventions and, 
despite a nod to Csikszentmihalyiʼs work on the significance of cultural context, 
it embraces a cognitive model of creativity which can then be ʻtestedʼ.  
 
I suggest that such research might benefit from abandoning the word ʻcreativityʼ 
and, instead, specifying the changes in behaviour that it is seeking. Although, in 
this case, (and this may be a cynical suggestion) once denuded of the all-
encompassing term ʻcreativityʼ, the nature of the putative benefits of the project 
would have to be more tentatively qualified and may not be as appealing in 
terms of funding. 
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Regarding a scientific approach to finding ʻthe grailʼ, whether cognitive or 
neurophysiological, I would suggest simply, stop. There seems to be a 
fundamental inadequacy in positivist scientific methodologies when faced with 
socially constructed meanings.  
 
I have suggested earlier that ethnographic sociological work might be revealing 
in pursuit of ʻcreativity effectsʼ and the ʻcreativity functionʼ within specific 
domains. This kind of work, rather than fruitlessly chasing an ʻessenceʼ could be 
valuable in creating understanding about how ʻcreativityʼ functions as a criterion 
and as a value for particular groups. No universalising claims would, could or 
should be made on the basis of such research, but creativity as a social 
construction could be revealed more tangibly. 
 
POLICY 
It must be acknowledged at policy level that creativity has no tangible existence 
and, therefore, attempts to mobilise and implement it are doomed to fail. This is 
a blunt and provocative statement, but a necessary one, given the seductions of 
the concept; even if the term ʻcreative industriesʼ were acknowledged to be 
merely a pragmatic label, we would probably still find ʻcreativityʼ being ascribed 
to the employees of such industries. 
 
It may be that for the UK coalition government, in power since May 2010, 
economic survival rather than creativity is the top priority and we may see its 
decline as a policy term. But in education it has become, and will probably 
remain, a key element, as we have seen, in the Ofsted inspection framework.  
 
The problem with creativity as a policy term is that it has been established as a 
universal concept which can then be implemented in specific domains. The 
opposite might be more helpful – for subject or domain specific qualities to be 
identified and developed. We might then find that creativity becomes redundant 
– even as rhetorical decoration – and that other, less obfuscatory, terms 
become recognised as valuable. 
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Interventions at this level are difficult, however, given the speed and nature of 
policy production but, nevertheless, I suggest that policy needs to be 
interrogated on both rhetorical and logical grounds; creativity has been indulged 
as a concept because of, as Wagner (2009) puts it, its “semantic aura”, but 
could one imagine a similarly vague, but appealing, term like ʻloveʼ being made 
into policy? 
 
It is not clear where this conversation could take place, but there is a need for 
meta-discourse around creativity policy. 
 
PRACTICE 
By practice I am referring specifically to educational practice at all levels. I 
would like to think that this research constitutes an invitation, perhaps a 
provocation, to engage students, colleagues and others in a meta-discourse 
around creativity. This would, in a way, constitute a refusal to operate with the 
category, except on this critical level, and it could be practised within existing 
pedagogic contexts.  
 
I teach, for example, on an MA in ʻCreative and Media Educationʼ, a course 
which has ʻcreativeʼ in the title and uses the term ʻcreativityʼ in its assessment 
criteria. The students on the course are all teachers of media or ʻcreative artsʼ 
subjects and, therefore, accustomed to seeing themselves, their students and 
their subjects as ʻcreativeʼ. The bulk of the learning takes place on a Virtual 
Learning Environment (VLE) on which asynchronous discussions take place on 
key themes. The ʻPracticeʼ unit involves the production of an artefact and 
generates, therefore, considerable discussion about ʻcreativityʼ. I see my role 
here as providing critical interventions, which means starting discussion threads 
in which I ask the students to question their assumptions about creativity. This 
has provoked responses such as this one: 
 
I wonder if we do put creativity up on a pedestal (can you do that with an 
abstract concept?), along with originality, and talk about it in quite reverent 
terms. It's as though creativity is something aspirational but necessarily 
possible for all. Surely though, it's just the capacity to 'create' something. I 
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would have thought anyone has that ability if it lends itself to their 
preferred 'intelligence'. (MACME student 2008) 
 
This, and other similar responses, provide evidence of the students starting to 
grapple with the concept, but also being explicit about when it is necessary to 
operate with a problematic term pragmatically – to extend to it, as Eagleton 
does with the contradictory notions of ʻideologyʼ, a degree of “charity”. (Eagleton 
1991, p.7) 
 
Later in this thread the idea that notions of creativity might be allied with class-
based notions of taste and distinction emerges from one of the students: 
 
this thread's debate is great - exactly what Iʼve been looking for - what is 
coming across to me, is the very real, taste and creative, class divides. 
what is very interesting is where the minority creative/media elite get their 
confidence/arrogance for their own taste and judgements on an artefact, 
over that of the masses? (MACME student 2008) 
 
Whilst I am not making any revolutionary claims for such interventions, I will 
suggest that they constitute a minor, local disturbance to the common sense 
about creativity; the nature of the cohort, the course and the forum all made 
possible a discussion in which ʻcreativityʼ was decentred. This decentring could 
be argued to be a move against power – the power of value, status and fixity of 
meaning. This was effected through the generation of a meta-discursive 
conversation in which the usual “what is it?” questions were circumvented in 
favour of reflective questions, such as “how do I conceive it, and why?” I hope, 
but cannot know, that this quality of discussion, this alternative order of thinking, 
was carried to the respective students of my students, thus enlarging the impact 
of this ʻlocal disturbanceʼ. 
 
But the hold of creativity is strong and such ripples of disquiet may not be 
effective for long. Other strategies I have employed have been the conference 
paper and the student workshop and, in both cases there has been interest and 
enthusiasm in an alternative perspective. However, after one such disquisition 
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on the proposal that there is no such thing as creativity, a student approached 
me at the end and asked: “so what is creativity then?” 
 
The critical conversation I am advocating is, unfortunately, nowhere in evidence 
on the website of the University of East Anglia where we read that: 
 
The University of East Anglia has pioneered the teaching of creative 
writing, world art and entrepreneurship; and is now leading the way in UK 
academic research into creativity and the creative process. (University of 
East Anglia 2010) 
 
The creativity pages of the site include a range of quotations that would not be 
out of place in All Our Futures and there is a similar willingness to assert that 
creativity can be studied “across disciplines”. There is even a “Senior Lecturer 
in Creativity”.  
 
Whilst acknowledging that ʻcreativityʼ might be a useful marketing term (links 
take us to “creativity related degree programmes”), one would hope that the 
UEA promise that: 
 
You can be part of a creative and intellectual community that is aspiring 
to not just to do different – but think different and be different. (University 
of East Anglia 2010) 
 
would involve the suggestion that the orthodoxy of creativity might also be 
challenged. 
 
This challenge, I suggest, is necessary, not just intellectually, but in order to 
move against the imposition of a fiction on the professional lives of those in 
education. 
 
9.2 Summing up 
It may be possible to argue that creativity in education is just a smokescreen; 
that behind the rhetoric of self-determination, freedom to follow oneʼs dream and 
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self-actualisation there exists, as ever, a systematic training in particular roles in 
the economy. In Althusserʼs terms, students learn “know how” in relation to 
particular roles, and it is irrelevant whether or not these roles are within the 
ʻcreative industriesʼ, because  
 
…children at school also learn the ʻrulesʼ of good behaviour, i.e. the 
attitude that should be observed by every agent in the division of labour, 
according to the job he is ʻdestinedʼ for: rules of  morality, civic and 
professional conscience, which actually means rules of respect for the 
socio-technical division of labour and ultimately the rules of the order 
established by class domination. (Althusser 1977, p.127) 
 
The fact that the rhetoric of creativity, with its investment in the freedom of the 
individual subject, challenges this notion of class-driven, predetermination does 
not necessarily mean we should abandon Althusserʼs model. We might argue 
firstly, for example, that the kinds of observable ʻcreativeʼ skills that are 
encouraged through policy documents are those which might simply produce 
more flexible, more compliant workers. We might argue secondly, as Crawford 
does, that the promise of democratic creativity (he critiques Richard Floridaʼs 
work, in particular) is a myth which, at best, may make people feel better about 
their menial jobs and, at worst, has caused a neglect of traditional craft skills. 
(Crawford 2010) We could also adduce Kendall and Wickhamʼs assessment of 
the modern classroom, which: 
 
…became much more like a laboratory: an exclusive, experimental 
space where the results of specific strategies can be accurately 
assessed and new strategies accordingly invented and tried out. 
However, in becoming more and more like a laboratory, the classroom 
simultaneously became more like a factory, in that the desire to produce 
good, moral citizens became the guiding impulse. The classroom now 
had not only something like a recognisably modern moral tone, it also 
had a recognisably modern final aim: the manufacture of the young 
citizen. (Kendall and Wickham 1999, p.133) 
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The discursive formation of creativity through policy and advisory documents fits 
into this paradigm of education appositely; it has been modelled through 
rhetorically scientific means as something which can be implemented, 
monitored and assessed and, in addition, shaped as something which will 
enhance the identity and productivity of the learning subject. 
 
But this research has not been concerned with exposing the ʻmythʼ of creativity 
by juxtaposing it with ʻrealityʼ, in the sense that there is a lie which can be 
disproved by confronting it with the truth. It has, however, been concerned with 
examining the construction of the ʻmythʼ of creativity in the post structuralist 
sense that myth is a product of discourse and, for Barthes, may be used as a 
synonym for ideology. In this methodological context the work has been to 
identify the ways in which truth effects are produced about creativity within in 
various spaces, domains and contexts: in the ʻgeneralʼ or popular domain 
common sense absorbs contradictions and reproduces resilient myths about 
creativity; in education there is an observable tension between elitist and 
democratic myths; and in education policy the requirement to produce 
demonstrable outcomes has created particular prescriptive versions of the 
creative student, teacher and curriculum. There are inevitably blurred 
boundaries between these categories; the ʻgeneralʼ domain is informed by the 
academic domain – particularly the discourses produced within the arts and 
science (psychology and neuroscience in particular). And given the popular 
desirability of creativity, there is also some overlap with the pedagogic domain, 
at least in the form of self-improvement and management literature.  
 
The overlap between the domains of education and education policy is 
considerable and, arguably, they belong together, however, one of the primary 
motives for this research has been to show how creativity can exist as a 
contested, plural concept within the domain of education, and how pressure is 
exerted upon it to function as singular and unambiguous in a policy context.  
The structure of the thesis reflects this principle of moving from the general to 
the particular, adopting a historiographic approach to the wider literature and 
adopting more refined tools in order to unpick the discursive and rhetorical 
devices evident in the policy documents. Ultimately it has been possible to 
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demonstrate the problems and tensions evident in these documents and to 
assert that the very effort to produce creativity as a unitary, homogenous, 
operational concept is that which creates the conditions in which it is 
undermined. 
 
In this research I have approached creativity as a particular kind of problem – a 
problem of meaning rather than a problem of practice – and the concept of 
discourse has enabled me to show how the construction of particular meanings 
around creativity is constituted by, and constitutive of power/knowledge 
relations. The methodological armoury offered by Foucault, Kendall and 
Wickham, and Fairclough has enabled me to decide both what to examine and 
how to examine it in order to identify the production and transformations of 
creativity and consider the implications of this. 
 
In order to avoid the pitfalls of idealist philosophy, whilst retaining a foothold in 
an anti-essentialist position, I would like to follow Popper in avoiding “what-is?” 
questions. (Popper 1992, p.62) I have argued consistently throughout this work 
that creativity is not a ʻthingʼ and, therefore, it is irrelevant to ask “what is it?” 
The alternative is to circumvent questions which seek equations for answers 
and to look at the factors which produce a sense of ʻthingsʼ and which give them 
real effects. In this context there is no ʻtrue creativityʼ, but there may be many 
ʻtrue creativitiesʼ. The concept of ʻcontingent ontologyʼ may be a useful one to 
account for this phenomenon; this is related to the concept of multiple ontology 
proposed by Actor Network Theorists such as Mol (2003) and enables us to 
hang onto the reality of the effects of particular constructions of creativity, 
without capitulating to the notion of an essential nature. This could also provide 
a theoretical framework for future work on the production of ʻcreativityʼ within 
specific material contexts; indeed this sort of work is essential if a Foucaultian 
project is to be pursued which would identify the full range of discursive and 
material practices by which creativity is constituted. 
 
Similarly, as Albert argues in a discussion of identity: 
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If one considers identity to be a question, then the next step is not 
measurement - one does not measure a question - but rather a 
discussion of why identity is relevant or important within a particular 
context, what kinds of answers to the question of identity might be 
provided, and how adequate they are, and so on. Identity may be 
precisely that kind of question that eludes standard conceptions of 
measurement - that may be one of its defining properties… To measure 
identity may require that one measure its reluctance to being measured, 
that one study the genius of its disguises and the way it eludes capture 
while still claiming presence as a core defining feature. (Albert 1998, p.3) 
 
These statements about the construction of identity as a concept chime with my 
own thoughts about creativity as a concept and, perhaps, indicate a possible 
way forward; it may be that in order to retain creativity as a concept in education 
we need to reframe it, to redefine the nature of the questions we ask about it. 
We would not, in this context, ask any more what it is, how we can make it 
happen or how we can measure it; instead we would ask why we use it in a 
particular statement, what are our expectations of it and what do we have 
invested in it.  
 
Creativity is a privileged term and a powerful concept, but the reality of this 
privilege and power is not revealed by attempts to define, implement and 
measure it – all these do is preserve its notional mystery. As Law says, albeit in 
a different context: 
 
The naming, the fixity and the triumphalism - I want to argue that in 
current circumstances these pose the larger danger to productive 
thinking - the larger danger to the chance to make a difference, 
intellectually and politically. (Law 1999, p.2) 
 
My stance in this work has been both reactionary and radical: reactionary in that 
I have practised resistance to the seductions of ʻcreativityʼ, its promises of 
progress and its apparent uncritical embrace by all; radical in that I have sought 
to undermine and subvert particular dominant orders of thinking about creativity. 
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What I have shown, at least, is that a small selection of UK education policy and 
advisory documents in the last ten years exemplify a grappling with the concept 
of creativity. I have tried to avoid attributing this to specific causes or situating it 
within a ʻgrand narrativeʼ, but have attempted to attend to the specifics of 
conceptual modelling and ideological mobilisation. I have resisted and drawn 
attention to the way in which creativity has been produced as something with 
ontological status in most research and particularly in education policy – the 
way in which it has been mobilised within a teleological discourse as something 
progressively to be ʻknownʼ, a view exemplified by Hopeʼs assertion that “As 
they advance the science disciplines discover things that have always existed.” 
(Hope 2010, p.42) 
  
I argue that, given the abstract, slippery nature of the concept, that any attempt 
at reification is inevitably productive and that this is inevitably in conflict with the 
rhetorical investment in an essence of creativity. In the context of education 
policy, which argues for change and illustrates good practice, this results in 
ʻcoherent incoherenceʼ – there is nothing here but seductive rhetoric which 
binds together a range of completely different and often incompatible ideas, 
activities, behaviours and strategies. This research has been a revolt against 
“the naming, the fixity and the triumphalism” inherent in the many articulations 
of ʻcreativityʼ. 
 
Ultimately I suggest that this research might provide sufficient evidence to 
undermine the use of ʻcreativityʼ in education or, at least, to provide grounds for 
unpacking what is always implicit in its invocation and implementation. There is 
a strong argument here for refusing to operate with the concept unless this is 
done or, at least, to move towards a position which acknowledges that there is 
no ʻtrue creativityʼ, in terms of a phenomenon or essence, but that there are 
multiple ʻtrue creativitiesʼ in terms of beliefs and practices, and that attention 
must be paid to its discursive production. This is particularly necessary in 
education, at a local and national level, where the rhetorically produced 
associations with freedom, alternativeness and self-realisation can divert 
attention from the production of creativity as prescriptive, delimited and 
determined by the exigencies of authoritative institutions.  
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APPENDIX  
Definitions of creativity 
 
Delegates at CEMP Media Summit, Bournemouth University (2 September 
2008) 
 
Bringing fresh eyes and perspectives to an idea/concept – pushing the 
boundaries of a (?). Thinking differently in a positive way. 
 
The ability to create emotional intellectual etc. space based on oneʼs own 
experience, whilst being spacious enough for others to inhabit it as their own. 
Recognisable and unfamiliar at the same time. What is the purpose of defining 
creativity in educational context, apart from necessity to justify its inclusion in 
our marking system (unfortunate?!?). 
 
Creativity is the process of making new and artistic media artefacts for the 
consumption of everyone around you. 
Mad people can have ideas but itʼs the creative person who manufactures. 
 
Making original statements – juxtaposition of ideas or images – confidence with 
and command of a medium. Talented/inspired. 
 
A process of making original statement through use of chosen medium/media. 
Added ʻvalueʼ to other activity e.g. problem solving – generally a positive. 
 
Making  
Developing an idea 
Inventing 
 
The will to take ideas and turn them into something solid – a product to show or 
communicate the concept and develop your imagination.  
 
The novel or unique assimilation and synthesis of the known into something 
new, unexpected or unknown, or something new not made from extant 
knowledge. 
 
To add value to an idea in such a way as to grab attention and imagination. 
 
Responding imaginatively to a challenge 
Comment: interestingly we talk of “creatives” and (more commonly) “creative 
industries” – surely all industries are “creative” and therefore populated by 
“creatives”. 
 
A thought process 
Something new or re-interpreted 
Artistic expression 
Creations in different mediums: writing, painting, drama, dance, music, poetry, 
cooking, hair/make up etc. 
 
Making, doing (crude) but can be intangible – thinking. 
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Not necessarily original to all but will be to the learner. 
Does not have an end point. 
Pulling together of concepts to form new propositions. 
 
Making sense of the confusion of everyday life though all and any artful means. 
 
Originality, innovation, ability to tell a story. Adds to the world view (i.e. the 
world would be  a poorer place without that prog, film, book, play, painting etc.) 
Courage, self belief, rebellious (when needed). 
 
Definitely not just problem solving. Scriptwriting is both craft and art! 
 
Curiosity and linking the different ideas encountered. 
 
Creating new or adapting existing concepts or objects with a new perspective. 
 
Creativity. The act of creating 
 
Making something that helps us see things differently. 
 
 ʻBlue Sky Thinkingʼ. 
-Thinking outside the box 
- Using the resources you have in the most effective way. 
 
 
BA screenwriting students, Bournemouth University (13 Oct 2008) 
 
Creating – being artistic in the sense that you are trying to make something out 
of nothing, being original. You have this passion of making something, be it 
story or image. Interesting. Exciting stuff! As well as to nurture it to fully realise it 
into being. To be inspired and use that inspiration. 
It is a form of expression that delves into the artistic and imaginative realm of 
oneʼs mind.  
 
Creativity is an extension of having a lot of imagination. It is the ability to create 
something original or otherwise, out of a trail of thought. Results of creativity can 
be: useful, beautiful, original, disturbing etc. Creativity can also be very 
therapeutic. If one feels isolated or depressed, working on something important 
and being creative can offer great satisfaction.  
 
Creativity is a skill of making something beautiful out of nothing but your own 
head. 
 
Creativity is a conjuring of ideas in oneʼs mind that can be put into different 
forms/mediums of practice. To a degree it reflects oneʼs though process. Some 
are good at reflecting their ideas into other mediums, whereas some are not. 
Predominantly it depends on the individual in question.  
 
Creativity is a thought process that is put into physical or mental practice. To a 
degree it is a talent that not everybody has. 
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Creativity is the forming of an idea or ideas, generating visions in the mind in 
your own individual way, depending on their own personal ability. 
 
Being original; creativity works in an established medium that inspires others; 
pushing boundaries; being true; commenting on issues through oneʼs work. 
Production of oneʼs own thought and ideals into a familiar medium. 
 
A personal way to convey my ideals or thoughts. 
 
The production of your own thoughts and ideas through your own chosen 
medium(s) to convey an expression of yourself/ideals/what you believe.  
 
Creativity is the ability to take old ideas and reshape them into new concepts, 
and in extreme cases create new ideas/concepts altogether. It is being able to 
differentiate yourself from the norm to think of something in an original way. 
Creativity is using these new ideas to create something artistic, such as a story 
or work of art.  
 
To be creative, to think about things rather than being told. To use oneʼs 
imagination. 
Discovering something new and interesting with the help of the 
subconscious/muse. Through imagination. 
 
Creativity is a way of understanding the world through imagination and 
observation as well as a desire to tell stories in as interesting a way as possible. 
Through it you can achieve many things you might not be able to in reality, and 
can enhance reality by looking at something in a new way (or in an old way that 
you may have previously ignored).  
 
Thinking outside the box; being imaginative; being able to imagine ideas; ability 
to turn ideas into a form of realism; observing something and being able to 
interpret it into something else.  
 
Creativity means, for me, being able to express oneʼs thought and imagination 
in some sort and by that creating something new. Itʼs also about combining 
different things, thoughts etc. in an innovative way.  
 
Creativity is to me the ability to create an original piece out of anything, whether 
it is to prepare a meal in a new and original way, or it can be to write a script 
about a subject or a character or what that the world did not know they wanted 
to see. Creativity is the ability to put things that existed separately together and 
create a unit out of it.  
 
The ability to express oneʼs emotion and feelings through a piece of work??? ; 
Communicate to others; Therapy – soothing the emotion, for example 
(especially since many ʻcreative types; suffer mental health; Escapism (stolen 
from the person next to me!)  
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Escapism, opposite situation to the ʻnowʼ. Original thought or thought branching 
from thought itʼs possibilities of something. (person next to me said: expressing 
feelings, communication, therapy).  
 
The capacity to organize ideas and thoughts in a unique and personal way. (Is it 
really a capacity, or rather an ability? Are we capable of being creative or able 
to?) 
 
Creativity to me means the ability to produce something spontaneously using a 
skill and/or talent, with ideas influenced by personality and the experience of the 
writer.  
 
Creativity is basically something people do for fun, and to make life more 
bearable and interesting. I think itʼs almost an unconscious thing – people are 
creative all the time without realising it. But it can also be channelled, and used, 
to create cool stuff like films and pretty shoes. It can also be used for important 
means – like raising awareness, etc. So it is a) an escape from reality, b) a way 
of making reality ʻmore realʼ.  
 
Freedom to express yourself and influence others; to bring to the forefront your 
ideas, concepts and morals, and advertise them to others. Escapism from 
reality, and like dreaming when sleeping, creating is compulsory for survival.  
 
Creativity means making something out of nothing and being able to express 
your thoughts and beliefs either through text or images. 
 
Creativity, to me, means freedom of expression, the ability to gather thoughts 
and ideas and combine them into an original product. It is a practice that not 
everyone can achieve successfully, but there are some who possess the ability 
to be original and thoughtful. As a scriptwriter, creativity is perhaps one of the 
most important abilities to have, without it limits what you can write in terms of 
its originality and place in a mediated society.  
 
Creativity means the flourishing of ideas into a recognisable product that others 
can relate to – a generator of new perspectives and ideas. The ability to look at 
ordinary objects or event in a fresh and enlightened way. Creativity is exciting. 
Creativity is a means of expressing a personal emotion in visual form. 
 
Creativity is the human ability to create. To manufacture new thoughts, ideas 
and concepts. It may also be considered to include putting these ideas into a 
medium. Contrary to popular belief, creativity is not strictly limited to ʻartʼ. 
Creativity is required in science, sport – even government. Even more important 
is to note that it is not strictly a force for good – creativity can be used to invent 
new forms of torture, weaponry or control.  
 
Creativity = planning, creating or practising new or different ideas. (not a very 
creative answer). 
 
Creativity is an impulse in the mind, it is a force to distract, to delight, to dazzle, 
to make sense of the world through something that comes from you and that 
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you “add” to the world through different formats, not just in art. All areas of life 
not just the arts have ʻcreativityʼ at its core not just artists but everything from 
mathematics to coal-mining and everything in between. 
The ability to imagine or see things in a different way. Be able to create new 
ideas, imagine new things.  
 
The expression (or desire to express) some manner of emotion, whether itʼs 
aimed at an audience or purely for self gain/need. I am unsure whether it needs 
to be physically shown – in fact I would probably say creativity is the activity in 
the mind, the thought, rather than the expression. Is creativity the same as 
freedom of thought? Is any expressive or progressive idea a form of creativity?  
 
Creativity is the warm feeling – a glorification of something that feels new. 
However creativity is typically applying old stimuli and hiding the sources. As a 
species that imitates, the creative stems from experimenting with that imitation. 
 
I think it means using your own imagination to produce something that 
interest/captivates a specific audience. Being able to create new ideas and 
imagine new things.  
 
Expression of thoughts, ideas or skills which captures the imagination and 
contains emotion.  
 
Originality, Inventiveness, imagination. A good way to express thoughts/ideas. 
Also ʻa capturing of emotionʼ.  
 
To capture life, emotion and relevance.  
 
The system of taking that spark within thatʼs intrigued in all and using it to build 
and fashion a body of work, capturing emotion.  
 
Creativity… to me can be a process in which one can process, vent and 
perhaps understand emotions and experiences. I believe creativity on a 
personal level can to an extent be a basics of personal exploration. When 
frustrated, sad, creativity can be a satisfying use of positive and negative 
energy. To create something organic and pure? It can be a constant battle with 
a cynical side of my self. “I must do something creative now!” This is what has 
pushed me throughout my life to play music…and now write.  
 
Creativity is the means to turn conscious ideas into something expressive and 
concrete. Expression, thoughts, feelings etc. The ability to create ideas and the 
means to express them. Or not. Expression isnʼt strictly necessary. 
 
Creativity is about thinking of or producing something new, exciting and different 
to things that have come before it. 
 
Creativity means you have a good imagination, can think of lots of ideas and 
are artistic. 
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Creativity is the ability to make something out of nothing, or to find meaning 
where it is not so apparent. Creativity is the ability to make something of 
nothing, or to find or ʻCREATEʼ meaning where it is not so apparent.  
 
Creativity is the desire to and process of producing or imagining something 
original and new. It is the desire to and process of producing or imagining 
something original and new from your imagination and from the world around 
you.  
 
Creativity is a means of expressing myself – using different objects/words etc. 
to project my thoughts and ideas to others and striving to achieve this in 
innovative, original and exciting new ways. Creativity is unpredictable, with 
materials being endless, and responses varying greatly within different 
generations, and different personalities – these influence our creative juices.  
 
Creativity is seen in many forms such as art, activities, writing, music, acting 
and so on. In relation to script writing itself I think it can be done in many ways 
using various ingredients to crate a product whether itʼs a radio production or a 
film. In film I think you can take into account colours, object, music, people, 
language. Itʼs a way to express a story or meanings in any which way you want. 
Itʼs very exciting because the material we can use are endless. We can do what 
ever we want. I thrive on having an effect on people, entertain and inspire.  
 
 
BA students, Newman University College (21 November 2008)  
 
I feel creativity is taking an image or an idea and using it to create, say, a 
picture, video. Itʼs not that I didnʼt think of some of the things, but the 
presentation has widened my view for e.g. breaking the rule like drugs making 
you more creative seeing things differently. 
 
Creativity! Expressing yourself through different mediums. E.g. drawing, writing, 
making a film, the way you dress. 
 
Creativity. To realise in practice what you imagine using whatever you want or 
need. 
 
Creativity is the ability to invent new worlds and new sensations in order to 
produce new things. 
 
Being an individual, creating something unique and different. Imagining 
something and creating it for the world to see, something which has a purpose 
to serve, even if it is an extremely small one. 
 
Putting your own twist on things and by doing that I guess that makes you 
original. Creativity is a characteristic everyone has – some are more in touch 
with it than others. 
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To me creativity is an individualʼs own thoughts and ideas creating a product or 
a concept. It involves not only thinking outside the box but tearing the box up all 
together. 
 
To me, creativity is the process in which a piece of work is made – including the 
idea and how it is handled and made into the final piece of work. 
 
I believe that creatism [sic] is the use of imagination and freedom used in 
whatever the people are doing and that there is no measure of it but just levels 
of it. 
 
Process of using personal imaginative input when creating any ʻproductʼ of your 
own design. 
 
Creativity, I feel is something which allows us to form an idea/image etc. 
through perspective/experiences/emotions. I believe it to be the thought/path to 
the idea rather than the finished product! 
 
Creativity – oneʼs imagination presented through any means. The freedom to 
record thoughts and develop ideas. 
 
Making something up that can be about anything and go in any direction. E.g…. 
Clothes – Goths/rockers/emoʼs 
Written text 
Drawing 
Video production 
 
People, computers even cars can be creative. Cars e.g.: James May doing the 
Top Gear theme with cars. 
 
Creativity is influence gained from our surroundings, culture and social 
background. Creativity is a mechanism found in the brain. 
 
Creating something that is wholly original to you as an individual, group, 
organisation etc. (ʻGoing against the normʼ). 
 
 
MA screenwriting students, Bournemouth University (3 July 2009) 
 
A natural process involving the brain enabling the individual to respond to any 
form of stimuli which enables them to create a brand new or interpreted form of 
this. However, just like other expansive terms such as happiness, it is relative 
and varies between individuals. 
 
The inability to inhabit an environment that I necessarily havenʼt been to and 
would never want to go to. Nonetheless, I created it , therefore it exists because 
of my inquisitiveness. 
 
An unconscious linking or association of disparate ideas that leads to an output 
of some type. 
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Being original and non-derivative, and often telling lies. 
 
Re-look at reality. Re-define reality. 
 
To imagine and ʻcreateʼ an object, piece of writing, art, design, problem solving 
etc in a way that no-one else has – i.e. be original. 
 
Creativity is creating something which should be liked by others and should 
raise the awareness of human beings, which should lead human evolution. 
 
Imaginative, working towards individual though. Exploring ideas, thinking of new 
ways of doing things, expressing personality in a unique way. 
 
Are you creative? 
 
I like to think so, I love all art forms and when I listen to music or read a book it 
creates unlimited images in my mind. I am also able to create a whole story 
from the most simple of starting points. I can also come up with extremely 
original and dynamic displays of fruit and veg at Sainsburyʼs. 
 
No more creative than a conduit. No more than a funnel. No less than a mass 
computer with the ability and ego with human weakness that is self preservation 
and the desire to leave your mark on the world. 
 
Sometimes. Why? Because it is very important to me. Pleasurable. 
 
I believe everyone is creative, but writers are probably more so. So the answer 
is yes. Why? Because for various reasons I have had to tell lies and make up 
stories for most of my life; this engenders originality of thought. 
 
Yes. I want to use narrative and visual (art department work) to tell stories 
about, largely, anxieties within man, or within each one of us. Also: I want also 
to provoke dialogue on xxx norms within society.  
 
Yes – relative to my usual environment. Why? 1. Aim to find innovative 
memorable means of communicating messages, addressing issues. 2. 
Psychological reasons – toward imaginative rather than proscribed (sic) 
approaches.  
 
Yes in some situations, no in others. Why? Because of my strengths and 
weaknesses as a person and an inability to engage in many ʻcreativeʼ practices 
such as art, design, problem solving etc. 
 
Partly – part craftsman and part artist – though the term makes me 
uncomfortable as Iʼm not yet satisfied with the quality of my output – not enough 
to think of it as particularly creative, and certainly not as art. Why? Thereʼs the 
potential for lots of challenges – and thatʼs something we need – and also the 
potential to communicate at a different level to verbal communication. In fact itʼs 
probably mostly about that. 
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Yes. 
 
Yes. Why? Everybody is creative in some sense in a large variety of ways and 
in different forms of expression. Personally I think I am as the way I think and in 
various subjects such as writing and music, but also in other skills i.e. 
leadership and so forth! 
 
I am creative because I take pleasure in it, and in being part of a wider group of 
creative people i.e. going to see films, exhibitions, seeing the creative work of 
other people is interesting. I sometimes feel I am being my true self when 
thinking or acting creatively. I feel committed to it and that it improves the quality 
of my life through the satisfaction it gives me. I like to develop ideas as I have 
no idea where they will go and what I will find out about others, the world and 
myself.  
 
 
MA in Creative and Media Education students, Bournemouth University 
(22 January 2010) 
 
Having ideas which inspire you to develop them, they have value. Ideas with 
potential for development, scope. I donʼt think creativity comes in isolation – 
there is often a journey + something to say about it. 
 
Creativity is something that an individual produces/demonstrates that 
challenges convention in terms of their own perceptions, abilities and positions. 
 
Creativity. Exploring possibilities. Challenging convention. 
 
Creativity is to produce something that has thoughtful intent. i.e. A child 
choosing to put a paint brush in the Red paint and make a splodge on paper. 
 
Creativity in my opinion is the combination of four elements:  
1. using appropriate technology successfully + being inventive. 
2. Creating an obvious meaning for the audience. 
3. Passion and flair including originality is obvious to the audience. 
4. Appropriate codes and conventions used successfully and employed 
creatively. 
 
Creativity. To create something ʻoriginalʼ. Audience can interpret ideas & draw 
meaning from the product. Expression. 
 
A combination of (a) new idea(s) produced originally for an audience in an 
expressive way, that challenges conventions or produces solutions. 
 
Being able to think of a range of solutions to a problem, using a range of 
methods and possibilities. 
 
Creativity is oneʼs ability to think beyond the sum of their experiences to make 
something new that adds value. 
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The application of imaginative processes. 
 
Expressing yourself in a way which is original and innovative for you! 
 
An ability to produce something in an original way. 
 
 
BA Screenwriting students, Bournemouth University (25 January 2010)  
 
When you said ʻwhat is creativity?ʼ I thought of its definition in the dictionary to 
create meaning to make. So it is the ability to [ ] something. Its magnitude and 
versatility is irrelevant. Buildings are creation, faeces are creation, cake is 
creation. Itʼs all creative, billions of things are. Utility is irrelevant. We only shun 
creations we see these examples endlessly. Intelligence and originality and 
persistence is what interests us. The truth is we do it every day, creativity goes 
unrecognised by us all. Our choice of creativity relies soully [sic] upon what we 
decide to define within ourselves as creative. We are all creative, in one way or 
another. Itʼs what we value that sticks out the most. 
 
Producing something youʼre passionate about. 
 
Using the collection of thoughts, imaginings and feelings in your mind as 
building blocks to create something. 
 
To think in an open-minded manner about numerous ideas. – A wealth of ideas. 
 
Creativity. When you see a molehill and make a mountain.  
 
Creativity. An inspiration, undertaken by a person, creating an idea. 
The invention of something. 
 
Creativity: The ability to create, be original think outside the box and to place 
your own, individual mark upon the world. 
 
Creativity. A way of putting your imagination in an expressive way. 
Making something new, exciting and as original as possible. 
 
Creativity – The ability to create exciting and imaginative works. In the field of 
art the works being unique and personal. 
 
CREATIVITY – The act of thinking, making or doing something in a unique and 
different way. 
 
Imagination; Story Telling; Spontaneous thought; Improvisation; Creating 
something out of nothing; The process of the above↕ [bullet points on the card] 
 
CREATIVITY making something from nothing 
 
Creativity The ability to use imagination to create something such as art, stories, 
film, machines, etc. Helps if it is original as itʼs more creative. 
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Making something out of what you imagine. 
 
Creativity:- I believe this to mean: one who uses their imagination, skills, talents 
etc to make anything and everything. 
 
Creativity The artistic use of imaginative ideas to create something. 
 
The ability to produce/think of imaginative things and interesting ideas. 
Creativity: The ability to create original pieces of work/stories from your 
imagination. 
 
Creativity: Building something from nothing. 
 
An abundance of ideas and the ability to develop them into something material 
and original. 
 
Making or “creating” a form of something. Being original or common use: 
thought or taught. 
 
Creativity ability to improvise. 
 
Creativity A piece of work spawned from an idea. 
 
Creativity – The imagination and individuality to write episodes of Hollyoaks just 
like everyone else. Sorry, that didnʼt really make any sense. 
 
Creativity – harnessing original ideas and realising their importance. – I kept 
changing my mind. [final comment refers to the crossings out and 
interpolations]. 
 
Bringing something into the world that never existed before. (Not babies) Ideas 
turned into something physical. 
 
Creativity. Making ideas, thoughts and feelings become real  
 
Creativity – Expression – something personal. Feelings and emotions. 
 
Making something from nothing using just your mind. 
 
Self-expression and relief. 
 
The ability to express your imagination in original and valuable ways. 
 
Creativity is what you make it! 
 
Creativity is…being able to define something imaginatively in sixty seconds! 
 
The ability to imagine and think up new and diverse ideas. 
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The ability to manufacture an imaginary idea and elaborate into a feasible 
world. 
 
Creativity [sketch of light bulb and brain]. 
 
Creativity – making something from nothing or very little. 
 
Are you creative? Why? 
 
Yes – because before this was a blank postcard and I have created a postcard 
with writing on it. 
 
Not yet. I still have a lot to prove. Perhaps one day… 
 
Yes…I continuously think of new ideas and try to try new things whenever I can. 
 
Yes! Isnʼt everyone?! Nothing is unimportant. I see ideas and novelty in things 
others would ignore – I think that counts for something. 
 
YES* *Because I create stuff.  
 
Yes = Because I can be inventive. 
 
Yes. Because I canʼt not be. I couldnʼt do anything else. 
 
Yes. I drew that [arrow points at a small sketch – a sort of segmented wedge]. 
 
I try 
 
Creative – I am creative because of my imagination and ability to transcribe it to 
words and stories. 
 
Am I creative? Probably not, but I do know the meaning of life. 
 
No 
 
I think I am because I see the potential for creativity in many things around me. 
 
Am I creative? I donʼt know as creativity has so many meanings and I think that 
maybe nobody truly knows what it means to be creative. 
 
Yes. I believe everyone is in their own way. I think I am because I regularly use 
my imagination to the best as I can to think of new, fresh ideas. 
 
Yes – But everyone is to some extent because creativity is subjective. What I 
think is creative, others may not? What is creative? 
 
Yes – in a sense, everybody is creative in their own ways. Iʼm writing a film 
about Beastiality, creative enough! 
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Depends what definition of creativity is. 
 
Yes I think so (even though at time the creativity goes untapped) and not 
necessarily because I have a talent or ability others donʼt but because I exhibit a 
desire to want to explore that talent/ability where others might necessarily not. 
 
Yes, with the ability to imagine and transfer to word or image, I am creative. 
 
Yes. [accompanied by a sketch of what seems to be a smiling, waving carrot]. 
 
Am I creative? Not really, but neither is Michael Bay, and heʼs doinʼ alright. 
 
Am I creative? Yes, yes I am. I have ideas and often write them down. 
 
Yes. I donʼt want a real job and writing seems more interesting. 
 
Yes [represented as speech from a stick man]. 
 
Am I creative? Yes – but isnʼt everyone? 
 
Yes. Perhaps it is genetic as I come from a long line of story-tellers. 
 
Yes – because (see other side) [which says: ʻcreativity is what you make itʼ] 
 
Yes, because everyone is. 
 
Yes but I canʼt prove it…interesting. 
 
Yes! I think, therefore I am. 
 
Am I creative? Yes…I am Serbian. 
 
Am I creative? Iʼm not sure, weʼll see how much money I make. 
 
 
Creative and Media Diploma students, Long Road Sixth Form College, 
Cambridge (22 February 2010) 
 
Everything you do could be classed as creative. 
 
Self-expression. “When Iʼm creative I express my spirit on the piano.” Creativity 
is something you express visually or any other form. It is the key to being 
different. You can use any materials and create something in your eyes only. 
 
Creativity. Being spontaneous and expressive. 
 
Creativity? Being expressive. [with arrow pointing to a squiggle] 
 
Creativity? Originality. Being individual. 
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Creativity? Expressive. Different. Risks? 
 
The undividable moments in life. Writing video treatments. Looking [at] other 
peopleʼs videos.  
 
Creativity is all from the imagination and can be anything you want it to be. 
 
Creativity is an expression of your imagination. 
 
Creativity is – expressing new ideas in an innovative way. 
 
Creativity – is doing or creating something original and inventive. This could be 
art, or a piece of tech or a story. 
 
Creativity – formulating and expressing new ideas and stuff. [teacherʼs 
response] 
 
Creativity is getting excited and making something. [teacherʼs response] 
 
Creativity. Something eye catching, original, expressive. [BU hospitality student] 
 
Creativity. New ideas. Unique. Inspired. Outside the box. [BU hospitality 
student] 
 
 
ʻEducational Challengeʼ Conference delegates, Tallin (26 March 2010) 
 
Creativity: ability to apply experiential knowledge (in new situations AND with 
other people as well). 
 
Being different! 
 
Creativity: something unique and natural simultaneously. 
 
Creativity - concept how to see, to do, etc. differently. 
 
Remaking/remodelling. 
 
Creativity = ability to apply old knowledge, experience, memories, habits to new 
situations - flexibility - agility. 
 
Creativity: coming up with new things. 
 
Creativity - doing something differently and better. 
 
Old wine in new bottles. Combining two elements or objects, or ideas in a new 
original way. 
 
Creativity - avoiding traditional, habitual, learned solutions in thought process 
and practice. 
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Creativity - unpredicted approaches, non-standard solutions to old 
situations/problems. 
 
Definition of creativity: … is an ability to think and act in a manner that is new 
and problem solving. 
 
Going from conflict to consensus (finding a solution) or going from consensus to 
conflict (creating a problem). 
 
Creativity: think about things that do not exist (yet). 
 
Definition of creativity as I see it: ideas with courage. 
 
Creativity = linked brains via complex open networks generating new idea(s) 
towards the growth of knowledge. 
 
The arrival of a new idea that flows from the immediate or the distant and 
manifests as a revelation. 
 
Creativity = thinking faster than others. Ability to catch attention. 
 
Creativity means seeing things a bit differently, i.e. in a new way. It is a skill to 
make things differently. 
 
Make or do something that did not exist before. 
 
My definition of creativity is the classificatory work of generating new 
conventions. 
 
Creativity is an idea or act that establishes or changes a new or existing 
domain. 
 
A new/original combination of known elements (although sometimes forgotten). 
 
Creativity - ability to see known things in a new light and to develop them further 
- innovatively in a new way or in a new direction. 
 
Creativity: getting the idea. Innovation: following it through. 
 
Creativity is ability to think and act 'outside the box' whilst in most cases having 
an understanding of what the box is. It is both a characteristic of the individual 
and a group, also an environment. Take old and make new. 
 
Association of certain things into new combinations. 
 
(in the presentation, there was the notion of value, but it made me think that 
most mischief is very creative and could be considered as 'destroying' valuable 
stuff.) 
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BBC Academy tutors (31 March 2010) 
 
Creativity: to be able to make something out of nothing. 
 
Creativity is…thinking about things differently, and making them beautiful. 
 
Creativity is having the vision, power, enthusiasm to drive through your ideas in 
any circumstance - being brilliant and new! 
 
Innovative thinking to deliver a vision or strategy in a unique way. 
 
Creativity the process of generation of ideas. 
 
Creativity exploration of novel ways of problem solving. 
 
Creativity…exciting, thought provoking and fun. 
 
Creativity is the ability to adopt an original and engaging approach to any work 
or situation. 
 
Creativity is…letting your mind go wild to explore the possible, the impossible 
and all beyond! 
 
Creativity is…making new stuff. 
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